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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is guided by the overarching question of how people determine when they are 
exhausted or when they have recovered. Taking a motivational approach, it defines 
exhaustion and recovery as motivational states that prompt disengagement from an ongoing 
activity that has begun to net more costs than benefits. To this end, the thesis introduces 
perceived changes in mood, in opportunity costs, and in subjective time perception as 
psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery. Taking a life-span approach, it further 
proposes age-differential effects of opportunity costs and subjective time perception on 
exhaustion and recovery (Part I). These propositions were tested in a set of methodologically 
diverse studies encompassing micro-longitudinal laboratory experiments (Parts II and III), a 
longer-term daily diary study in a naturalistic recovery setting (Part IV), and large online 
surveys that complement the main studies (Parts II, III, and V). Taken together, this thesis 
yielded the following main results: (1) Good mood is positively related to recovery; bad 
mood is positively related to exhaustion. (2) Opportunity costs are unrelated to recovery and 
are positively related to exhaustion. (3) A subjective acceleration of the passage of time is 
unrelated to recovery; a subjective extension of the passage of time is positively related to 
exhaustion. (4) Older adults, as compared to younger adults, report faster initial increases in 
opportunity costs and exhaustion during an exhaustion period. (5) Older adults, as compared 
to younger adults, do not differ in their subjective recovery during a subsequent recovery 
period. The theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of these findings are 
elaborated on in the Overall Discussion. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Menschen erkennen, wann 
sie erschöpft bzw. erholt sind. Dabei werden Erschöpfung und Erholung definiert als 
motivationale Zustände, die die Ablösung von einer Aktivität begünstigen, die begonnen hat, 
mehr Kosten als Nutzen einzubringen. In diesem Rahmen führt die vorliegende Dissertation 
wahrgenommene Veränderungen in der Stimmung, in den Gelegenheitskosten und in der 
subjektiven Zeitwahrnehmung als psychologische Kennzeichen der Erschöpfung und 
Erholung ein. Ferner werden altersunterschiedliche Einflüsse der Gelegenheitskosten und der 
subjektiven Zeitwahrnehmung auf die Erschöpfung und Erholung vorgeschlagen (Teil I). 
Diese Propositionen wurden in einer Reihe von methodologisch diversen Studien getestet, 
bestehend aus mikro-längsschnittlichen Laborexperimenten (Teile II und III), einer länger 
andauernden Tagebuch-Feldstudie in einem natürlichen Erholungsumfeld (Teil IV) und 
umfassenden Online-Studien, die die Hauptstudien ergänzen (Teile II, III und V). 
Zusammenfassend haben sich folgende Hauptresultate ergeben: (1) Gute Stimmung hängt 
positiv mit der Erholung zusammen; schlechte Stimmung hängt positiv mit der Erschöpfung 
zusammen. (2) Gelegenheitskosten hängen nicht mit der Erholung zusammen und hängen 
positiv mit der Erschöpfung zusammen. (3) Eine Beschleunigung des subjektiven 
Zeitempfindens hängt nicht mit der Erholung zusammen; eine Ausdehnung des subjektiven 
Zeitempfindens hängt positiv mit der Erschöpfung zusammen. (4) Ältere Erwachsene, 
verglichen mit jüngeren Erwachsenen, berichten über einen schnelleren anfänglichen Anstieg 
der Gelegenheitskosten und der Erschöpfung in einer Erschöpfungsphase. (5) Ältere 
Erwachsene, verglichen mit jüngeren Erwachsenen, unterscheiden sich nicht in ihrer 
wahrgenommenen Erholung in einer anschliessenden Erholungsphase. Die theoretischen, 
methodologischen und praktischen Implikationen dieser Befunde werden in der 
anschliessenden Diskussion erörtert.  
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INTRODUCTION 
How is it that we can feel tired when we do not appear to have done very much? How is 
it that we appear to be able to recover so quickly under some conditions, but not others? 
What is going on when weariness following a hard day at work can be banished by 
going for a run or a session at the gym? Why do some kinds of activity make us feel 
tired, while others, equally or even more demanding, do not? (Hockey, 2013, p. 1) 
 
In these introductory remarks for his comprehensive monograph on exhaustion, Robert 
Hockey has aptly paved the way for the present thesis. Indeed, the rationale for the present 
thesis was born out of a series of related anecdotal peculiarities: Why is it that, given the 
possibility, we do not engage in recovery activities indefinitely? Why do we sometimes take 
pleasure in exhausting ourselves instead? And most importantly: How do we know when we 
are exhausted or when we have recovered? What is happening when we decide to stop 
browsing the internet and to resume work, or when we seemingly have no other choice but to 
interrupt an ongoing sprint to catch our breaths? In an attempt to answer these questions, the 
present thesis examines psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery (i.e., perceived 
internal changes that are taken as information about one’s current extent of exhaustion or 
recovery and impact one’s decision to disengage from an ongoing activity). 
Before delving into the main theoretical part of this thesis that provides a 
comprehensive conceptualization of exhaustion and recovery and a detailed introduction to 
their proposed psychological indicators, it is necessary to first highlight some general 
challenges pertaining to the study of exhaustion and recovery, and how the present thesis 
addresses them. More specifically, in the following two sections I discuss prominent 
approaches toward measuring and inducing exhaustion and recovery in experimental settings 
and highlight their pertinent limitations. Based on these considerations, I then make the case 
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for taking a psychological approach to exhaustion and recovery and for inducing exhaustion 
and the need for recovery through effortful physical exercise.  
Challenges in the Measurement of Exhaustion and Recovery 
How to best measure exhaustion and recovery in experimental settings? A long-
standing research tradition has focused on decrements in task performance (e.g., decreasing 
accuracy and increasing reaction time) as a characteristic and observable expression of 
exhaustion (Ackerman, 2011; Bartley & Chute, 1947; Boksem & Tops, 2008; Hockey, 2013; 
Thorndike, 1914). The central assumption underlying this approach is that as time-on-task 
increases, so does exhaustion, which in turn reduces participants’ ability to maintain the level 
of performance required to succeed at the task. Indeed, a particularly influential application 
of this approach – the sequential-task paradigm – has been used to validate classical work 
related to exhaustion and recovery, such as the strength model of self-control (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000) and attention restoration theory (Kaplan, 1995). 
This approach is problematic for at least two reasons. First, task performance is 
strongly linked to motivation, such that participants are more likely to spend effort and 
perform well on a demanding task when they perceive a sufficiently high likelihood of 
succeeding as well as sufficiently high intrinsic and/or extrinsic incentives (Brehm & Self, 
1989; Richter, Gendolla, & Wright, 2016). Experimental settings that do not clearly 
disentangle the processes underlying changes in task performance cannot, therefore, make 
strong inferences as to why performance declines or increases in the first place (Muscio, 
1921; Navon, 1984). Second, there is well-documented variability in the direction of change 
in task performance in the presence of subjective exhaustion, with some studies reporting 
stability or even an increase in performance in exhausted participants (Ackerman, 2011; 
Ackerman & Kanfer, 2009; van Cutsem et al., 2017). It seems that exhausted participants can 
still be motivated to exert compensatory effort on a demanding task in an attempt to maintain 
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high levels of performance. Based on these considerations, task performance seems ill-suited 
as a “be-all and end-all” proxy variable for exhaustion and recovery.  
Should experimental settings instead rely on other objective markers of exhaustion and 
recovery, such as physiological correlates? On the one hand, a considerable amount of 
research has linked changes in physiological indicators such as heart rate variability (Luft, 
Takase, & Darby, 2009; Segerstrom & Nes, 2007), body temperature (Nybo, 2008), oxygen 
uptake (Ament & Verkerke, 2009), oxidative stress (Finaud, Lac, & Filaire, 2006), and blood 
lactate concentration (Jacobs, 1986) to exhaustion and recovery periods. On the other hand, 
“it is not possible to measure more easily observable aspects of emotion (e.g., facial 
movements, vocal acoustics, voluntary behaviors, peripheral physiology [emphasis added]) to 
learn something about its subjective aspect” (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007, p. 
376). Indeed, studies have shown that changes in peripheral physiology during exhaustion 
and recovery periods are unrelated to the accompanying subjective experience (Bartley & 
Chute, 1947; Marcora, 2009; Marcora, Staiano, & Manning, 2009; Smirmaul, 2012; van 
Cutsem et al., 2017; but see Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). For 
instance, in his literature review on the relation between physiology and subjective effort, 
Marcora (2009, p. 2061) concluded that, “although essential for a variety of other 
physiological and perceptual processes such as cardiorespiratory regulation and sense of 
position and movement, afferent feedback from skeletal muscles, heart, and lungs does not 
contribute significantly to perception of effort during exercise.” Taken together, this research 
suggests that there is no clear relationship between peripheral physiology and subjective 
experiences related to exhaustion and recovery. 
Absent more compelling and valid behavioral and objective measures, it seems 
reasonable to take a psychological perspective on exhaustion and recovery. Speaking for the 
psychological perspective, Staiano, Bosio, de Morree, Rampinini, and Marcora (2018) 
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demonstrated in two experiments that perception of effort, rather than muscle fatigue or 
muscle pain, was the best predictor of exhaustion-related exercise termination during high-
intensity aerobic exercise. Furthermore, Giles et al. (2018) found that the way people regulate 
their emotions during physical exercise impacts how effortful they perceive the activity to be. 
In a more general sense, Knecht and Freund (2015) found that people categorize everyday 
life activities involving physical effort as exhausting and relaxing similarly often. This 
finding is corroborated in a study by Rook and Zijlstra (2006), who found that some people 
perceive physical activity as a remedy from stressful work demands. Taken together, this 
research suggests that what determines an activity as exhausting or relaxing is not primarily 
determined by its objective properties but rather by how a person perceives it. Thus, taking a 
psychological perspective on exhaustion and recovery (i.e., assessment through self-report) 
provides a valid method to studying the subjective experience underlying these constructs.  
Challenges in the Induction of Exhaustion and Recovery 
Having established a reasonable approach toward measuring exhaustion and recovery, 
the question arises: How to best induce these states in experimental settings? Perhaps the 
most common way of inducing exhaustion in the lab is to have participants solve a series of 
repetitive and/or mentally demanding tasks for a prolonged period of time (for a detailed 
overview, see Ackerman, 2011). As such, a considerable amount of research has focused on 
tasks targeting different facets of executive functioning, such as attentional vigilance (e.g., 
monitoring displays for low frequency targets in high frequency noise; Boksem, Meijman, & 
Lorist, 2005; Gunzelmann, Moore, Gluck, Van Dongen, & Dinges, 2011), working memory 
(e.g., deciding whether each stimulus in a sequence matches the one that appeared a specified 
number of items ago; Hopstaken, van der Linden, Bakker, & Kompier, 2015; Owen, 
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005), and inhibition (e.g., identifying the print color of a 
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target color word that spells a different color; Pageaux, Marcora, Rozand, & Lepers, 2015; 
Wright, Stewart, & Barnett, 2008).  
These approaches are problematic for at least three reasons. First, the mental tasks are 
typically administered for two to five hours without rest to produce task performance 
decrements and induce subjective exhaustion (e.g., Ackerman & Kanfer, 2009; Gergelyfi, 
Jacob, Olivier, & Zénon, 2015). Such a time-intensive procedure drastically reduces the test 
efficiency of these tasks and increases respondent burden, which might in turn lead to 
underpowered study designs due to insufficient sample sizes (e.g., Boksem, Meijman, & 
Lorist, 2006). Second, with increasing time-on-task it becomes more difficult to distinguish 
exhaustion from various other negative affective experiences, such as boredom and 
frustration (Milyavskaya, Inzlicht, Johnson, & Larson, 2019; Pattyn, Neyt, Henderickx, & 
Soetens, 2008). Third, the accumulated subjective exhaustion during a mentally demanding 
task might not transfer to subsequent tasks (Hagger et al., 2016; Hopstaken et al., 2015), thus 
making it difficult to study the temporal dynamics of recovery from exhaustion.  
A potential solution consists of having participants engage in effortful physical activity 
instead. As mentioned previously, the subjective sense of effort during physical exercise has 
been singled out as the best predictor of exhaustion-related disengagement from exercise 
(Marcora et al., 2009; Staiano et al., 2018). Furthermore, engaging in physical activity can 
become taxing very quickly, depending on the extent of exertion. For instance, running up 
and down the stairs of a 5-floor building as quickly as possible is likely to result in a 
pronounced state of exhaustion in a matter of minutes. Finally, physical exertion necessitates 
a subsequent recovery period due to biological constraints (Kellmann, 2002) – a notion that 
does not seem to apply to short-term mental exertion (Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). 
For these reasons, the present thesis employs demanding physical activity as a means to 
induce exhaustion and establish a subsequent need for recovery.  
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The Current Work 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to theoretically introduce (Part I) and empirically 
examine (Parts II-V) the role of perceived opportunity costs (i.e., the experienced costs of 
forgoing the next-best alternative activity compared to the benefits of staying engaged in the 
focal activity; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013), mood, and subjective time 
perception as psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery under the lens of a 
dynamical and motivational life-span perspective. In doing so, the present thesis answers the 
call to shed light “on the dynamics of recovery from fatigue” (Hockey, 2013, p. 205) and on 
how “the effectiveness of specific recovery activities or experiences change[s] with age” 
(Sonnentag, Venz, & Casper, 2017, p. 373). In this section, I briefly highlight the conceptual 
and methodological advances put forward by the present thesis before giving an overview of 
the main theoretical and empirical parts that are to follow.  
Conceptually, the current thesis advances previous work in four important ways. First, 
it proposes a unifying account of exhaustion and recovery that jointly integrates both 
constructs and illuminates their experiential components and short-term motivational 
consequences (Evans, Boggero, & Segerstrom, 2016). Second, it describes a potential 
metacognitive mechanism that might explain when people begin to feel exhausted or 
recovered through the weighing of subjective costs and benefits of the current environment 
(Hockey, 2013; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Third, it 
emphasizes the dynamic nature of exhaustion and recovery and their psychological indicators 
during an ongoing activity, thereby moving beyond restrictive pre-post designs (Ackerman, 
2011). Fourth, it generates and tests hypotheses about age-differential effects of exhaustion, 
recovery, and their psychological indicators – an as yet neglected research avenue (Sonnentag 
et al., 2017).  
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Methodologically, the current thesis advances previous work by focusing its scope of 
analysis on the estimation of interindividual differences in intraindividual variability 
(Molenaar & Campbell, 2009; Nesselroade, 1991; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004; Röcke & 
Brose, 2013). As such, a central methodological focus of this thesis lies on univariate and 
multivariate multilevel growth curve modeling (Bliese, 2000; McArdle & Nesselroade, 
2003), using both frequentist and Bayesian inference (Bürkner, 2017). More specifically, the 
focus of analysis lies on the estimation of cross-level main effects and interactions (Mathieu, 
Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012) and correlated within-person change between two 
variables over time (Hertzog, Lindenberger, Ghisletta, & von Oertzen, 2006; MacCallum, 
Kim, Malarkey, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997). Taking such a dynamic approach allows for a more 
fine-grained examination of the temporal patterns of exhaustion, recovery, and their proposed 
indicators, both at the within- and between-person level.  
Part I: When the Fun is Over: Toward a Motivational Account of Exhaustion and 
Recovery 
Part I provides a comprehensive theoretical introduction to the research reported in this 
thesis. Here, we tackle the challenging task (cf. Bartley & Chute, 1947; Hockey, 2013) of 
properly defining the concepts of exhaustion and recovery by integrating different strands of 
literature and distinguishing both concepts from similar constructs, such as boredom, interest, 
and mood. Furthermore, we review past theoretical and empirical research on influential 
limited resource models of exhaustion and recovery (Ryan & Deci, 2008; Kaplan, 1995; 
Kaplan & Berman, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) and point out their conceptual 
(Navon, 1984), methodological (Friese, Loschelder, Gieseler, Frankenbach, & Inzlicht, 2018; 
Wright, Mlynski, & Carbajal, 2019), and empirical (Carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 
2015) limitations. As a result, we align ourselves with research advocating for taking a 
motivational approach to understanding exhaustion and recovery (Hockey, 2013; Inzlicht et 
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al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Building on this motivational 
framework, we introduce the notion of perceived opportunity costs (Kurzban et al., 2013), 
mood (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007), and subjective time perception (Zakay, 2014) as 
psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery. Next, we integrate this theoretical 
background into a novel motivational account of exhaustion and recovery. In short, we 
propose that perceiving an increase in opportunity costs, a decline in positive mood, and an 
extension of the felt pace of time is taken as an indication that one is exhausted or has 
recovered, depending on the motivational context, and should therefore disengage from the 
focal activity. Lastly, we review literature on age-related differences in the role of 
opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception for exhaustion and recovery.  
Part II: The Role of Mood and Opportunity Costs for Subjective Recovery 
Part II presents four methodologically diverse studies testing the hypothesis that 
perceived opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception are related to subjective 
recovery from exhaustion. Study 1 is a large online study that examines people’s lay beliefs 
about what thoughts, feelings, and behaviors indicate to them exhaustion and recovery in 
their everyday lives using a content analysis approach. Studies 2-4 are laboratory experiments 
with the aim to induce a state of exhaustion through demanding physical activity (Study 2: 
20-minute high-intensity interval training; Studies 3 and 4: 5-minute stair running). In these 
studies, the focus of analysis lies mostly on the subsequent relaxing activity (watching a 25-
minute excerpt of an aquatic documentary), where we investigate the correlated change in 
perceived opportunity costs, mood, as well as subjective time perception and subjective 
recovery using a micro-longitudinal design (Studies 2 and 3: 10 measurement occasions; 
Study 4: eight measurement occasions). Furthermore, Studies 3 and 4 develop a between-
person manipulation of perceived opportunity costs and test its effect on the subjective speed 
of recovery during the relaxing activity.  
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Part III: More or Less Energy with Age? A Motivational Life-Span Perspective on 
Energy, Exhaustion, and Opportunity Costs 
Part III takes a lifespan-developmental approach to exhaustion and recovery. Study 1 is 
a comprehensive online study that investigates people’s lay beliefs about the limitedness of 
their energy as a means for goal pursuit, the availability of energy for goal pursuits related to 
different functional domains (i.e., physical, mental, social, emotional), as well as within- and 
cross-domain energy spillover effects (e.g., the extent to which spending energy on a 
demanding physical activity affects one’s perceived available energy for mental activities). 
Study 2 aims to replicate part of the findings and extend the methodology of Part II by 
investigating (1) between- and within-person variability in subjective exhaustion and 
recovery, perceived opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception during both a 
demanding physical activity (20-minute high-intensity interval training; 11 measurement 
occasions) and a subsequent relaxing activity (20-minute mindfulness-based relaxation video; 
10 measurement occasions), and (2) age-related differences in this within-person variability.  
Part IV: How to Recharge During a Vacation: The Role of Daily Mood and 
Opportunity Costs for Recovery 
Part IV complements Parts II and III by examining the role of perceived opportunity 
costs, mood, and subjective time perception for recovery from exhaustion on a different time 
scale: the day level. Using a daily diary design over 21 consecutive days in a naturalistic 
recovery setting (i.e., student’s summer break from a demanding exam period), here we 
investigate the predictive validity of within- and between-person variability in daily 
opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception for explaining variability in daily 
recovery, over and above well-established factors contributing to daily recovery (i.e., daily 
psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control; Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007).  
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Part V: Development and Initial Validation of a General Exhaustion and Recovery 
Scale 
Part V chronicles the development and initial validation of a scale that measures 
exhaustion and recovery as separate factors and can be applied at the trait and state level. 
Study 1 summarizes the item generation process. Study 2 examines the factorial structure of 
the selected exhaustion and recovery items using exploratory factor analysis. Study 3 cross-
validates the factorial structure of the scale using confirmatory factor analysis on a new data 
set. Finally, Study 4 investigates the sensitivity of the scale in detecting changes in state 
exhaustion and recovery following a series of effortful mental tasks, as well as the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the scale. Notably, Study 4 also includes a between-person 
manipulation of retrospective time perception following the mentally demanding tasks and 
examines its effect on exhaustion and recovery.  
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Abstract 
How do we know when an activity has exhausted us or helped us recover? In this paper, we 
present a motivational approach to exhaustion and recovery that takes into account the 
multidimensional nature of the constructs. The account details three psychological processes 
that may – individually and in interaction – underlie exhaustion and recovery. Specifically, 
we propose that changes in mood, subjective time perception, and opportunity costs 
experienced during an ongoing effortful or relaxing activity indicate a person’s momentary 
degree of exhaustion and recovery and impact the decision of whether the person should 
continue or disengage from the activity at hand. Addressing developmental changes across 
adulthood, we present two opposing hypotheses on how younger and older adults may differ 
in their experiences of exhaustion and recovery: (i) Older adults may experience an 
accelerated subjective time perception compared to younger adults, and may thus feel less 
exhausted (more recovered) than younger adults after spending an identical amount of time 
engaged in an effortful (relaxing) activity. (ii) Older adults may be more sensitive towards 
increasing opportunity costs experienced during an effortful or relaxing activity and may 
therefore feel exhausted or recovered faster than younger adults.   
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Introduction 
Picture the following scenario: Tom has been working hard on digging up the garden 
for quite some time and wants to proceed for as long as he can. Thirty minutes later, he has to 
call it quits: Tom is in a bad mood, time seems to drag, and thoughts on all the things he 
would rather do instead become more and more intrusive. Thus, Tom decides to watch some 
episodes of his favorite TV show. For quite some time, he greatly enjoys watching the show. 
Tom’s mood gets better. He sporadically checks his watch and is surprised to see how 
quickly time has passed. Two and a half episodes later, however, Tom’s mood starts to 
worsen and his enjoyment to wane. He checks his watch more frequently now, wondering 
why these latest scenes seem so boring. Shortly thereafter, Tom turns off the show and 
resumes digging up the garden. 
How did Tom know when it was time for him to disengage from garden work or 
watching TV? More specifically, what psychological processes might have indicated to Tom 
that he was exhausted and sufficiently recovered? This is the central topic of this paper. 
Drawing on the affect-as-information approach (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Clore, Wyer, 
Dienes, Gasper, & Isbell, 2001), the literature on subjective time perception (Wearden, 2015; 
Zakay, 2014), and opportunity cost models of subjective effort (Hennecke & Freund, 2013; 
Kurzban et al., 2013), we propose that changes in mood, subjective time perception, and 
opportunity costs experienced during an effortful or relaxing activity indicate to a person that 
the currently pursued activity has fulfilled its recovery function or has become too exhausting 
to continue.  
Using the scenario of Tom, we posit that with increasing exhaustion stemming from 
the garden work, Tom’s mood worsens, he perceives time as passing more slowly, and 
opportunity costs as increasing. In contrast, the recovery induced by watching TV should 
gradually restore Tom’s mood, accelerate his subjective time perception, and should not 
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evoke any opportunity costs for as long as the experience is helping Tom unwind. However, 
once Tom has sufficiently recovered, we maintain that these psychological processes start to 
change again; that is, his mood should begin to decline, time perception to extend, and 
opportunity costs to become salient. In our approach, these internal changes are adaptive 
responses indicating to Tom that it is time to disengage from the current activity and do 
something else instead, to avoid remaining engaged in an activity that does no longer yield 
positive results, such as becoming ineffective in digging up the garden or wasting valuable 
time by watching too much TV. 
The aim of this paper is to introduce a motivational and functional approach to 
exhaustion and recovery as signaling goal disengagement. Despite the ubiquity of 
experiencing exhaustion and recovery, only little is known about the psychological indicators 
that inform us when an activity has exhausted or recovered us. For instance, given the 
opportunity, why do we not engage in pleasant and relaxing activities indefinitely? What 
prevents us from investing resources such as time or effort into an activity that is – 
temporarily – no longer contributing significantly to further goal achievement? We posit that 
exhaustion signals that the “return of investments” has fallen under that of the next best 
alternative. Similarly, feeling sufficiently recovered signals, in our view, that time and effort 
are better spent on another activity.  
In this paper, we first review and discuss the extant literature on exhaustion and 
recovery. Then, we conceptualize opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception as 
psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery. Next, we integrate the theoretical 
background presented in this paper into a functional and motivational account of exhaustion 
and recovery. Lastly, we discuss how exhaustion and recovery and their indicators may 
change across adulthood.  
 
Part I 
 
15 
 
Conceptualizing Exhaustion and Recovery 
Exhaustion 
Psychologists often use the term exhaustion interchangeably with fatigue (e.g., Féry, 
Ferry, Vom Hofe, & Rieu, 1997), referring to a multidimensional construct comprising 
physical, cognitive, and emotional components (e.g., Maslach & Jackson, 1981). For 
example, Smets, Garssen, Bonke, and De Haes (1995, p. 315) define exhaustion as “a normal, 
everyday experience that most individuals report after inadequate sleep or rest, or after 
exertion of physical power,” adding that cognitive effort can also contribute to exhaustion. 
More often, researchers conceptualize exhaustion with regard to a specific functional domain. 
For example, Boksem and Tops (2008) define cognitive exhaustion as the feeling during or 
after a prolonged period of cognitive activity encompassing tiredness, an aversion to continue 
the current activity, and a decrease in commitment to the activity at hand. Wright and 
Cropanzano (1997, p. 486) conceptualize emotional exhaustion as “a chronic state of physical 
and emotional depletion that results from excessive job demands and continuous hassles.” 
Interestingly, this latter definition of emotional exhaustion also includes physical depletion. 
This implies that the different functional domains in which exhaustion occurs may be closely 
related. Note also, that Wright and Cropanzano view emotional exhaustion as a consequence 
of work demands rather than of an emotionally demanding event (e.g., an argument with a 
close friend), further suggesting that the functional domains might be interrelated. This raises 
the question of how effortful or relaxing activities in one functional domain (e.g., physical 
exercise) affect the state of recovery or exhaustion in a different functional domain (e.g., 
cognition, motivation). There is some evidence about cross-domain influences: Marcora et al. 
(2009) have shown that cognitive exhaustion can have a negative impact on subsequent 
physical performance. Conversely, Brisswalter, Collardeau, and René (2002) demonstrated 
that physical exercise can prove beneficial for subsequent cognitive performance. 
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Taken together, exhaustion seems to be associated with changes in physical (e.g., 
increased tiredness and low energy), cognitive (e.g., increased aversion to the current 
activity), emotional (e.g., negative mood), but also motivational (e.g., reduced commitment to 
the activity at hand) and behavioral (e.g., reduced activity performance) processes. Some of 
these characteristics also pertain to the phenomenon of boredom. Bored people also perceive 
their current activities as unpleasant and uninteresting, and show an increased motivation to 
disengage from them (van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). To distinguish boredom from other 
negative states including exhaustion, van Tilburg and Igou (2012) have argued that boredom 
is associated with feeling unchallenged by the current situation and perceiving current 
activities as meaningless. Thus, in their view, the dimensions “challenge” and “meaning” 
distinguish the state of boredom from exhaustion. However, recent research has shown that, 
similar to exhaustion, boredom can also result from feeling over-challenged, when such a 
state leads to problems in maintaining attention (Milyavskaya et al., 2019; Raffaelli, Mills, & 
Christoff, 2017). Thus, we argue that it is primarily the “meaning” dimension that 
distinguishes boredom from exhaustion (van Tilburg & Igou, 2017). What makes an activity 
meaningful is determined by the interaction of the value of the outcome of the activity and 
the instrumentality of the activity to achieve it (van Tilburg & Igou, 2013). Thus, when an 
activity (e.g., reading a theoretical paper) is perceived as effortful yet not instrumental (e.g., 
the paper is deemed uninformative) to the associated outcome (e.g., gaining more insight into 
a particular branch of psychological research), that, in addition, is of little personal value, 
then this activity is more likely to induce boredom rather than exhaustion. 
Recovery 
The concept of recovery has been examined from various angles in different fields of 
psychology. Even within one research area, the term is often only vaguely defined and may 
refer to different aspects of recovery. For instance, clinical psychologists define recovery 
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very broadly as a process of changing from displaying abnormal patterns of behavior to 
showing more normalized patterns of behavior (e.g., Leamy, Bird, Le Boutillier, Williams, & 
Slade, 2011). Sports psychologists refer to recovery as the resting and relaxation period that 
is preceded by an interval of physical effort (e.g., Kellmann, 2002). Environmental 
psychologists use the terms restoration and recovery interchangeably and emphasize the role 
of natural environments for recovery (Kaplan, 1995). Occupational health psychologists see 
recovery as a dynamic process that restores a person’s energetic and cognitive resources 
following stressful work demands (Zijlstra, Cropley, & Rydstedt, 2014).  
Before providing our own definition of recovery, it is important to conceptually 
distinguish recovery from other positive affective states such as relaxation, interest, relief, 
and happiness. First, relaxation mainly refers to the down-regulation of physiological arousal 
(Benson, 1975) that can be achieved by various techniques such as mindfulness (Brown, 
Ryan, & Creswell, 2007) and progressive muscle relaxation (Esch, Fricchione, & Stefano, 
2003). By this definition, achieving relaxation precludes engaging in any form of physical 
activity. In contrast, research has shown that physical activity can lead to states of recovery 
(e.g., Sonnentag & Zijlstra, 2006). Thus, we posit that relaxation is a sufficient, but not a 
necessary condition for recovery. Second, interest is a narrow construct that emerges when an 
activity or event is perceived as new, complex, unexpected, and comprehensible (Silvia, 
2008). In comparison, recovering activities need not necessarily fulfill these criteria. For 
instance, listening to music is a pleasant and relaxing activity (e.g., Thayer, Newman, & 
McClain, 1994) and often encompasses listening to one’s favorite songs that are well known 
(and hence do no longer offer surprises). Third, relief is “an emotion that is experienced in 
situations in which (a) the actual outcome of a course of action is positive or neutral and (b) a 
possible alternative decision would have resulted in a more negative outcome (Guttentag & 
Ferrell, 2004, p. 764). In order to experience relief, a person needs to actively compare the 
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actual with a potential negative outcome, and this comparison needs to favor the actual 
outcome. There is no reason to assume that recovery involves such a comparison that requires 
the representation of a counterfactual negative state. Fourth, happiness is a broad construct 
encompassing affective (i.e., positively valenced moods and emotions) and cognitive (i.e., 
life satisfaction) components (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Based on this definition, 
distinguishing happiness from recovery is difficult, especially when considering that some 
researchers view recovery as a process of “mood repair” (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007). 
However, as we will elaborate in the following sections, we posit that happiness or positive 
mood is positively related to recovery only as long as a person has not achieved the goal of 
recovery. Once a person has achieved the goal of recovery, we propose that this person will 
start to feel less happy, indicating that the current activity should be discontinued. Thus, for 
reasons that will be outlined in the following sections, we maintain that recovery and 
happiness can be distinguished based on their differential time courses unfolding during the 
engagement in a relaxing activity.  
Are Exhaustion and Recovery Emotions? 
In much of the literature, emotions are defined as short, intensive states encompassing 
physiological, cognitive, and experiential processes that are aroused by specific events, 
objects, or people (e.g., anger, surprise) and elicit certain action tendencies (Russell, 2003). In 
contrast, moods are less specific states that vary along the dimension of valence (good – bad), 
are of longer duration, are not bound to a specific event, object, or people, and are not related 
to strong action tendencies but rather “color” our experiences, cognition, and behavior (e.g., 
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner, & Reynolds, 1996). According to 
this definition, recovery and exhaustion are moods rather than emotions. 
According to psychological construction theories of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2014), 
emotions are constructed events, not fixed, essential entities. When constructing an emotion, 
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the brain combines multimodal sensory input (from the body and from the environment) with 
experience-based knowledge about emotions. As will be elaborated in detail below, we 
propose three psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery – perceived changes in (i) 
opportunity costs, (ii) mood, and (iii) time perception during an effortful or relaxing activity. 
These indicators could be conceptualized as sensory inputs that convey information about the 
goodness or badness of an object (e.g., the current activity). In this view, exhaustion and 
recovery might qualify as emotional states.  
However, based on the taxonomy of the affective lexicon proposed by Ortony, Clore, 
and Foss (1987), exhaustion and recovery do not seem like good candidates for emotions. 
Rather, the authors argue that “words such as ‘exhausted,’ ‘sleepy,’ and ‘thirsty’ refer more 
directly to Physical and Bodily states” (p. 351). The authors also note that such physical 
states can be accompanied by psychological aspects, such as changes in motivation or 
cognition, but they are not emotions.  
 Following the perspective of Ortony et al. (1987), we do not conceptualize exhaustion 
and recovery as emotions. First, we do not find it likely that exhaustion and recovery are 
always associated with a specific object. For instance, a person who feels exhausted at the 
end of a long day likely attributes his or her exhaustion to a number of events (e.g., work, 
time spent awake, physical activity, emotional arguments). Second, exhaustion and recovery 
can unfold over a longer period of time compared to specific emotional states such as fear or 
anger. Third, studies have found that the physiological responses that had been thought to be 
associated with exhaustion and recovery (e.g., heart rate variability) are actually unrelated to 
the phenomenology underlying the constructs (Marcora, 2009; Smirmaul, 2012). Taken 
together, exhaustion and recovery do not meet the commonly employed criteria for emotions. 
Instead, we conceptualize exhaustion and recovery as mainly motivational states that both 
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prompt goal disengagement. We will build towards this conceptualization in the following 
sections. 
Clarifying the Notion of Resources 
The literature often refers to the depletion and restoration of resources as an important 
part of the exhaustion and recovery process (Zijlstra et al., 2014). However, researchers often 
fail to provide a definition of resources and their role for exhaustion and recovery. According 
to an influential definition by Hobfoll (2001), resources constitute a broad range of valued 
objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies if they help people in achieving 
desired outcomes. The list of resources outlined by Hobfoll includes positive emotional 
states, social status, or intelligence. Although these states are often related to better outcomes 
in a variety of situations, they seem to be generally desirable states rather than goal-relevant 
means that are invested into goal pursuit (Freund & Riediger, 2001). Navon (1984) would 
call such states “alterants,” which he contrasts with “commodities” that denote means that 
can be spent only once at any given point in time (e.g., money, time, effort). Distinguishing 
between alterants and commodities is particularly useful in the context of recovery and 
exhaustion because it distinguishes limited resources for goal pursuit (e.g., time, money, 
energy) and characteristics that may influence how these limited resources are used (e.g., 
moods, emotions, cognitions). In this perspective, recovery and exhaustion might affect both 
the subjective availability of limited resources, as well as the way we use them. 
 What is the role of resources for exhaustion and recovery? Do limited resources 
simply get “used up” when we engage in an exhausting activity and replenish when we 
recover (“my batteries are drained and need to recharge”)? Alternatively, exhaustion and 
recovery may be mainly motivational constructs and influence how we make use of limited 
resources. To approach this question, we must first understand what it means to be exhausted, 
the state that recovery aims to remedy. In the following two sections we provide an overview 
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of the two most prominent theoretical approaches to exhaustion, limited resource models and 
cost-benefit models of exhaustion, and how they conceptualize the recovery process. We 
conclude these sections with the formulation of our own conceptualization of exhaustion and 
recovery. 
Resource Depletion Models of Exhaustion 
Why do effortful tasks seem to sometimes result in subsequent performance reductions 
and experiences of exhaustion? Limited resource models (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Kaplan, 1995, 2001) state that voluntary and effortful cognitive 
activity, such as self-control or directed attention, depends on one or more depletable 
resources. According to these models, performance reductions and feelings of exhaustion are 
the direct result of resource depletion, and recovery denotes the process of restoring these 
depleted resources.  
One influential limited resource model is the strength model of self-control (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The model 
maintains that all acts of self-control draw from a common and limited energy resource. Self-
control describes a person’s capacity to resist impulses and temptations, and suppress the 
dominant response in a specific situation (Baumeister et al., 1998). The model predicts that 
exerting self-regulatory effort on a task drains this limited energy resource and leads to a state 
of self-regulatory failure, the so-called “ego depletion” effect. In this state, persons are likely 
to show reduced performance on a subsequent self-regulatory task (for a meta-analysis, see 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). However, in recent years researchers have 
started to criticize the strength model of self-control (e.g., Carter & McCullough, 2013; Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010). If a task involving self-regulation depletes some limited resource 
needed to succeed in that task, how can incentives (e.g., Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Capa, 
Bouquet, Dreher, & Dufour, 2013), positive affect (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 
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2007) or interest (Thoman, Smith, & Silvia, 2011) counteract performance reductions in a 
subsequent self-regulation task? In fact, two recent meta-analyses have found that when 
publication bias is accounted for, the ego depletion effect may be no different than zero 
(Carter et al., 2015; Carter & McCullough, 2014). In addition, a recent pre-registered project 
encompassing 23 laboratories around the world failed to replicate the ego depletion effect 
(Hagger et al., 2016).  
Another limited resource model is Kaplan’s (1995, 2001) attention restoration theory. 
This model assumes that directed attention (i.e., a voluntary and effortful cognitive activity) 
is a limited resource and its depletion leaves a person cognitively exhausted. According to the 
theory, directed attention resources are best replenished when they are allowed to rest. Thus, 
the theory predicts that environments invoking the use of involuntary attention (i.e., an 
effortless activity) are best suited to replenish one’s directed attention resources. Kaplan and 
Berman (2010) have proposed directed attention as the central depletable resource underlying 
all forms of self-regulation, information processing and executive functioning. However, 
while there is empirical evidence that people fare better on cognitive tasks after spending 
time in natural compared to urban environments (e.g., Kaplan & Berman, 2010), the 
conclusion that this performance-enhancing effect is due to a central resource having 
replenished more efficiently in natural than in urban environments is highly speculative: 
These studies do not demonstrate the existence of such a resource, let alone its depletion or 
restoration. Instead, researchers infer from task performance that the underlying cognitive 
system of interest behaves “as if” it were constrained by a limited resource. Navon (1984), 
writing about limited resource models in general, made a convincing argument that,  
The frequent cases in which the predictions do not bear out are dismissed by resorting 
to built-in escapes in the theory, such as, data limits, operation below full capacity, 
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disparate resource composition, and so forth. This is probably the source of the self-
reinforcing nature of the concept and the unfalsifiable status of the theory. (p. 231) 
Taken together, limited resource models provide a relatively simple and intuitive 
framework of exhaustion and recovery as resource depletion and restoration processes. 
However, research has yet to provide convincing evidence that self-regulatory or attentional 
resources can be depleted and restored by providing quantifiable measures of these resources 
(instead of indirectly inferring them from performance measures that can be influenced by 
many factors other than resources).  
Cost-Benefit Models of Exhaustion 
Cost-benefit models of exhaustion assume that motivation plays a central role in 
determining a person’s task performance and subjective feelings of exhaustion. These models 
posit that exhaustion primarily affects the way we allocate limited resources to the pursuit of 
multiple goals. Proponents of such models conceptualize exhaustion as an adaptive feeling 
that serves to maintain an effective overall management of one’s goals (e.g., Boksem & Tops, 
2008; Hockey, 2011; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014). For instance, Inzlicht et 
al. (2014) argue that feelings of exhaustion after a self-regulation task in an experiment serve 
to uphold “the motivational balance between maintaining cognitive effort on externally 
rewarded ‘have-to’ goals versus switching to more ‘want-to’ goals that act as form of 
cognitive leisure” (p. 129). This implies that competing goals are regularly compared in terms 
of their perceived costs and benefits. Indeed, Boksem and Tops (2008) propose that “when 
the perceived energetical costs of task performance come to exceed the motivation to obtain 
reward or avoid punishment, the present activities may be abandoned, and perhaps a 
potentially more rewarding activity will be engaged in” (p. 135), noting that the feeling of 
exhaustion corresponds to the tendency to abandon the current activity. The commonality 
between these models, then, is that they conceptualize exhaustion as an adaptive response to a 
Part I 
 
24 
 
perceived unfavorable cost-benefit ratio of the current activity (i.e., the activity nets more 
costs than benefits) that serves to drive behavior towards more beneficial activities.  
Building on previous cost-benefit models, Kurzban et al. (2013) argue that the 
performance in effortful tasks is the direct result of computations of the focal tasks’ costs 
relative to the benefits of other tasks that could be done instead. They describe subjective 
effort (and by extension, exhaustion) as the conscious, experienced measurement of the costs 
of continuing an activity. Thus, feelings of exhaustion should increase as the costs of the 
current task and the benefits of other tasks increase. However, is it reasonable to assume that 
competing goals are always considered in such cost-benefit computations? What about a 
scenario where one would rather do anything else other than continue with an effortful 
activity? In an attempt to close this gap, Hennecke and Freund (2013) propose that 
exhaustion arises from the perceived costs as well as the amount of resources invested in a 
task relative to the overall amount of available resources. In their view, exhaustion emerges 
from cost computations related to the currently pursued goal (i.e., how much have I already 
invested into this goal and how much do I still have to invest towards the desired end?). This 
conceptualization does not require a comparison with another goal and relates the feeling of 
exhaustion mainly to the means of goal pursuit (i.e., the amount of resources one has at one’s 
disposal to attain a certain outcome). As of yet, however, it is unclear if opportunity costs 
drive exhaustion by making salient how the goal-relevant means could be spent instead or if 
focusing mainly on the resources spent on the goal at hand is more strongly associated with 
exhaustion.  
Taking a Functional Approach to Exhaustion and Recovery 
Following Hennecke and Freund’s (2013) proposition, we define exhaustion as an 
adaptive motivational response arising from (non-conscious) computations regarding the 
means or resources one has available to pursue a given goal. According to this 
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conceptualization, exhaustion signals to a person to disengage from an activity that might be 
better invested into alternative goals. In this perspective, the primary function of exhaustion 
is to help maintain an effective overall management of a person’s multiple goals. The 
function of recovery lies in reducing or removing the feeling of exhaustion and its associated 
physical, cognitive, emotional, motivational, and behavioral responses so as to reinvigorate a 
person for the pursuit of more attractive goals. Accordingly, recovery can occur in different 
functional domains (e.g., physical, cognitive, emotional), depending on what kind of domains 
are affected by exhaustion.  
If exhaustion serves to guide us away from further pursuing a goal with a currently 
unfavorable cost-benefit ratio towards a goal with a favorable cost-benefit ratio, people 
should start to recover when they cease the pursuit of a goal or activity with an unfavorable 
cost-benefit ratio. In line with this assumption, Meijman and Mulder (1998) argue that 
persons can only begin to recover in one functional domain once they cease all activities that 
contribute to the exhaustion associated with activities in that domain. For instance, a person 
likely recovers more efficiently from one-hour of running by avoiding rather than further 
engaging in physical effort. This does not mean, however, that persons should avoid any kind 
of effort following exhaustion in order to recover. For instance, physical effort may help to 
recover from cognitive effort. In fact, physical effort can enhance performance on a 
subsequent cognitive task (e.g., Brisswalter et al., 2002). 
Psychological Indicators of Exhaustion and Recovery  
 How do we know when an activity has helped us to recover or has exhausted us? 
What processes might indicate the increasing costs of staying engaged in an activity whose 
purpose has already been fulfilled (recovery) or that has become too costly to be continued 
(exhaustion)? As outlined at the outset of this article, we propose three distinct yet 
interrelated psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery, namely (1) perceived 
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opportunity costs, (2) mood, and (3) subjective time perception. In the following, we discuss 
how these processes might relate to exhaustion and recovery.  
Opportunity Costs 
Everything we do carries an opportunity cost – that is, the value of the next-best 
alternative to the current activity. This notion goes back to the problem of simultaneity (i.e., 
not everything can be done at once) and its solution, prioritization (i.e., choosing one option 
at the expense of others; Kurzban et al., 2013). On a behavioral level, this means that we 
cannot pursue every goal we hold simultaneously; rather, we must always choose to pursue 
some goals over others at any given point in our lives. Successfully managing such conflicts 
in personal goals is beneficial for one’s subjective well-being (Riediger & Freund, 2004). The 
same principle holds true for everyday life activities. For instance, spending your evening 
working out in the gym carries the cost of forgoing any alternative way you could spend the 
evening (e.g., meeting a friend or reading a book). Indeed, this notion seems especially 
plausible for effortful activities: Instead of exerting effort and exhausting ourselves, we could 
always be doing something involving less effort. However, when we apply the same notion to 
relaxing activities, we are faced with a seeming paradox: Why should we think about the 
value of alternative activities when we are engaged in something we find relaxing? In fact, 
why should we engage in anything else but relaxing activities when given the choice? We 
propose a simple explanation: There comes a time when such an activity has fulfilled its goal 
of recovery. In order to maintain an overall effective management of our goals, it is important 
to notice when that time has come, so that we can avoid further investing resources into the 
already achieved goal of recovery. Increases in perceived opportunity costs might be one way 
of signaling that an activity has successfully relaxed us: Increasing the frequency of thoughts 
about, and the attractiveness of, alternative activities should increase the probability that a 
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person soon thereafter disengages from the current activity and settles on a more attractive 
alternative. 
This leads to an interesting proposition: An activity should entail no noticeable 
opportunity costs for as long as a person perceives it as relaxing. However, once the goal of 
recovery has been met, an increase in the awareness of the activity’s opportunity costs might 
indicate to a person that it is time to disengage from the activity and engage in a more 
beneficial activity. For effortful activities, we argue that an effortful activity starts to become 
exhausting when opportunity costs begin to become conscious. In other words, the higher the 
perceived opportunity costs of an effortful activity, the more exhausting it is experienced. 
Mood 
Mood can be defined as a diffuse and objectless affective experience (Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007). Mood differs from emotions in both duration and intensity, with mood 
typically lasting longer and being felt as less intense than emotions (Parkinson et al., 1996). 
Mood also comprises a core affective component that provides an informational value about 
the current situation as positive or negative (Russell, 2003). Morris (1992) describes mood as 
providing valuable information about a person’s internal state and about the resources 
available to meet environmental challenges. Hence, one function of mood might be to signal 
what is going right (positive mood) or wrong (negative mood) with interacting with the 
environment. 
According to the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Clore et 
al., 2001), mood serves as an affective feedback that, in turn, influences judgment, decision-
making, and information processing. For instance, when judging an object, we may simply 
ask ourselves how we feel about a given object and integrate this affective feedback in our 
evaluations (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Positive mood could indicate that the object is valuable 
and pleasant, and thereby lead to more positive evaluations. Negative mood might signal that 
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the object is neither valuable nor pleasant, and lead to a more negative evaluation. One 
explanation for this is that positive mood often promotes top down, theory-based processing 
and a reliance on easily accessible information (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, stereotypes, 
expectations, primed thoughts). In contrast, negative mood tends to promote bottom up, data-
based processing with a reliance on information from the external environment (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). In a related manner, people in a positive mood tend 
to process incoming information relationally (i.e., cognitive, interpretive, category-level, 
global), whereas people in a negative mood tend to process incoming information 
referentially (i.e., perceptual, item-level, and local; Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Fiedler, 2001). 
Processing information more thoroughly might motivate people in a bad mood to locate the 
cause(s) of their unpleasant state, and try to change it towards a more positive state. 
Processing information more loosely might motivate people in a positive mood to stay 
engaged in their current activity, as they perceive nothing wrong with the current situation 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
The affect-as-information approach along with the different processing styles that 
accompany positive and negative mood marks mood as another possible indicator of 
exhaustion and recovery. Assuming that engaging in a recovering activity puts people in a 
good mood, they should then be more likely to adopt a relational, top down processing style 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). The positive mood state indicates that the current activity is 
desirable and to be continued. Once the goal of recovery is met, one’s mood should become 
less positive and pleasant, thereby increasing the likelihood to disengage from this activity. In 
contrast to recovery, engaging in an effortful activity should start to worsen one’s mood when 
the activity starts to be experienced as exhausting and thereby gradually increase the 
likelihood to disengage from it.  
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Time Perception 
Time perception is highly subjective: While waiting, time seems to expand, but while 
being engaged in a fun activity, time seems to fly. What underlies such variations in 
subjective time perception? Research has mainly focused on psychological processes such as 
attention (Brown, 1985; Zakay & Block, 1996), arousal (e.g., Mella, Conty, & Pouthas, 
2011), and affect (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009). Much of this research has focused on 
experimental designs that use prospective duration judgments (i.e., being aware that a target 
duration needs to be timed) as indicators for subjective time perception, with timing intervals 
in the milliseconds and seconds range (e.g., Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini, 1997; 
Droit-Volet, Brunot, & Niedenthal, 2004; Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 
2007).  
Results from these prospective timing studies have primarily been interpreted within 
the context of internal clock models (Church, 1984; Zakay & Block, 1995; Lejeune, 1998). 
According to these models, humans possess an internal clock mechanism that accounts for 
the formulation of prospective duration judgments. In short, an internal pacemaker sends 
“time pulses” at a steady pace into an accumulator, where the pulses are stored. The more 
pulses are accumulated, the longer the time interval seems to last. When the to-be-timed 
event is over, this internal clock compares the amount of pulses stored in the accumulator to a 
reference duration in our memory. The internal clock then uses this information to determine 
whether the target duration has lasted longer or shorter than the reference duration. 
Attention plays a central role in modulating this internal clock mechanism (Zakay & 
Block, 1996), and researchers have extended internal clock models by including an 
attentional gate (Zakay & Block, 1995) or dynamic switch (Lejeune, 1998) between the 
pacemaker and accumulator. When we attend to time, the attentional gate or dynamic switch 
opens, and time units can freely flow into the accumulator. However, when we do not attend 
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to time, the attentional gate or dynamic switch closes, and time units are not recorded. Thus, 
the more attention is spent on timing, the more time units are stored in the accumulator due to 
an opening of the gate, and the longer the target duration seems to last. The more attention is 
spent on non-temporal information, the less time units are stored in the accumulator due to a 
closing of the gate, and the shorter the target duration seems to last (Grondin, 2010).  
A considerable amount of research has examined the effects of arousal and affective 
valence on prospective duration judgments (for a review see Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009). On the 
one hand, when persons are exposed to highly arousing negative stimuli for up to four 
seconds, they consistently overestimate the duration of these stimuli (Noulhiane et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, highly arousing positive stimuli often lead to underestimations in duration 
judgments. These findings have been interpreted in terms of the internal clock model; that is, 
high arousal leads to increased rate of time pulses sent into the accumulator, which leads to a 
higher accumulation of pulses and, as a result, longer duration estimations. However, an 
important limitation is that these studies use only prospective duration estimation or 
reproduction tasks to assess subjective time perception and only very short durations in the 
milliseconds to seconds range. For this reason, these study designs are not suited to explain 
variations in subjective time perception in everyday life activities, which are often performed 
for several minutes or hours.  
Passage of time judgments (i.e., subjective evaluations of how quickly or slowly time 
passes for a person in a specific situation; Wearden, 2015) seem well suited to assess 
subjective time perception in everyday life activities. For instance, Droit-Volet and Wearden 
(2015) found that happy people report a faster momentary passage of time, whereas sad 
people report a slower momentary passage of time. In addition, they found a positive 
association between arousal and passage of time judgments: The higher the arousal, the faster 
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time seems to pass in a situation. No age effects were found between younger and older 
adults in their passage of time judgments, although time seems to speed up as people age.  
How is subjective time perception associated with exhaustion and recovery? Similar to 
the affect-as-information approach, Zakay (2014) argues that the felt pace of time during an 
activity provides us with information about that activity’s contribution to our overall level of 
functioning: An elevated pace of time signals that the current activity is valuable and desired; 
an extended pace of time signals that the current activity might be contributing negatively to 
our overall level of functioning. Using the case of boredom, Zakay (2014) illustrates that 
when people feel bored, they start to adopt prospective timing and focus more attention to the 
passing of time. According to the internal clock models reviewed above, this enhanced 
attention to timing leads to the feeling that time drags, alerting us that something is wrong in 
the current environment. This alerting function of subjective time perception can be extended 
to the context of recovery and exhaustion: Engaging in a pleasant and recovering activity 
leads to less time monitoring and the feeling that time flies. In extreme cases, we might even 
find ourselves in a state of “flow” and not perceive the passage of time at all (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). However, once the goal of recovery has been met, it should become 
adaptive for a person to start perceiving time as slowing. This change in time perception, 
coupled with increasing opportunity costs and negative mood, might indicate to the person 
that it is time to disengage from the activity and turn to more attractive alternatives. In 
addition, engaging in an activity should gradually lead to an extended time perception when it 
starts to become exhausting. Thus, taken together with changes in opportunity costs and 
mood, a change in subjective time perception during an effortful or relaxing activity might be 
an indicator of exhaustion or recovery.    
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Putting It All Together: Towards a Motivational Account of Exhaustion and Recovery 
Based on the work reviewed in the prior sections, we propose that changes in mood, 
subjective time perception, and opportunity costs experienced during an effortful or relaxing 
activity indicate a person’s feelings of exhaustion or recovery. This perspective on exhaustion 
and recovery is built on the notion that the degree of engagement in an activity is influenced 
by its perceived cost-benefit ratio (e.g., Boksem & Tops, 2008; Hockey, 2011; Inzlicht et al., 
2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014). As can be seen in Figure 1, a favorable cost-benefit ratio 
(i.e., the activity’s benefits outweigh its costs) should lead to a good mood, a fast to neutral 
subjective time perception, and no discernible opportunity costs. This motivational state 
indicates to a person that the current activity is desirable and should be continued (Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007; Kurzban et al., 2013; Zakay, 2014). However, once the cost-benefit ratio 
turns unfavorable (i.e., the activity’s costs outweigh its benefits), these processes should start 
to change: One’s mood should become unpleasant, time start to drag, and opportunity costs 
become more salient. This change in one’s motivational state, in turn, indicates to a person 
that the current activity is no longer desirable and should be disengaged from. In the context 
of recovery and exhaustion, this disengagement process is adaptive because the outcome of a 
relaxing activity has been achieved (recovery) or the outcome of an effortful activity cannot 
be achieved with the currently available means or resources (exhaustion).  
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Figure 1. A motivational perspective on exhaustion and recovery: As long as the cost-benefit 
ratio for an activity is favorable (i.e., the activity nets more benefits than costs), the person 
experiences good mood, neutral to accelerated subjective time perception, and no opportunity 
costs. In this motivational state, the person perceives the activity as contributing to their 
recovery (relaxing activity) or not yet exhausting (effortful activity). The behavioral response 
is continued engagement in the activity. When the cost-benefit ratio turns unfavorable (i.e., 
the activity nets more costs than benefits), the person experiences a gradual decrease of 
positive mood, expanded subjective time perception, and an increase in opportunity costs. In 
this motivational state, the person perceives the activity as no longer contributing to their 
recovery (relaxing activity) or as increasingly exhausting (effortful activity). The behavioral 
response is eventual disengagement from the activity.  
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Several hypotheses can be derived from this motivational perspective: 
Hypothesis 1: Engaging in a relaxing (effortful) activity gradually leads to (a) good 
mood, (b) the feeling that time passes fast, (c) no discernible opportunity costs. This will be 
experienced as recovery (absence of exhaustion). 
Hypothesis 2: After a certain amount of time (i.e., when the cost-benefit ratio turns 
unfavorable), one will no longer perceive the activity as contributing to one’s recovery (one 
will perceive the activity as increasingly exhausting).  
Hypothesis 3: The continued engagement in an activity that is no longer perceived as 
contributing to one’s recovery (that is perceived as increasingly exhausting) will result in (a) 
one’s mood starting to become less pleasant, (b) the feeling that time passes more slowly, and 
(c) increasing opportunity costs. 
Hypothesis 4: Engaging in an effortful activity gradually leads to (a) bad mood, (b) the 
feeling that time passes slowly, (c) increasing opportunity costs. This will be experienced as 
exhaustion. 
The Development of Exhaustion and Recovery Across Adulthood 
 One of the most dramatic changes that occur across the lifespan is the changing ratio 
of resource gains to losses, such that gains decrease and losses increase (Baltes, 1987). This 
change in the availability of resources affects processes of goal setting and pursuit across the 
lifespan, emphasizing the trade-offs between multiple goals with increasing age (Freund & 
Baltes, 2000). What does this imply for the motivational approach to exhaustion and recovery 
proposed above? How do the psychological processes underlying exhaustion and recovery, 
and the occurrence and manifestation of exhaustion and recovery, change across adulthood? 
Next, we discuss the development of opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception 
across adulthood, and how this development may impact experiences of exhaustion and 
recovery at different stages in life.  
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Opportunity Costs Across Adulthood 
 A central tenet of lifespan psychology holds that development comprises the presence 
of both gains and losses in all phases of life (Baltes, 1987). Yet, as people grow older, 
biological and cognitive functioning decline, and the gains/losses ratio is increasingly 
weighted towards losses (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006). Ebner, Freund, and 
Baltes (2006) showed that changes in the ratio of gains and losses across adulthood relate to 
age-related changes in personal goal orientation. This means that younger adults, being at the 
peak of biological and cognitive functioning, mainly invest their resources in growth- and 
gain-oriented goals (e.g., broadening their social networks, acquiring broader knowledge, 
advancing their careers), whereas middle aged and older adults, facing increasing declines in 
resource availability, primarily invest their resources in goals aimed at maintaining their 
current level of functioning and preventing further losses. Further supporting the age-related 
shift in goal orientation, Freund (2006) found experimental evidence that older adults persist 
longer than younger adults in tasks designed to regain lost resources, whereas younger adults 
persist longer than older adults in tasks designed to optimize their performance.  
If fewer resources are available with increasing age, the importance of not wasting any 
of them in superfluous goal pursuit should become more and more imperative with age. 
Therefore, increases in opportunity costs during an effortful or relaxing activity should 
become more salient in older compared to young adulthood. If this is true, older adults should 
feel exhausted faster when pursuing effortful activities and, consequently, also disengage 
faster from the exhausting activity than younger adults. Being more sensitive to opportunity 
costs might be adaptive for older adults as it helps them to avoid exhaustion-related losses. 
This assumption is supported by evidence that older adults disengage faster from blocked and 
unachievable goals (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003) and prioritize more 
efficiently between conflicting goals (Freund & Tomasik, 2019). 
Part I 
 
36 
 
Taken together, opportunity costs might be more salient for older adults than for 
younger adults. This, in turn, might indicate that older adults exhaust more easily and for this 
reason spend less time in an exhausting activity than younger adults. Furthermore, older 
adults might spend more time in a recovering activity (i.e., an activity designed to regain lost 
resources), which might indicate that older adults recover more slowly compared to younger 
adults.  
Emotional Experience Across Adulthood  
Research from the past 15 years has shown that older adults – compared to younger 
adults – generally report more positive and less negative emotions in their everyday lives 
(Carstensen et al., 2011). Socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999) offers a possible explanation for older adults’ stable and largely positive 
emotional well-being: According to the theory, as people grow older and their perceived 
future time horizons shorten, they start to place more importance on emotional and hedonic 
goals that are achievable in the present rather than in the future. This emphasis on 
emotionally meaningful goals, such as seeking a greater appreciation of life and engaging in 
more meaningful social relationships, improves older adults’ emotional experience by 
reducing the occurrence of negative emotions and enabling a steady rate of positive emotions.  
On the basis of socioemotional selectivity theory, one might argue that older people – 
by actively shaping their environment toward more positive and less negative experiences – 
create more opportunities to engage in pleasant and recovering activities and less instances to 
engage in exhausting activities. Furthermore, older adults might be more efficient at 
regulating their emotions than younger adults (Urry & Gross, 2010). For instance, Larcom 
and Isaacowitz (2009) found that following a negative mood induction, older adults down-
regulated negative emotions and up-regulated positive emotions faster and for longer than did 
younger adults. Such improved emotion regulation abilities might have an influence on older 
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adults’ experienced recovery and exhaustion in everyday life: older adults might (1) be more 
efficient in repairing negative mood arising from exhaustion, and (2) stay longer in up-
regulated positive mood states than younger adults. With regard to recovery, older adults 
might thus recover faster and stay recovered for longer than younger adults.  
Time Perception Across Adulthood 
For more than a century, psychologists have attempted to explain the feeling that time 
seems to speed up as we get older (e.g., James, 1890; Draaisma, 2004). However, empirical 
results regarding a speeding up of time with age are controversial. For instance, Wittmann 
and Lehnhoff (2005) found that momentary perceptions of the passage of time seem to 
accelerate with age, whereas studies investigating the retrospective recall of time passage 
tend to report age-related accelerations in time perception only when investigating the 
passage of the previous 10 years compared to smaller time intervals (e.g., Janssen, Naka, & 
Friedman, 2013).  
The increasing losses in biological and cognitive functioning in older adulthood might 
have an influence on prospective duration judgments as theorized by internal clock models. 
For instance, decreases in basal metabolism in older adulthood (Altman & Dittmer, 1968) 
might lead to decreased activities of older adults’ internal pacemakers (Block, Zakay, & 
Hancock, 1998), which would in turn result in shorter time estimations in prospective 
duration tasks. Furthermore, age-related decreases in attentional capacity (e.g., Lustig, 2003) 
and information processing speed (e.g., Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997) might cause the 
hypothesized attentional gate between the pacemaker and accumulator to close more 
frequently, and, as a result, again lead to shorter duration estimations (for a meta-analysis on 
aging and duration judgments, see Block et al., 1998).  
To date, only few studies have examined age-related differences in everyday life 
passage of time judgments, and the available results are mixed. For instance, in two 
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experience sampling studies, Droit-Volet and Wearden (2015, 2016) found no significant 
acceleration of time passage during everyday life activities for older adults compared to 
younger adults, despite the fact that participants generally agreed with the notion that time 
seems to pass more quickly as people age. In contrast, Wittmann and Lehnhoff (2005) 
reported a significant acceleration of momentary passage of time perceptions in older versus 
younger adults. Thus, it is as of yet unclear whether older and younger adults differ in their 
perceptions of time, and how duration estimations and passage of time judgments might 
change across adulthood.  
The length of the time period during which recovery or exhaustion occur might serve as 
an important informational cue that tells people how much they have recovered or become 
exhausted (Zakay, 2014). A person who perceives time to pass more quickly, then, might feel 
more recovered (less exhausted) after engaging in a relaxing (effortful) activity than a person 
who perceives time to pass more slowly during the same activity and time span. Assuming 
that older adults perceive time to pass more quickly than younger adults in everyday life 
activities, one might thus argue that older adults feel more recovered (less exhausted) than 
younger adults after a certain amount of time spent in the same relaxing (effortful) activity. 
Summary 
With regard to the development of exhaustion across adulthood, it seems plausible that 
opportunity costs become more salient in old age: Age-related changes in resource 
availability (i.e., losses of important physical and cognitive functioning; Heckhausen, Dixon, 
& Baltes, 1989; Mustafić & Freund, 2012a) as well as a shift in time perspective (i.e., 
increased salience of the fact that life-time is running out; Lang & Carstensen, 2002) may 
motivate older adults to focus their remaining energy and time on avoiding further losses 
(Freund & Baltes, 2000). Therefore, it seems adaptive if older adults feel exhausted more 
easily, as it would prompt them to disengage from a taxing activity earlier, and in so doing 
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better protect their remaining resources. On a different account, older adults’ subjective time 
perception might be accelerated, so that they might perceive everyday life activities to go by 
faster, and as a result feel less exhausted after the same time span than younger adults.  
With regard to recovery across adulthood, one could argue that older adults persist 
longer in a recovering activity (e.g., Freund & Tomasik, 2019). This might be the case for 
several reasons. First, older adults might simply need more time to recover compared to 
younger adults. Second, older and younger adults might recover at similar rates, yet older 
adults might perceive the changes in recovery indicators (i.e., increasingly negative mood, 
expanded subjective time perception, increase in opportunity costs) more slowly than 
younger adults. Third, older adults might engage longer in recovering activities because their 
time perception is accelerated.  
General Conclusion 
Taking a motivational approach to exhaustion and recovery, we propose that changes in 
mood, subjective time perception, and opportunity costs experienced during an activity are 
central indicators of recovery or exhaustion. This approach allows to formulate empirically 
testable hypotheses. Moreover, embedding the motivational approach in the context of adult 
development and aging, we suggest that exhaustion and recovery change systematically 
across across adulthood. To our knowledge, this is the first psychological account that 
integrates exhaustion and recovery as separate constructs and that provides a comprehensive 
account of the psychological indicators that serve the function to indicate when an activity 
should be abandoned because it no longer contributes sufficiently to goal achievement. We 
hope that this motivational account of recovery and exhaustion will serve as the theoretical 
starting point for empirical research that will contribute to a better understanding of 
exhaustion and recovery across adulthood. 
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Abstract 
Four methodologically diverse studies investigated the role of mood, opportunity costs, and 
subjective time perception for recovery from exhaustion. Study 1 (N = 356) explored 
people’s lay beliefs in open-ended responses about what thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
indicate recovery. Study 2 (N = 134) examined within-person associations between changes 
in recovery, mood, opportunity costs, and time perception following an exhaustion induction. 
Studies 3 and 4 (NStudy3 = 129; NStudy4 = 150) experimentally tested the hypothesis that 
opportunity costs are related to recovery. We consistently found a positive association 
between changes in mood and recovery, but no associations between opportunity costs or 
time perception and recovery. Furthermore, despite a successful manipulation of opportunity 
costs in Study 4, the perceived value of competing activities was unrelated to recovery. 
However, increasing opportunity costs were associated with increasing exhaustion. Taken 
together, these results suggest that changes in mood are an important indicator of recovery 
and provide first empirical support that opportunity costs influence experienced effort.  
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Introduction 
Imagine an overworked lecturer grading her students’ essays on her commute home. 
Exhausted from the day’s events, she soon finds herself in need of a break. She closes the 
laptop, puts on noise-cancelling headphones, and indulges in her favorite music playlist. Eyes 
shut, she begins to relax. Her mood gets better. She is pleasantly surprised how fast time had 
passed when the train arrives at the next station. Then, halfway through the playlist, she starts 
to feel bored, the current song seems to go on for too long, and she catches herself thinking 
about resuming essay grading. Thus, she puts away her headphones and opens the laptop 
again, ready to spend more effort.  
How did this lecturer know when she was sufficiently recovered to resume work? We 
(Cardini & Freund, 2019a) have recently proposed that people infer their recovery progress 
from three psychological indicators: (i) perceived opportunity costs (i.e., the subjective costs 
of foregoing attractive alternatives compared to the benefits of staying engaged in the focal 
activity), (ii) mood, and (iii) subjective time perception. To preview, as long as an activity 
(e.g., listening to music) contributes to our recovery, we are in a good mood, perceive time as 
passing quickly, and experience no opportunity costs. However, once the activity no longer 
contributes significantly to further recovery, our mood starts to decline, time to extend, and 
opportunity costs to become more salient. According to our model, these perceived changes 
indicate recovery and, as a result, an increased motivation to disengage from the focal 
activity.  
In this paper, we present first empirical research on the importance of mood, 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception as psychological indicators of recovery. In 
what follows, we introduce our motivational approach to recovery as signaling goal 
disengagement and detail the theoretical rationale for choosing perceived opportunity costs, 
mood, and subjective time perception as indicators of recovery. 
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A Motivational Perspective on Exhaustion and Recovery 
Perhaps the most prominent approach to exhaustion and recovery assumes the existence 
of a limited domain-general resource that is depleted through usage and then needs to be 
restored (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan & Berman, 2010; Ryan & Deci, 
2008). However, recent meta-analytic work (Carter et al., 2015; Carter & McCullough, 2014) 
and preregistered replication efforts (Hagger et al., 2016; Lurquin et al., 2016) have cast 
serious doubt on this notion. In fact, offering incentives (Boucher & Kofos, 2012), inducing 
positive affect (Tice et al., 2007), and adopting a non-limited theory of willpower (Job et al., 
2010) counteract exhaustion-related decrements in task performance, speaking against the 
limited resource model. Taken together, these findings suggest that exhaustion and recovery 
are mainly subjective and do not reflect an objective state of depletable resources.  
Recent approaches have focused on the role of motivation for exhaustion (Hockey, 
2013; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Common to these 
motivational accounts is the hypothesis that the subjective cost-benefit ratio of an activity is 
closely associated with the experience of effort and exhaustion. In short, as long as an activity 
is perceived as generating more benefits than costs, people enjoy engaging in it. On the 
contrary, when the activity is perceived to incur more costs than benefits, it becomes 
unpleasant and tiresome. Similar to boredom (Bench & Lench, 2013), such theories 
conceptualize exhaustion as a “stop-emotion” with the primary function to guide behavior 
away from costly to more rewarding activities (van der Linden, 2011).  
While these motivational accounts provide a compelling explanation for exhaustion, 
they have largely neglected to address the flip side of the coin – recovery. If exhaustion 
indicates that the current activity should be discontinued due to its unfavorable cost-benefit 
ratio, then does recovery indicate that the current activity should be continued because its 
cost-benefit ratio is favorable? And if this were the case, how would we know when recovery 
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is achieved? In other words: What prevents us from pursuing relaxing activities indefinitely? 
In an attempt to close this gap, we have recently proposed three psychological indicators of 
recovery (i.e., perceived opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception), which we 
will introduce next. 
Psychological Indicators of Recovery 
Perceived Opportunity Costs 
Given that our physical and cognitive capacities are limited, we are constantly faced 
with the challenge of prioritizing some actions, activities, or goals at the expense of others. 
Successfully managing such goal conflicts in daily life is important for psychological well-
being (Riediger, Freund, & Baltes, 2005). By necessity, prioritization introduces costs and 
benefits. For instance, choosing to spend one’s evening revising a manuscript over hanging 
out with friends comes with the benefit of working toward advancing one’s career but carries 
the cost of neglecting valuable social relationships. While we acknowledge that these costs 
and benefits are highly subjective, situation-specific, and thus difficult – if not impossible – 
to systematize, we agree with Kurzban et al. (2013) that the ultimate price of engaging in any 
activity is the time forgone on the next-best alternative – an activity’s opportunity costs. 
Experiencing opportunity costs during an ongoing task is associated with an increase in 
perceived effort, a decrease in perceived task utility, and ultimately leads to task 
disengagement (Hofmann, Rom, Katzir, & Diel, 2019). Exerting effort is usually experienced 
as aversive (Kurzban, 2016, but see Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, 2018) and people avoid 
unnecessarily exerting effort (Richter et al., 2016). Thus, perceiving opportunity costs might 
serve the adaptive function of signaling that one’s time and effort are better spent on another 
task. Applying this notion to recovery, we maintain that experiencing opportunity costs 
during a relaxing activity indicates that the activity’s perceived cost-benefit ratio has turned 
unfavorable (i.e., is no longer contributing to recovery) and should thus be disengaged from.  
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Mood 
According to the affect-as-information approach (Clore et al., 2001), mood provides 
valuable information about one's current environment. Positive mood, along with an 
increased reliance on global and heuristic cognitive processing, indicates a safe and benign 
environment. Negative mood, along with an increased reliance on local and systematic 
cognitive processing, signals a problematic environment (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; but see 
Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014). Based on this approach, we propose that people take their 
current mood as information about their recovery progress. In particular, people are more 
likely to perceive their current environment as contributing to their recovery when they are in 
a good mood. However, once the relaxing environment does no longer significantly 
contribute to recovery, we posit that people's mood starts to get worse, thereby indicating that 
the environment has become problematic and is no longer contributing to recovery.  
Reinforcing this notion, the mood-as-input approach (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Myer, 
1993) maintains that positive mood tells us to continue and negative mood to cease an 
activity, provided that mood reflects one’s current level of enjoyment. Thus, when 
deliberating whether they should stay engaged in a relaxing activity, people may ask 
themselves “Am I still enjoying this?” and answer in the affirmative when in a good mood 
and in the negative when in a bad mood, prompting them to continue or cease the activity, 
respectively. Therefore, we conceptualize positive mood as an indicator of the current state of 
recovery.   
Subjective Time Perception 
Similar to mood, Zakay (2014) argues that subjective time perception (i.e., the felt pace 
of time) during an activity provides us with information about that activity’s utility: An 
accelerated subjective time perception ascribes value to the current activity (“time flies when 
having fun”); an extended subjective time perception indicates a lack of value (“time drags 
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when being bored”). Indeed, people take their perception of time as input for hedonic 
evaluations: Irrespective of their baseline valence, tasks are consistently rated as more 
pleasant when they end sooner than expected and more unpleasant when they last longer than 
expected (Gable & Poole, 2012; Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse, & Sackett, 2010).  
The motivational implication of subjective time perception, then, might be to continue 
an activity when the pace of time is perceived as accelerated and disengage from an activity 
when the pace of time is perceived as extended. Accordingly, we propose that people are 
more likely to perceive their current environment as contributing to their recovery when they 
experience an acceleration of subjective time perception, and as not contributing to recovery 
anymore when their perception of time begins to extend. Taken together, along with 
increasingly negative mood and salient opportunity costs, we argue that an extension in 
subjective time perception is taken as an indication that the current activity has reached its 
saturation point and that time and energy are better spent on another activity.  
The Present Studies 
Four studies investigated the role of perceived opportunity costs, mood, and subjective 
time perception for recovery. In Study 1, we explored people’s lay beliefs about the 
indicators of exhaustion and recovery. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, we induced exhaustion 
experimentally and in the subsequent recovery period assessed the co-occurrence of 
subjective recovery and its proposed indicators over time. Doing so allowed us (1) to test the 
hypotheses about the time courses of recovery, opportunity costs, mood, and time perception, 
as well as (2) to examine which of the three indicators is the most relevant for the experience 
of recovery. We had no a priori hypothesis about which of the proposed indicators might be 
most strongly associated with recovery. Thus, our overarching aim was to achieve as 
parsimonious an account of recovery as possible.  
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Across the studies, we employed a methodologically diverse approach: In Study 1, we 
explored the indicators of exhaustion and recovery qualitatively using inductive content 
analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). We designed Study 2 as a laboratory experiment 
encompassing an exhaustion and recovery period in a controlled environment with the aim to 
track the specific time courses (and their covariations) of recovery, opportunity costs, mood, 
and time perception. Building on these correlative results, in Studies 3 and 4 we sought to 
establish a causal relationship between opportunity costs and recovery by testing whether 
manipulating opportunity costs before and during the recovery period systematically impacts 
the subjective speed of recovery.  
All four studies adhered to the guidelines of the local ethics committee, including the 
signing of an informed consent form and a debriefing after the study. We disclose all 
measures, manipulations, and exclusions for these studies in the main text. All the data was 
collected prior to data analysis.  
Study 1 
We began our empirical investigation by exploring people’s lay beliefs about the 
indicators of exhaustion and recovery. Lay beliefs are scientifically informative because they 
can have a substantial impact on cognition, behavior, and health (Zedelius, Müller, & 
Schooler, 2017). The aim of Study 1 was to examine (1) the most frequently mentioned 
indicators of exhaustion and recovery, and (2) whether these lay beliefs converge or diverge 
from the indicators we have proposed (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). 
Method 
Participants. The data are based on a subsample (N = 356) of a larger study targeting 
the factorial structure of exhaustion and recovery items stemming from various 
questionnaires (Cardini, Knecht, & Freund, 2019). Participants in this subsample were aged 
between 18 and 72 years (M = 45.15, SD = 15.29; 43% female). They were recruited from an 
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online access panel by a German research agency (www.respondi.de). Participants were 
reimbursed according to the agency’s regulations (3.20 Euros excluding incentives).  
Measures. The measures of interest for this study were two open-ended questions that 
read “How do you personally know when you are exhausted (recovered)? What kinds of 
feelings, thoughts, and behaviors indicate to you that you are exhausted (recovered)?” 
Procedure. After giving their informed consent and filling out a sociodemographic 
questionnaire, we asked participants to define exhaustion and recovery in their own words 
and to write down what, to them, indicates exhaustion and recovery. Not part of the current 
study are the following measures: The frequency with which participants reported to 
experience exhaustion and recovery in different functional domains (i.e., physical, cognitive, 
emotional, social, and motivational) in their everyday lives; a list of the selected exhaustion 
(recovery) items stemming from various published scales.  
Statistical analysis. We used an inductive content analysis approach (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005). The first author read each open statement and derived coding categories 
based on recurring words or sentences (e.g., “When I’m exhausted I feel tired” or “When I’m 
recovered I’m in a good mood”). This procedure yielded 42 categories for exhaustion (e.g., 
tiredness) and 43 categories for recovery (e.g., good mood). Both authors then further divided 
the categories into six functional domains (i.e., physical, cognitive, emotional, social, 
motivational, behavioral). For example, tiredness was characterized as physical (Ortony et al., 
1987), while good mood was characterized as emotional. In a next step, a trained research 
assistant and the first author independently identified key words from each open statement 
(e.g., “tired” or “good mood”). These key words represent the unit of analysis. N = 916 key 
words were derived for exhaustion, and N = 893 key words for recovery. The agreement was 
high, with both coders selecting the same key words for 92% of the freely generated 
sentences. Finally, the research assistant and the first author independently coded each key 
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word into one category. Key words that did not match any existing category were either 
coded into an “other” category in the respective functional domain or into a “rest” category if 
the key word did not match any functional domain.  
Results 
The inter-rater reliability was good with Cohen’s κ = .86 for recovery (z = 97.60, p < 
.001) and κ = .83 for exhaustion (z = 104.00, p < .001). Disagreements were solved through 
consensus. The relative frequency of key words coded into the various categories is depicted 
in Figure 2. As can be seen, regarding exhaustion, the most frequently mentioned indicators 
were tiredness, low energy, listlessness, difficulty concentrating, bad mood, and irritability. 
Only 1.1% of key words described opportunity costs (i.e., wanting to do something else). 
None of the participants mentioned subjective time perception as an indicator of exhaustion. 
Taken together, 41% of the mentioned exhaustion indicators were physical (including 
tiredness), and of the psychological indicators 20% were emotional, 13% cognitive, 10% 
motivational, 10% behavioral, 4% social, and 2% could not be categorized. 
Regarding recovery, the most frequently mentioned indicators were good mood, zest 
for action, high energy, and relaxation. As was true for exhaustion, opportunity costs were 
mentioned very rarely (0.3%). None of the participants mentioned subjective time perception 
as an indicator of recovery. Taken together, 24% of the mentioned recovery indicators were 
physical, and of the psychological indicators 31% were emotional, 17% motivational, 14% 
cognitive, 8% behavioral, 2% social, and 4% could not be categorized.  
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Figure 2. Relative frequencies of the mentioned recovery (N = 893; panel A) and exhaustion 
indicators (N = 916; panel B). 
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Brief Discussion 
The results of Study 1 suggest that out of the three proposed indicators, mood seems 
to be the most frequently experienced indicator of recovery. In fact, being in a good mood 
was the most frequently mentioned indicator out of all the recovery indicators. In contrast, 
people did not come up with subjective time perception and opportunity costs as salient 
indicators of recovery. However, given that people are not necessarily aware of the processes 
underlying their psychological functioning (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and often neglect 
opportunity costs in decisions involving the use of limited resources, such as money 
(Frederick, Novemsky, Wang, Dhar, & Nowlis, 2009; Plantinga, Krijnen, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2018; Spiller, 2011), in a next step we empirically tested if opportunity costs, 
mood, and subjective time perception predict how recovered people feel. 
Study 2 
Designed as a more direct test of the proposed account, in Study 2 we investigated the 
associations between subjective recovery, mood, activity valence, time perception, and 
opportunity costs as they unfold during a recovery period. We first exhausted participants by 
means of a 20-minute high intensity interval training. Before and after the training, we 
assessed participants’ perceived exhaustion as a manipulation check. Immediately afterwards, 
they watched a 25-minute relaxing video on a computer while carrying noise-cancelling 
headphones playing very tranquil music. We assessed the variables of interest ten times every 
two minutes during this recovery period. This design enabled us to analyze the time courses 
of recovery, mood, activity valence, time perception, and opportunity costs, as well as the 
associations between the random slopes of the variables (i.e., the degree to which the 
variables “travel together” during the recovery period).  
We hypothesized that the recovery time course is best described by a concave function 
of time (i.e., participants recover at first, but will at some point stop recovering and even start 
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to feel less recovered as time goes on). To be able to capture this trajectory of recovery, we 
chose a long recovery period of 25 minutes to guarantee that participants could fully recover 
from the induced short-term exhaustion. We chose an excerpt of the 1999 undersea 
documentary Coral Sea Dreaming (Small World Music, Inc.) as the relaxing activity. This 
documentary features beautiful visuals of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and tranquil 
instrumental music. Prior research has shown that this documentary can – on average – 
successfully recover participants in as little as seven minutes following an effortful task 
(Piferi, Kline, Younger, & Lawler, 2000). Based on the psychological indicators we proposed 
for the experience of exhaustion and recovery, we also expected that, once the goal of 
recovery is achieved, mood and activity valence begin to gradually decrease, time perception 
to expand, and opportunity costs to increase, as a signal that the present activity’s cost-benefit 
ratio has become unfavorable (i.e., nets more costs than benefits) and should therefore be 
discontinued. 
Method 
Participants. An a-priori power analysis with G*Power (Version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that we needed at least 119 participants to detect a main 
effect of a within-person factor with a small population effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.10), 95% 
power and a 5% error probability in a repeated measures design consisting of ten 
measurement occasions. We included every person that signed up for the study provided that 
s/he was at least 18 years old, physically healthy, and reported no diagnosed psychological 
disorder at the time. This resulted in a sample of N = 134 adults (Mage = 23.93 years, SD = 
5.04, 74% female). The sample consisted largely of students who participated for course 
credit (85%). In general, participants reported relatively high physical fitness (M = 3.30, SD = 
.78, on a scale from 0 [not fit at all] to 5 [very fit]).  
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Measures.  
Dispositional exhaustion and recovery. The General Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
(Cardini et al., 2019) measures dispositional exhaustion and recovery as two separate 
dimensions. The exhaustion dimension consists of 8 items (e.g., “In general, I feel weak”; α = 
.93). The recovery dimension consists of 5 items (e.g., “In general, I feel energized”; α = 
.82). Items are measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Participants in this 
sample reported relatively high dispositional recovery (M = 3.43, SD = 0.59) and low 
dispositional exhaustion (M = 1.06, SD = 0.74). 
Dispositional mood state. The Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (German 
short version; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997) measures three bipolar 
dimensions of psychological functioning: Wakefulness-tiredness (4 items, α = .84), good 
mood-bad mood (4 items, α = .84), and calmness-nervousness (4 items, α = .80). Sample 
items are “In general, I feel rested” for awake-tired, “In general, I feel content” for good 
mood-bad mood, and “In general, I feel composed” for calm-nervous. Items are measured on 
a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Participants in this sample reported relatively 
high scores of dispositional awakeness (M = 3.28, SD = 0.94), good mood (M = 3.91, SD = 
0.77), and calmness (M = 3.35, SD = 0.92).  
Dependent variables. We operationalized each dependent variable as a bipolar visual 
analogue scale ranging from -5 to +5, with a neutral zero point in the middle (Russell & 
Carroll, 1999). We decided for bipolar and against bivariate affective state items for the 
following reason: In his comprehensive review on mixed emotions, Russell (2017, p. 116) 
concludes that “in most circumstances a person feels either good or bad but not both,” adding 
that mixed emotions occur only in rare events, such as “when a stimulus event is highly 
salient (a powerful film, college graduation and so on).”  
Part II 
 
54 
 
The recovery item read “How do you feel right now?” with -5 (very exhausted) to +5 
(very recovered) as verbal anchors. The mood item was “What is your momentary mood?” 
with -5 (very bad) to +5 (very good), the activity valence item “How pleasant is this activity 
right now?” with -5 (very unpleasant) to +5 (very pleasant), the time perception item “How 
does time pass for you right now?” with -5 (very slowly) to +5 (very fast), and the opportunity 
costs item “Right now, would you rather…” with -5 (continue this activity?) to +5 (do 
something else?) as verbal anchors. The bipolar scales allowed participants to indicate the 
intensity of their feelings towards one pole, while also allowing for the possibility of a neutral 
state (i.e., the zero point), indicating that neither of the poles were presently experienced. 
Within-person reliabilities were good (RCns between .81-.83; Cranford et al., 2006), 
indicating that systematic change over time was reliably measured by these variables.  
Time as independent variable. The time variable was coded from 0 to 9, such that 0 
was the first measurement occasion during the recovery period (i.e., 30 seconds into the 
video) and 9 was the last measurement occasion (i.e., 18 minutes and 30 seconds into the 
video). The time points were equally spaced (i.e., two minutes). This scaling of time implies 
that a linear slope for time estimates the change in the dependent variable every two minutes.  
Procedure. Participants first filled out an online screening questionnaire, where they 
read a detailed description of the study and gave their informed consent for participation. 
Next, they filled out a sociodemographic questionnaire, reported on their perceived physical 
fitness, weekly exercise frequency, dispositional exhaustion and recovery (Cardini et al., 
2019), and filled out the trait version of the Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire 
(Steyer et al., 1997).  
The main part of the study was conducted in two adjacent laboratory rooms in groups 
with up to 12 participants. Participants first filled out a baseline occasion of the paper-and-
pencil items. Next, they participated in a 20-minute high intensity interval training (adopted 
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from Kaftan & Freund, 2019). It consisted of a four-minute training unit that was repeated 
five times. One training unit consisted of a bout of physical exercises (e.g., jumping jacks, 
push-ups, plank, sit-ups, high knees). Each exercise was maintained for 20 seconds and 
followed up with 10 seconds of rest. Immediately upon finishing the training, participants 
filled out the second occasion of the paper-and-pencil items. Next, participants were quickly 
guided into another room, where they watched a relaxing aquatic video on a computer with 
noise-cancelling headphones. Thirty seconds into the video, the dependent variable items 
popped up in a small space on the right side of the computer screen (see Figure 3), which 
participants were instructed to answer as quickly as possible. The items appeared every two 
minutes during the video, resulting in a total of ten assessments. The video ended after 25 
minutes. Participants then rated how much they enjoyed the content of the video, the music, 
the volume, the pop-up questions, and the degree to which the video contributed to their 
recovery. Lastly, they were debriefed and reimbursed (one course credit or 15 Swiss francs).  
Statistical analysis. We analyzed the time course of the dependent variables using 
multilevel growth curve models with measurement time as independent variable, accounting 
for an autocorrelative error structure (AR[1]) and for heteroscedasticity. To assess correlated 
change between the variables, we extended these analyses to a multivariate multilevel growth 
curve model that estimates the time course of all variables simultaneously. We conducted all 
analyses in R (R Core Team, 2018). For the univariate analyses, we used the nlme package 
(Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2018). For the multivariate analysis, we 
used the Bayesian brms package with default priors (Bürkner, 2017), as this package tends to 
produce more stable estimates for multilevel models with complex variance-covariance 
matrices (Bürkner, 2017). We followed the suggestions of Bolger and Laurenceau (2013) for 
reporting multilevel analyses. 
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Figure 3. Screenshot of the computer screen during the recovery period (Study 2). The 
dependent variable items appeared every 2 minutes in the grey area of the screen.   
Results 
Exhaustion manipulation check. Participants reported a significant decrease in 
recovery (increase in exhaustion) after the training (M = -1.51, SD = 2.19) compared to 
before (M = 1.07, SD = 2.03), t(133) = 10.94, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [2.11, 
3.04], d = 0.82, 95% CI [0.57, 1.07]. Thus, the training successfully induced exhaustion. In 
comparison, the other dependent variables did not change meaningfully on average before vs. 
after the training (ds between 0.02 to 0.26; see Table A1 in Appendix A).  
Preliminary analyses. The initial multilevel analysis dataset consisted of N = 134 
(participants) x 10 (measurement occasions) = 1,340 observations. Inspection of the 
scatterplots, person by person, indicated that due to a very infrequent technical failure, four 
persons had missing data for one up to five measurement occasions. Thus, the final dataset 
consisted of 1,328 observations.  
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Model building. All dependent variables showed substantial between-person variance 
(ICCs between .57 and .71), confirming the nested structure of the data (measurement 
occasions nested in persons) and necessitating the use of multilevel modeling. We began the 
model building process by comparing random-intercept-only models to random-intercept-
and-slope models for each dependent variable. In a next step, we added a simple 
autocorrelative error structure (AR[1]) to the models. Then, we tested whether the models 
should account for heteroscedasticity. Given that these models are nested, we decided on the 
best-fitting model using the chi-square likelihood ratio test. The best-fitting models across all 
dependent variables were random-intercept-and-slopes models that account for 
autocorrelation, but not for heteroscedasticity. In other words, participants varied 
substantially on all dependent variables with regard to their initial intercepts (i.e., 30 seconds 
into the video), as well as in their rate of change over the recovery period.  
In the final model-building step, we tested which polynomial degree (i.e., linear, 
quadratic, cubic) best characterized the time course of the dependent variables. For each 
dependent variable, we compared the model with a linear fixed effect of time with a model 
encompassing both a linear and quadratic fixed effect of time, and so on. Since these 
comparisons involve non-nested models (i.e., different fixed effects structures), we decided 
on the best-fitting model using the AIC and BIC, with lower values indicating better model 
fit.   
Modeling the time courses. The results for the time courses are shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 4. Table 1 has two sets of parameter estimates. The first set, the fixed effects, estimate 
the results for the average person in the sample. These fixed effects are represented by the 
thick black lines in Figure 4. The second set in Table 1 are the random effects. These describe 
variation at two levels of analysis: At the between-person level, they model the extent to 
which persons deviate from the typical person in the sample. At the within-person level, they 
Part II 
 
58 
 
model the extent to which the raw data varies from the values predicted by the model. The 
between-person random effects are visualized in Figure 4 by the variability in individual 
regression lines (thin grey lines) from the average regression line.  
As can be seen in Table 1, the fixed time course of recovery was best described by a 
cubic function of time: The typical participant had an initial level of recovery of 0.76 units on 
the -5 (very exhausted) to +5 (very recovered) scale. This typical participant then showed an 
initial 0.67 units increase in recovery (linear slope), followed by a 0.16 units degree of 
curvature (quadratic slope), and finally reported another 0.01 units increase in recovery 
(cubic slope). The critical time values (i.e., those values of time where the slope of the cubic 
function is zero) were approximately located at 4.5 minutes and 14.5 minutes. Thus, the 
typical person recovered for the first four and a half minutes, and afterwards reported a 
decline in recovery until 14.5 minutes into the video, and from then on reported another 
increase in recovery.  
The fixed mood and activity valence time courses were similar to each other: 
Participants’ mood and the perceived pleasantness of the video showed a linear decline over 
the recovery period but were positive throughout the entire duration of the relaxation period. 
The fixed time perception trajectory started out near the neutral zero point and decreased 
strongly as time went on, so that by the end of the video, participants reported a strong 
feeling that time was passing very slowly. 
The fixed opportunity costs time course started below the neutral zero point, indicating 
that initially, the average participant wanted to continue watching the video. As time went on, 
however, the opportunity costs started to strongly increase and crossed the neutral zero point 
(i.e., started to become salient) at six and a half minutes into the video.  
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Table 1 
 
Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates (Standard Errors in Parentheses) for the Dependent Variables. 
 
 Study 2 (N = 134)  Study 3 (N = 129)  Study 4 (N = 150) 
Fixed effects RE MO TP OC VA  RE MO TP OC  PRE MO TP OC MRE IN 
Intercept 0.76 
(0.19) 
2.35 
(0.14) 
0.30 
(0.18) 
-1.85 
(0.21) 
2.16 
(0.15) 
 0.01 
(0.27) 
2.24 
(0.21) 
-0.38 
(0.24) 
-1.76 
(0.30) 
 0.02 
(0.23) 
2.01 
(0.20) 
-0.18 
(0.23) 
-0.21 
(0.31) 
1.96 
(0.21) 
0.24 
(0.26) 
Time 0.67 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
-0.49 
(0.08) 
0.72 
(0.09) 
-0.20 
(0.02) 
 1.02 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.03) 
-0.57 
(0.09) 
1.00 
(0.11) 
 1.06 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.30 
(0.03) 
0.40 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.28 
(0.03) 
Time2 -0.16 
(0.03) 
– 0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
–  -0.18 
(0.03) 
– 0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.01) 
 -0.19 
(0.03) 
– – – – – 
Time3 0.01 
(0.00) 
– – – –  0.01 
(0.00) 
– – –  0.01 
(0.00) 
– – – – – 
Condition – 
 
– – – –  -0.53 
(0.34) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
0.55 
(0.29) 
-0.07 
(0.37) 
 -0.13 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.28) 
-0.08 
(0.30) 
-1.15 
(0.41) 
0.12 
(0.30) 
0.53 
(0.34) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Study 2 (N = 134)  Study 3 (N = 129)  Study 4 (N = 150) 
Random effects RE MO TP OC VA  RE MO TP OC  PRE MO TP OC MRE IN 
Between-person                  
   Intercept 1.72 1.13 1.74 1.96 1.23  2.07 1.22 1.69 1.75  1.85 1.52 1.61 2.33 1.46 1.62 
   Time 0.53 0.12 0.74 0.74 0.16  0.69 0.20 0.72 0.86  0.61 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 
   Time2 0.00 – 0.06 0.07 –  0.05 – 0.06 0.07  0.06 – – – – – 
   Time3 0.01 – – – –  – – – –  0.00 – – – – – 
Within-person                  
    Residual 1.35 1.32 1.21 1.45 1.52  1.21 1.37 1.38 2.01  0.91 0.99 1.38 1.82 1.22 1.68 
    AR(1) .49 .68 .50 .45 .53  .55 .60 .48 .65  .26 .32 .47 .58 .56 .60 
Marginal R2 .01 .01 .09 .14 .05  .06 .02 .14 .16  .10 .01 .08 .12 .00 .07 
Conditional R2 .74 .61 .77 .78 .63  .78 .60 .69 .65  .83 .77 .66 .66 .68 .61 
Note. RE = Recovery; MO = Mood; TP = Time Perception; OC = Opportunity Costs; VA = Valence; PRE = Physical Recovery; MRE = Mental Recovery;  
IN = Interest. The fixed effects are reported as unstandardized regression coefficients. The random effects are reported as standard deviations and correlations. 
Condition is coded 0 = high opportunity costs and 1 = low opportunity costs. The fixed effects estimates in bold are significant (all ps < .001, except for the 
main effect of condition on opportunity costs in Study 4, with p = .006). Marginal R2 depicts the proportion of explained variance of the fixed effects. 
Conditional R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed and random effects combined (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014).
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Figure 4. Spaghetti plots of the fixed and random effects of time (Study 2). Panel A: 
Experienced recovery, B: Mood, C: Time perception, D: Opportunity costs, E: Valence of the 
activity. 
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Random slopes correlations. The estimates of the random slopes correlations are 
shown in Table 2. These within-person associations provide information about the degree of 
association between the rate of change in one variable and the rate of change in another. Out 
of all the indicator variables, only the random slopes for mood showed a substantial 
correlation with the random slopes for recovery: Persons who reported a steeper increase 
(decrease) in mood during the recovery period also showed a steeper initial increase 
(decrease) in recovery. The random slopes for mood, activity valence, and time perception 
evinced a positive manifold: Persons who reported an increase (decrease) in one of those 
variables also reported an increase (decrease) in the other variables over time. Lastly, the 
random slopes for opportunity costs were negatively associated with the random slopes for 
activity valence and time perception: Persons who reported an increase (decrease) in 
opportunity costs perceived the video as less (more) pleasant and time as more (less) 
extending as time went on. 
Brief Discussion 
The central finding of Study 2 is that changes in mood were substantially associated 
with changes in recovery within persons. In comparison, none of the other psychological 
indicators covaried with the experience of recovery over time. Furthermore, we found first 
evidence for the hypothesized time course of experienced recovery and opportunity costs 
during a relaxing activity. Regarding recovery, persons tend to recover only for a limited 
amount of time, and report decreases in recovery when they stay engaged in a relaxing 
activity past a certain point. This finding suggests that relaxing activities do not contribute to 
the experience of recovery indefinitely. The amount of time to the point when the activity no 
longer contributes to one’s recovery varies greatly between persons, as is evident by the 
substantial variation in individual slopes (see Figure 4, panel A). Hence, in a next step, we 
sought to explain this between-person variability in the slopes for recovery. 
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Table 2  
Bayesian Multivariate Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates of the Random Slopes 
Correlations (Study 2). 
 
Random Slope 1 2 3 4 
1. Recovery –    
2. Mood .46 [.22, .67] –   
3. Valence .11 [-.15, .35] .49 [.23, .71] –  
4. Time Perception .10 [-.13, .33] .37 [.13, .58] .27 [.02, .50] – 
5. Opportunity Costs .03 [-.22, .28] -.13 [-.39, .15] -.42 [-.63, -.16] -.47 [-.66, -.25] 
 
Note. N = 134. Reported are the means of the posterior distributions (95% credible intervals 
in brackets). Correlations in bold are substantial (their 95% CIs do not include 0). 
 
The average opportunity costs slope showed a strong increase as recovery progressed, which 
might indicate that opportunity costs are central for understanding whether an activity is 
experienced as relaxing or not. For this reason, in Studies 3 and 4 we manipulated perceived 
opportunity costs to examine whether such a manipulation can explain some of the between-
person variability in the slopes for recovery.  
We decided against a mood manipulation for the following reasons: First, in this study 
design, a manipulation of the psychological indicators of recovery needs to take place 
between the exhaustion and recovery period. Thus, the manipulation needs to be as quick as 
possible so as to not interfere with the recovery process. Because mood manipulations 
typically take some minutes, we did not see any viable solution on how to implement a mood 
manipulation in such a short amount of time. Second, even if we were successful in 
implementing a short mood manipulation, we still would have no way of knowing if a person 
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attributes her or his mood on the mood manipulation activity itself or on the relaxing activity 
(the latter of which is what would be necessary to test a causal relationship between mood 
and recovery; Schwarz, 2011).  
Study 3 
The aims of Study 3 were to (1) replicate the results of Study 2, and (2) test for a causal 
relationship between opportunity costs and recovery by manipulating the perceived 
opportunity costs of a relaxing activity. To this end, we employed the same design as in 
Study 2 with a few alterations: As an easier and shorter way to induce exhaustion, we 
employed 5-minutes of stair running instead of the 20-minutes high intensity interval training 
from Study 2. Further, in a comprehensive pilot study we presented participants (N = 296) 
with a list of computer-based activities and asked them to rate the extent to which they would 
prefer doing these activities compared to watching a relaxing aquatic video. Results 
suggested that watching funny YouTube videos, online shopping, looking something up 
online, and mind wandering were the most attractive alternatives, while watching old weather 
forecasts, reading an article of a tabloid, and listening to old German pop songs were the most 
unattractive alternatives. As the attractive and unattractive activities had to be as comparable 
as possible on all other dimensions, we settled on watching funny YouTube videos as the 
attractive alternative and watching old weather forecasts as the unattractive alternative. Thus, 
in Study 3, before participants began watching the relaxing video, we told them that after the 
relaxing video had ended, they would either watch very funny or boring YouTube videos. 
With this manipulation, we sought to alter the perceived opportunity costs of the relaxing 
activity (i.e., induce high costs in the “funny videos” condition and induce low costs in the 
“boring videos” condition). Based on our theoretical considerations about psychological 
indicators of exhaustion and recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019a), we hypothesized that 
participants in the “funny videos” or high costs condition feel recovered faster than 
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participants in the “boring videos” or low costs condition, if experiences of increasing 
opportunity costs serve as an indication that a relaxing activity has fulfilled its goal of 
recovering a person. 
Method 
Participants. An a-priori power analysis with G*Power (Version 3.1; Faul et al., 2009) 
indicated that we needed at least 120 participants to detect an interaction of a between-person 
(condition: high costs vs. low costs) and within-person (time) factor with a small population 
effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.10), 95% power and a 5% error probability in a repeated measures 
design consisting of ten measurement occasions. We applied the same inclusion criteria as in 
Study 2, with the addition that participants had not participated in Study 2. A total of N = 129 
adults (Mage = 28.17 years, SD = 9.98; 56% female) participated in this study. Approximately 
two thirds of the sample consisted of students (64%). In general, participants reported 
relatively high physical fitness (M = 3.47, SD = .95, range from 0 [not fit at all] to 5 [very 
fit]). 
Measures. We used the same measures as in Study 2, with two exceptions: (1) We 
omitted the activity valence item from the list of dependent variables, because it showed 
substantial correlations with the random slopes of mood, time perception, and opportunity 
costs in Study 2, and (2) we included the main effect of the between-person condition 
variable (coded 0 = high costs, 1 = low costs) as an additional independent variable. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2, with the following modifications: 
Instead of a 20-minute high intensity interval training, participants ran up and down the stairs 
of the 5-floor University building for five minutes. We instructed participants to run as 
quickly as possible. In order to motivate participants to exert maximal effort, either a student 
assistant or the first author took part in each stair running session. Afterwards, participants 
were immediately guided into a lab room, where they were seated in front of a computer. 
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Before they started watching the relaxing aquatic video, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: Participants in the high costs (low costs) condition were instructed 
that after watching the relaxing video, they would see very funny (very boring) YouTube 
videos. Because we run a “no deception lab,” this was actually the case. 
Statistical analysis. The analysis approach was the same as in Study 2.  
Results 
Exhaustion manipulation check. Participants reported a significant decrease in 
recovery (increase in exhaustion) after the training (M = -2.33, SD = 2.27) compared to 
before (M = 1.25, SD = 2.33), t(128) = 13.73, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [3.07, 
4.10], d = 0.73, 95% CI [0.48, 0.99]. Thus, the stair running successfully induced exhaustion. 
In comparison, the other dependent variables did not change meaningfully on average before 
vs. after the training (ds between 0.05 to 0.24; see Table A2 in Appendix A). 
Preliminary analyses and model building. The initial multilevel analysis dataset 
consisted of N = 129 participants x 10 measurement occasions = 1,290 observations. 
Inspection of the scatterplots, person by person, indicated that due to a very infrequent 
technical failure, three persons had missing data between six and nine measurement 
occasions. Thus, the final analysis dataset consisted of 1,267 observations. The scatterplots 
further revealed that eight participants reported a ceiling effect of recovery without any 
substantial changes for the ten measurement time points. However, these participants did 
report changes in other dependent variables, therefore we refrained from excluding them 
from the analyses. The model building process was the same as in Study 2.  
Opportunity costs manipulation check. To check whether the opportunity costs 
manipulation had worked, we inspected the opportunity costs time course for both conditions. 
Contrary to our expectations based on the pilot study, the main effect of condition was not 
significant, b = 0.07, t(127) = -0.18, p = .85, 95% CI [-0.80, 0.67]. Thus, the experimental 
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manipulation was not successful.1 For further analyses, we collapsed the two experimental 
conditions and proceeded with the analyses in a correlational manner just as in Study 2. 
Time courses and random slopes correlations. As can be seen in Table 1, the time 
courses of the dependent variables were very similar to the ones found in Study 2. Further, 
we also replicated the correlations of the random slopes found in Study 2 (see Table A4 in 
Appendix A), with one exception: In this study, the random slopes of mood were 
substantially negatively correlated with the random slopes of perceived opportunity costs: 
Persons who experienced a steeper decline (increase) in mood also experienced a steeper 
increase (decline) in opportunity costs throughout the recovery period. Again, changes in 
mood were significantly related to changes in recovery over time, whereas all other indicators 
were not. This replicates the main result of Study 2. 
Brief Discussion 
This study replicated the pattern of results of Study 2 regarding the time courses of the 
dependent variables and their random slopes correlations. Again, changes in mood were 
significantly related to changes in recovery within person, and none of the other 
 
1 Although the manipulation check indicated that we were not successful in 
manipulating the opportunity costs with our procedure, we tested if the two groups differed in 
their recovery. Table 1 shows the main effect of the between-person condition variable 
(coded 0 = high costs, 1 = low costs) on the within-person time variable (coded 0 to 9) for the 
dependent variables. Of particular interest is the main effect of condition for the recovery 
variable. Our main hypothesis for this study was that persons in the high costs condition feel 
recovered faster than persons in the low costs condition. However, regarding recovery, the 
main effect term was not significant, b = -0.53, t(127) = -1.59,  p = .11, 95% CI [-1.20, 0.13]. 
Thus, participants in both conditions did not differ in their recovery time courses.  
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psychological indicators of recovery included in this study covaried significantly with 
recovery.  
Despite the extensive pilot study, we were not successful in experimentally 
manipulating opportunity costs in Study 3. Thus, we were unable to test the hypothesis that 
perceived opportunity costs might underlie the experience of recovery. For Study 4, we 
conducted more pilot studies on the experimental induction of high vs. low opportunity costs 
and re-ran Study 3.  
Study 4 
Aiming at identifying a reliable way to experimentally induce high vs. low opportunity 
costs, we piloted three different manipulations: (1) the same instruction manipulation as in 
Study 3 but with additional preview clips of the attractive or unattractive alternatives, (2) 
making a donation to charitable institutions as the attractive alternative and performing a 
mindless task (repetitive clicking on a set of words; Markey, Chin, VanEpps, & Loewenstein, 
2014) as the unattractive alternative, and (3) having participants think about what attractive or 
unattractive activity they could be doing instead of taking part in the experiment and keeping 
this activity salient throughout the recovery period. Results of the pilot studies suggested that 
the third approach was most effective in altering participant’s perceived opportunity costs 
right before, during, and after the recovery period. Therefore, we adopted this manipulation 
paradigm in Study 4. 
In Studies 2 and 3, a small subset of participants reported higher levels of recovery after 
the exhaustion period compared to before. We suspected that these participants might have 
weighted their cognitive activation following the physical exercise more strongly towards 
their assessment of recovery than their feelings of physical exertion. Therefore, in Study 4 we 
included a distinction between physical and mental recovery and exhaustion with the aim of 
achieving a more homogenous assessment of these constructs. Furthermore, some of the 
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participants in Studies 2 and 3 anecdotally gave us the feedback that they became bored after 
watching the relaxing video for a while. To be able to disentangle boredom from recovery, 
we also included a measure of boredom.   
Method 
Participants. An a-priori Monte Carlo power analysis (Green & MacLeod, 2016) using 
simulated data from the third pilot study revealed that we needed 150 participants to detect a 
main effect of condition on the opportunity costs time course with 95% power and a 5% error 
probability. The study had the same inclusion criteria as Studies 2 and 3 with the addition that 
participants had not participated in the previous main and pilot studies. A total of N = 150 
participants (Mage = 28.09 years, SD = 12.23; 71% female) of mostly students (71%) 
participated in this study. As in the previous studies, participants reported relatively high 
physical fitness (M = 3.17, SD = .97, range from 0 [not fit at all] to 5 [very fit]). 
Measures. We used the same dependent variables as in Study 3, with the following 
additions: (1) We assessed recovery with the two items “How do you feel right now 
physically?” and “How do you feel right now mentally?” and (2) we included the 
interest/boredom item “How do you perceive this activity right now?” with -5 (very boring) 
and +5 (very interesting) as verbal anchors. 
We also included a number of additional opportunity costs manipulation checks: Right 
after the manipulation and before the relaxing video started, participants indicated the degree 
to which they wanted to watch the relaxing video versus engage in the alternative activity 
with the item “Which of these activities would you rather do right now?” with -5 (do the 
alternative activity) and +5 (watch the relaxing video) as verbal anchors. Immediately after 
the relaxing video had ended, we asked participants to guess how long the video had lasted 
and to indicate how long the video ideally should have lasted for them to fully recover. 
Further, we asked participants to indicate how often they had thought of the alternative 
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activity while watching the video on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 5 (a lot) and how attractive the 
alternative activity was compared to watching the video on a scale of -5 (a lot more 
unattractive) to +5 (a lot more attractive). 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 3, with the following modifications: 
For the opportunity costs manipulation, we asked participants to think of an attractive (high 
costs condition) or unattractive (low costs condition) alternative activity that they could be 
doing instead of participating in the study. We then kept this activity salient throughout the 
recovery period by briefly reminding participants of this activity at each measurement 
occasion before they answered the questions.  
Statistical analysis. The data analytical procedure was the same as in Studies 2 and 3.  
Results 
Exhaustion manipulation check. Participants reported a significant increase in 
physical exhaustion after the training (M = -1.49, SD = 2.12) compared to before (M = 0.96, 
SD = 1.94), t(149) = 11.02, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [2.01, 2.89], d = 0.89, 
95% CI [0.66, 1.13]. Thus, as in Study 3, the stair running was successful in inducing 
physical exhaustion. In contrast, participants reported feeling slightly more mentally 
recovered after the training (M = 1.79, SD = 1.82) compared to before (M = 1.36, SD = 1.79), 
t(149) = -2.25, p = .03, 95% CI of the mean difference [-0.81, -0.05], d = -0.14, 95% CI [-
0.37, 0.08]. As in the previous two studies, the other dependent variables did on average not 
change meaningfully before vs. after the training (ds between 0.03 to 0.27; see Table A3 in 
Appendix A). 
Preliminary analyses and model building. The initial multilevel analysis dataset 
consisted of N = 150 participants x 8 measurement occasions = 1,200 observations. There 
were no missing data. Inspection of the person-by-person scatterplots revealed that two 
participants reported a ceiling effect of recovery without any substantial changes for the eight 
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measurement time points. However, as in the previous two studies, these participants reported 
changes in other dependent variables, therefore we refrained from excluding them from the 
analyses. The model building process was the same as in Studies 2 and 3.  
Time courses and random slopes correlations. As can be seen in Table 1, the time 
courses of the dependent variables were very similar to the ones found in Studies 2 and 3. 
Mental recovery was the only dependent variable that did not change meaningfully over time 
on average. The time course of interest/boredom was similar to the one of time perception: 
Both started out near the neutral zero point and decreased as time went on (i.e., time started to 
extend and boredom to increase). We also replicated the random slopes correlations found in 
the previous two studies (see Table A5 in Appendix A), with one exception: As in Study 2 
and unlike Study 3, the random slopes of mood were not correlated with the random slopes of 
opportunity costs. The random slopes of mental recovery were positively associated with the 
random slopes of physical recovery, mood, and interest, and negatively with the random 
slopes of opportunity costs. The random slopes of interest/boredom were positively 
associated with the random slopes of mental recovery, mood, and time perception, and 
negatively with the random slopes of opportunity costs. 
Opportunity costs manipulation checks. Regarding the opportunity costs 
manipulation check, we found a significant main effect of condition on opportunity costs, b = 
-1.15, t(148) = -2.82, p = .006, 95% CI [-1.95, -0.34], with a substantial effect size (semi-
partial marginal R2 = .04, 95% CI [.06, .02]; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014). 
As the model with only the main effects of time and condition (AIC = 4712.4, BIC = 4753.1) 
fitted the data better than the model with an additional time and condition interaction term 
(AIC = 4714.1, BIC = 4759.9), we conclude that, although opportunity costs increased for 
both conditions as time went on, they were on average 1.15 units lower for the low costs 
condition throughout the whole recovery period.  
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Regarding the pre-video manipulation-check item, the high costs condition reported 
substantially lower scores (M = -1.36, SD = 3.15) compared to the low costs condition (M = 
3.19, SD = 2.42), t(132.94) = -9.87, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [-5.46, -3.64], d 
=  1.61, 95% CI [1.24, 1.98]; note that the scale of this item ranged from -5 (do the 
alternative activity) to +5 (watch the relaxing video). Thus, as expected, participants in the 
high costs condition reported rather wanting to do the alternative activity, while participants 
in the low costs condition reported rather wanting to watch the relaxing video. In addition, 
participants in the high costs condition reported a higher frequency of thoughts about the 
alternative activity while watching the video (M = 2.36, SD = 1.37) compared to those in the 
low costs condition (M = 1.69, SD = 1.48), t(146.98) = 2.88, p = .005, 95% CI of the mean 
difference [0.21, 1.13], d = -0.47, 95% CI [-0.80, -0.14], and found the alternative activity 
more attractive (M = 3.57, SD = 1.18) than those in the low costs condition (M = 1.90, SD = 
1.49), t(143.30) = 7.61, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [1.24, 2.11], d = -1.25, 95% 
CI [-1.60, -0.89].  
Main hypothesis test. To test the hypothesis that participants in the high costs 
condition feel recovered faster than participants in the low costs condition, we analyzed the 
main effect of condition on time with physical recovery as the dependent variable. Contrary 
to our expectation, this term was not significant, b = -0.13, t(148) = -0.45, p = .66, 95% CI [-
0.70, 0.44]: Participants in both conditions did not differ in their recovery time courses.  
Brief Discussion 
Although we were successful in manipulating opportunity costs before, during, and 
after a recovery period in Study 4, we did not find evidence for the hypothesis that persons 
with high opportunity costs feel recovered faster than persons with low opportunity costs. 
Considering these results, along with the descriptive results of Study 1 and the correlative 
findings of Studies 2 and 3, the evidence against the hypothesis that perceived opportunity 
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costs of a relaxing activity influence feelings of physical recovery is strong and suggests that 
it should be rejected. In contrast, replicating the pattern of results from Studies 2 and 3, the 
correlative findings of Study 4 suggest again that changes in mood are related to changes in 
the experienced recovery within person.  
General Discussion 
What indicates short-term recovery? Across four studies, we examined the role of 
opportunity costs, mood, and subjective time perception as indicators of subjective recovery. 
We consistently found a positive relationship between mood and subjective recovery: 
People’s lay beliefs revealed that “feeling good” is the most salient cue for assessing their 
recovery progress (Study 1). This link was further corroborated experimentally: Following an 
exhaustion induction, participants’ subjective recovery over time and changes in their mood 
were positively correlated within persons (Studies 2-4). In contrast, we did not find strong 
support for the theorized link between opportunity costs and recovery, and found no support 
for the relationship between subjective time perception and recovery. Nevertheless, on the 
basis of theoretical considerations (cf. Kurzban et al., 2013) and the finding in Study 2 that 
perceived opportunity costs sharply increased over the course of the recovery period, we 
targeted this construct for experimental manipulation that we successfully achieved in Study 
4. However, we found no evidence for the hypothesis that perceiving high opportunity costs 
during a recovery period accelerates the speed of subjective recovery.  
Positioning Mood as an Indicator of Recovery 
The findings of the present studies are in line with conceptualizations of recovery as a 
process of “repairing” one’s mood (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007; Thayer, 1989; Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988). For instance, in his biopsychological mood model, Thayer (1989) 
describes mood as arising from the interplay between the degree of energy (vs. tiredness) and 
tension (vs. calmness) that is presently experienced by a person. According to Thayer, the 
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optimal mood state is comprised of high levels of energy and low levels of tension (i.e., calm 
energy; Thayer, 2001), whereas a particularly negative mood state is comprised of low levels 
of energy and high levels of tension. Similarly, in their circumplex model of affect, Watson et 
al. (1988) describe positive affect as a state of high energy, full concentration, and 
pleasurable engagement, whereas negative affect is comprised of subjective distress, 
unpleasurable engagement, and a variety of negative emotions. Our research adds to these 
conceptualizations by positioning mood as an indicator of recovery.  
Prior empirical evidence for the relationship between mood and recovery has been 
scarce. For example, Sonnentag and Zijlstra (2006) found that people who reported a higher 
need for recovery after a working day also tended to report a worse mood at bedtime. Further, 
Sonnentag, Binnewies, and Mojza (2008) found that evening recovery experiences (i.e., 
psychological detachment from work, relaxation, mastery, and control; Sonnentag & Fritz, 
2007) positively predicted mood the next morning. However, a limitation of the two studies 
by Sonnentag and colleagues (Sonnentag & Zijlstra, 2006; Sonnentag et al., 2008) is that they 
did not assess the degree of subjective recovery but used proximate constructs such as need 
for recovery or experiences during the recovery process. Moreover, there was a temporal gap 
between the assessment of mood and recovery, thus telling us little about the co-occurrence 
of both variables. 
To our knowledge, this paper presents the first set of studies that have found a positive 
concurrent association between mood and subjective recovery. We hasten to add, however, 
that we do not view recovery as merely reflecting one’s current mood state. In our view, 
mood and recovery are conceptually related, yet not conterminous constructs (Cardini & 
Freund, 2019a). In particular, we conceptualize changes in mood as an indication of 
recovery, in that mood is only positively related to recovery for as long as the current activity 
contributes to one’s recovery, and that mood starts to decline once recovery is achieved, as a 
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motivational cue for goal disengagement. However, we acknowledge that the current studies 
cannot directly address this second part of our assumption (i.e., that mood starts to decline 
once recovery is achieved). 
What Do Perceived Opportunity Costs Reflect? 
Contrary to our expectation, we did not find strong support for the theorized association 
between opportunity costs and recovery. Specifically, instructing people to think about an 
attractive or unattractive alternative activity did not seem to have an effect on their subjective 
recovery from physical exertion. It seems that people do not use the attractiveness of or the 
thought frequency about alternative activities as a cue for evaluating their recovery progress. 
This finding contradicts our hypothesis that experiencing opportunity costs signals that the 
present activity has fulfilled its goal of recovery and should be discontinued (Cardini & 
Freund, 2019a).  
However, in partial support of our hypothesis, Study 4 revealed that persons who 
reported an increase in opportunity costs also tended to report a decrease in mental recovery 
(increase in mental exhaustion) during the recovery period. Perhaps, then, opportunity costs 
are more relevant for exhaustion. This view is supported by Kurzban et al. (2013), who 
propose that an activity’s opportunity costs are experienced as mental effort: The higher an 
activity’s opportunity costs, the more mentally demanding an activity is perceived. Thus, 
instead of signaling goal disengagement, opportunity costs might instead function as an input 
for experienced effort. This is further corroborated by the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4 that 
opportunity costs increase somewhat as a result of demanding exercise (see Tables A1-A3 in 
Appendix A).  
Subjective Recovery Is a Domain-Specific Construct 
Study 4 showed that participants on average reported a slight increase in mental 
recovery after demanding physical exercise despite feeling substantially more physically 
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exhausted. Study 4 also showed that participants did not report mean changes in mental 
recovery during the recovery period, despite reporting mean changes in physical recovery. 
This suggests that physical and mental recovery, while positively correlated (see Table A5 in 
Appendix A) are dissociable constructs that are characterized by differential time courses and 
affected by different factors. For instance, Study 4 showed that mental, but not physical 
recovery was associated with opportunity costs and interest: People who reported higher 
mental recovery also reported lower opportunity costs and higher interest in the relaxing 
activity. It might be that certain motivational variables such as interest and opportunity costs 
affect mental recovery more than physical recovery.  
This finding is in line with previous research showing that acute physical exercise can 
have a beneficial effect on the performance of subsequent cognitive tasks (Brisswalter et al., 
2002; Lambourne & Tomporowski, 2010). One explanation of this finding is that physical 
exercise leads to an increase in physiological arousal, which in turn facilitates cognitive 
functioning (Tomporowski, 2003; Audiffren, 2009).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
This set of studies has some limitations. First, in their meta-analysis on the effect of 
acute physical exercise on cognition, Lambourne and Tomporowski (2010, p. 17) conclude 
that “typical laboratory-based exercise protocols that are presumed to produce fatigue may be 
insufficient to simulate the physiological demands encountered in naturalistic sport and 
extreme human performance environments.” Furthermore, although our choice of the aquatic 
video was based on empirical work (Piferi et al., 2000) demonstrating that the video induced 
a faster physiological recovery from a period of effortful activity compared to traditional 
resting, this relaxing activity might not have been as effective at impacting the subjective 
experience of recovery, as was evident by the relatively small fixed effects of recovery in 
Studies 2-4 and the gradual increase of boredom in Study 4. Thus, the physical exercises and 
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recovery activity might not have fully induced the extent of exhaustion and recovery one 
might expect to find in naturalistic settings.  
Second, the very fact that persons likely planned their schedule so as to include 
participation in the study might have lessened their experiences of opportunity costs during 
the experiments: Knowing that the experiment lasted only for about an hour and planning 
accordingly might have lowered the perceived opportunity costs. For instance, while persons 
in the high opportunity costs condition in Study 4 rated alternative activities as more 
attractive (and persons in the low opportunity costs condition rated alternative activities as 
more unattractive) compared to watching the relaxing video, the knowledge that the relaxing 
video had a fixed endpoint determined by the experiment might have counteracted the value 
of these alternative activities. Opportunity costs might be more pressing when people can 
realistically envision doing something better with their time. 
Third, we did not capture the exact point in time where participants felt sufficiently 
recovered and wanted to disengage from the relaxing activity (i.e., goal attainment). Instead, 
we inferred this information from the subjective recovery and opportunity costs time courses. 
Assessing these constructs with a lag of two minutes during the recovery period might have 
been too coarse to detect interindividual differences in this regard. However, even assessing 
these variables every two minutes seemed pushing the feasibility of the frequency with which 
we interrupted their recovery experience. Alternatively, we could have introduced a stopping 
rule and asked participants to stop when they no longer enjoy the task or when they feel 
sufficiently recovered. Previous research suggests that people in a negative mood disengage 
faster from the task than people in a positive mood, given that mood reflects one’s task 
enjoyment (Martin et al., 1993).  
Lastly, one might argue that mood and recovery are confounded in the methodology, 
because the relaxing video might have induced both positive mood and recovery independent 
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of each other. In other words, the video in itself might be a positive mood manipulation that 
participants happen to watch while they are also recovering from physical exertion. In this 
case, the positive association between mood and recovery might be spurious due to the video 
as a confounding variable. However, in one of the pilot studies conducted for Study 4, we had 
young adults (N = 20) watch the relaxing video without inducing exhaustion beforehand. In 
this scenario, mood remained stable within- and between-person for the whole video duration 
(fixed effect of time: b = 0.01, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.10]; random-intercept-and-slope 
model did not provide better model fit compared to random-intercept-only model, p = .28). 
Thus, it appears that the video does not necessarily in itself induce positive mood. It seems 
more likely, then, that the increase in positive mood during the video in our studies is 
primarily due to participant’s recovery from induced exhaustion. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, we suggest that future work should consider 
assessing exhaustion and recovery in everyday life. Advantages to such an approach include: 
(1) We would learn how exhaustion and recovery unfold in a natural setting, where (2) people 
can freely choose their preferred exhausting and relaxing activities, and where we can (3) 
measure the same people across many exhausting and relaxing activities to get a more 
reliable estimate of the exhaustion and recovery time courses along with their proposed 
indicators. In addition, laboratory studies building on the design of the current studies could 
complement the field studies in a more controlled environment.  
Conclusions 
How do we know when an activity has helped us recover, and when it is time to 
disengage from it in order to pursue more beneficial alternatives? Across four 
methodologically diverse studies encompassing qualitative, correlational, and experimental 
designs, we consistently found evidence for a positive within-person association between 
changes in mood and recovery: When people recover, they simultaneously elevate their 
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mood. This relationship was not present at the between-person level: Average mood 
consistently showed a slight linear decrease during the recovery period. Thus, the relationship 
between mood and recovery might not be as straightforward as previously assumed (e.g., 
Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007). In contrast, it seems that people do not take their perceived 
opportunity costs and subjective sense of time as an indication of their recovery. However, 
people might nevertheless take their perceived opportunity costs as an indication of effort 
and, by extension, exhaustion. In fact, to our knowledge, this set of studies provides first 
empirical evidence for the core assumption underlying Kurzban et al.’s (2013) opportunity 
cost model of subjective effort. Taken together, then, the present research contributes two 
novel insights to our understanding of emotion and motivation: (1) Changes in mood might 
be an indicator of recovery, and (2) perceived opportunity costs might be one of the 
psychological inputs people use to determine their physical and mental states of exhaustion 
and might play an important role in the process of goal disengagement (see also Hofmann et 
al., 2019).  
These results have implications for other areas of research. For instance, Sonnentag and 
Fritz (2007) have stressed the importance of psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, 
and control for recovery from work-related stress. Furthermore, Newman, Tay, and Diener 
(2014) have singled out experiences of detachment, autonomy, mastery, meaning, and 
affiliation for promoting subjective well-being during leisure. Our results suggest that 
strategies aimed at improving one’s mood (e.g., listening to music; Thayer et al., 1994) 
represent another important avenue for promoting recovery.  
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Abstract 
Two studies investigated subjective conceptualizations of energy for goal pursuit across 
adulthood. Study 1 (N = 276, 20-92 years) explored age-related differences in the (a) 
endorsement of a limited vs. nonlimited account of energy for goal pursuit, (b) amount of 
energy available for physically, mentally, socially, and emotionally demanding activities, and 
(c) extent to which spending energy on a demanding activity inhibits or facilitates energy 
expenditure for subsequent activities, both within and across functional domains. Study 2 (N 
= 147, 18-86 years) experimentally induced energy loss through a 20-minute physical 
exercise and examined age-related differences in the increase of subjective exhaustion and 
opportunity costs as a motivational cue for goal disengagement. With increasing age, adults 
more strongly endorsed a nonlimited account of energy and perceived to have more energy 
available for personally relevant mental and social activities. However, older adults also 
reported higher negative cross-domain energy spillover after physical exertion. Multilevel 
growth curve models further revealed that, compared to younger adults, older adults reported 
a steeper initial increase in exhaustion and opportunity costs during physical exercise, but 
converged with the younger age groups again at the close of the exercise session. The 
discussion centers around the importance of selectivity in older adulthood and motivational 
accounts of effort and exhaustion.  
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Introduction 
Energy fuels many of our goal pursuits. For instance, maintaining fitness requires 
engaging in regular physical exercise. Writing a manuscript necessitates intense thinking 
about how to efficiently translate abstract ideas into engaging scientific prose. Cultivating a 
valued friendship requires emotional involvement and “being there” during tough times. 
Indeed, energy seems instrumental to achieve all of these desired ends. Yet, despite the 
apparent ubiquity of energy-consuming activities, surprisingly little is known about the nature 
of energy and its changes across adulthood. In the present studies, we addressed this research 
gap by examining how people conceive of energy, whether they differentiate between kinds 
of energy (e.g., energy for physical exercise, for mental activity, for emotional involvement), 
and how the subjective availability of energy might change across adulthood.  
To preview, in Study 1 we examined age-related differences in (1) the endorsement of a 
limited vs. nonlimited account of energy for goal pursuit, similar to, but distinct from, 
subjective beliefs about willpower (Job et al., 2010) or the malleability of abilities (Dweck, 
2008), (2) the perceived amount of available energy for everyday activities in different 
functional domains (physical, mental, social, emotional), and (3) the extent to which people 
believe that spending energy on a demanding activity in a given functional domain affects 
their available energy for subsequent activities (i.e., energy spillover). In Study 2, we 
expanded on some of the key results of Study 1. In particular, we experimentally induced a 
state of energy loss due to physical exertion and examined age-related differences in 
proximal motivational consequences, such as subjective exhaustion and opportunity costs 
(i.e., the extent to which one would rather spend currently available energy on attractive 
alternatives; Kurzban et al., 2013).  
In what follows, we first provide a working definition of energy. Next, we outline 
possible age-related differences in the subjective availability of energy in different functional 
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domains. Finally, we take a motivational perspective on energy and derive age-differential 
hypotheses about the development of subjective exhaustion and opportunity costs during 
effortful activities.  
Toward a Working Definition of Energy 
Energy is a broad concept that is used in many different scientific fields. The most 
basic definition of energy stems from physics, where it refers to “the capacity for doing 
work” (Merriam-Webster, 2019). Work is the action of moving something against a force. 
Energy, in physics, is bound to the first law of thermodynamics: It can be neither created nor 
destroyed but only converted from one form to another. The same principle of energy applies 
to biology: Living organisms require energy to do the work necessary for survival and 
reproduction. In the case of humans and other omnivores, this energy is generated from the 
nutrients in their food through the process of aerobic cellular respiration. In short, inhaled 
oxygen breaks down the ingested nutrients (e.g., glucose) in a set of chemical reactions, 
thereby releasing chemical energy, which is converted into mechanical energy, for instance to 
produce work in the form of muscle contractions. The expenditure of such energy can be 
measured reliably in units of joules.  
In stark contrast, energy is a surprisingly elusive construct in psychology, despite the 
many ways it is used in everyday language: People spend energy on various activities, waste 
energy on boring ones, save energy for later, feel energetic or drained, and need to recharge 
energy after a long day at work. To what kind of energy do people refer in these instances? In 
our view, people's everyday usage of energy taps into three different aspects of experience 
and behavior: (i) the subjective availability of energy or the perceived potential to perform a 
task (e.g., “I don’t have the energy to do the laundry right now”), (ii) the actual process of 
spending energy or the execution of physical and/or mental operations in the service of 
progressing on a task (e.g., “I’m wasting my energy on these chores”), and (iii) the 
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phenomenology of spending energy or the sense of effort and exhaustion associated with 
sustained physical and/or mental activity (e.g., “Interacting with this person feels strenuous 
and is draining my energy”). For the sake of clarity, we restrict our working definition of 
energy to the first aspect: the perceived potential to perform a task or pursue a goal.  
How is this working definition of energy different from related constructs such as 
willpower and effort? Willpower or self-control is a volitional construct that denotes people’s 
willingness to initiate and maintain goal-relevant behavior in the face of setbacks, obstacles, 
or temptations (e.g., the extent to which a person is willing to resist the desire to lazily lounge 
on the sofa and, instead, go on the planned hike in the Alpes; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; 
Job et al., 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In contrast, we maintain that energy is a 
broader construct that denotes people’s perceived potential to perform a task or to pursue a 
goal (e.g., the extent to which the person perceives herself capable to do the 6-hour hike). 
Effort, in turn, refers to the perceived amount of energy people invest into a task or goal at 
hand (e.g., the amount of physical and/or mental labor the person experiences while hiking; 
Inzlicht et al., 2018; Kurzban, 2016). Effort can be conceptualized as “the process that 
mediates between how well an organism can potentially perform on some task [energy] and 
how well they actually perform on that task [performance]” (Inzlicht et al., 2018, p. 338).  
Energy, effort, and willpower are interrelated, yet refer to different motivational 
phenomena. For instance, a person might perceive to have sufficient energy available to run a 
marathon but might not be motivated to invest the required effort and thus perform poorly, or 
might not be willing to resist the urge of disengaging from running at the onset of muscle 
soreness. Conversely, a person might feel exhausted yet still be motivated to maintain effort 
despite the physical pain. Taken together, then, energy captures the perceived potential to 
perform, effort the perceived amount of invested energy, and willpower the willingness to 
muster the energy and effort in the service of a given goal. In motivational terms, energy can 
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be conceptualized as a resource that guides goal pursuit; that is, one selects or disengages 
from goals based on the perceived potential to pursue them. Effort denotes a resource that 
fuels goal pursuit; that is, one mobilizes physical and/or mental activity to make progress on 
the selected goals (e.g., Freund, Hennecke, & Mustafić, 2012). Willpower denotes a resource 
that shields one’s goal pursuit from tempting alternatives.  
Age-Related Differences in Subjective Energy Availability 
There are several reasons to expect age-related changes in the subjective availability of 
energy for goal pursuit. As people grow older, declines in physical and cognitive functioning 
become more prevalent (Baltes et al., 2006; Baltes & Smith, 2003). As a result, older adults 
become more selective in their goal pursuits (Freund & Baltes, 1998; 2002), and are more 
likely to avoid activities that lead to high levels of physiological arousal (Charles, 2010; 
Charles & Luong, 2013; Labouvie-Vief, Grühn, & Studer, 2010), or that involve high levels 
of mental effort (Hess, 2014; Hess, Smith, & Sharifian, 2016). Furthermore, older adults 
spend more time of their days in a sedentary way (Harvey, Chastin, & Skelton, 2015; 
Wullems, Verschueren, Degens, Morse, & Onambélé, 2016) and less time being physically 
active (Bauman, Merom, Bull, Buchner, & Fiatarone Singh, 2016; Sparling, Howard, 
Dunstan, & Owen, 2015; Sun, Norman, & While, 2013). One of the reasons for this 
activity/inactivity pattern might be that older adults perceive themselves to have generally 
less energy. 
At the same time, however, older adulthood is characterized by a marked increase in 
autonomy, that is, post retirement older adults possess more freedom to decide how to 
structure their days and which activities and goals they want to pursue (Erikson, 1963; Ryff, 
1995; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). Given that older adults tend to avoid activities requiring high 
amounts of effort (Hess, 2014) and select and invest into their goals based on their available 
resources (Ebner et al., 2006; Freund, 2008), they might choose to engage primarily in 
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physical and mental activities that are not very exhausting. In other words, older adults might 
– by selecting activities that match their perceived resources – manage their lives in a way for 
which they perceive to have sufficient energy. Consequently, older adults might perceive to 
have similar amounts of energy available to pursue their personal goals. 
Indeed, research on subjective beliefs about developmental trajectories shows that older 
adults do not believe that all goal-relevant resources decline with age (Mustafić & Freund, 
2012b). One example is the general-purpose resource of willpower: Job, Sieber, Rothermund, 
and Nikitin (2018) found that with age people are more likely to believe that willpower (i.e., 
the capacity to exert self-control) is nonlimited. In turn, endorsing a nonlimited view of 
willpower is associated with higher subjective well-being (Bernecker, Herrmann, 
Brandstätter, & Job, 2017). Job et al. (2018) demonstrated that perceived autonomy on 
demanding tasks is the mechanism driving the age-related change in self-control beliefs. This 
finding is in line with the proposition by Ryan and Deci (2008), that activities can maintain or 
even enhance one's subjective energy if they contribute to one's sense of autonomy, 
competence, or relatedness (see also Hope, Milyavskaya, Holding, & Koestner, 2016; Sieber, 
Flückiger, Mata, Bernecker, & Job, 2019). 
Furthermore, with increasing age, people’s future time horizons shrink, leading to a 
fundamental restructuring of their goal hierarchies across various life domains, such that they 
tend to show a preference for present-oriented emotional goals over future-oriented goals 
(Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen et al., 1999). Accordingly, older adults are more likely to 
terminate social relationships that are emotionally unsatisfying, but maintain intensive 
relations with emotionally close interaction partners (Fung, Carstensen, & Lang, 2001). As a 
result of this “social pruning,” older adults are more satisfied with and report fewer conflicts 
in their remaining social relationships (Antonucci, Fiori, Birditt, & Jackey, 2010; Luong, 
Charles, & Fingerman, 2011). Given the importance of positive social relationships and a 
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sense of belonging for subjective well-being and health (Nikitin & Freund, 2018; Ryff, 1995), 
older adults might even perceive to have more energy to pursue their personal goals.  
Age-Related Differences in Subjective Exhaustion and Opportunity Costs 
Given their motivation to maintain their current level of functioning and avoid further 
losses (Freund, 2006; Freund & Baltes, 1998, 2002; Freund et al., 2012), older adults might 
feel more driven to protect their remaining resources (e.g., energy) from superfluous goal 
pursuits. This assumption is supported by evidence showing that compared to younger adults, 
older adults report to disengage more readily from excessively costly or unattainable goals 
(Wrosch et al., 2003). This is adaptive, because a timely disengagement from costly yet 
unattainable goals helps protect older adults from developing depressive symptoms (Dunne, 
Wrosch, & Miller, 2011). Furthermore, compared to younger adults, older adults prioritize 
more efficiently between conflicting goals (Freund & Tomasik, 2019). In turn, focusing on 
the most important goals is related to more mutual facilitation among personal goals and to 
higher goal engagement (Riediger et al., 2005).  
How do people determine when an activity or goal has become too costly? One 
potential explanation comes from recent models of exhaustion, which emphasize the 
importance of weighing subjective costs and benefits for goal disengagement (e.g., Boksem 
& Tops, 2008; Cardini & Freund, 2019a; Hockey, 2013; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 
2013). For instance, Kurzban et al. have stressed the role of perceived opportunity costs as a 
motivational cue for goal disengagement. In short, perceiving an increase in opportunity costs 
during an ongoing activity leads to an increase in the sense of effort and to a decrease in the 
perceived utility of the activity, which in turn leads to goal disengagement (Hofmann et al., 
2019). Embedding this notion into a life-span developmental context, we (Cardini & Freund, 
2019a) have argued that it is adaptive for older adults to more readily detect such increases in 
opportunity costs, so that they can disengage earlier from activities requiring excessive 
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amounts of energy and reengage in more beneficial activities to maintain their level of 
functioning and prevent further losses.  
The Present Studies 
Based on the research reviewed above, the present studies examined age-related 
differences in the subjective availability of energy for goal pursuits related to different 
functional domains (for the importance of assessing views on aging in a domain-specific way, 
see Kornadt & Rothermund, 2015). Notably, this paper merges two different empirical 
approaches: Study 1 explored subjective beliefs regarding the availability of energy in 
different age groups in a large self-report study. Study 2 was a lab-based experiment inducing 
the experience of having less energy available through demanding physical exercise and 
investigated age-related differences in the resulting proximal motivational consequences.  
In Study 1, we explicitly asked people about their available energy for physically, 
mentally, socially, and emotionally demanding activities, and to what degree they believe that 
energy spent on an activity related to one functional domain facilitates or hinders their 
subsequent involvement in activities of other functional domains. Study 2 focused on the 
physical and mental domain, and inferred information related to energy expenditure indirectly 
through feelings of physical and mental exhaustion (e.g., Boksem & Tops, 2008) and 
opportunity costs (Kurzban et al., 2013). Study 2 was part of a larger experiment designed to 
examine age-related differences in the psychological indicators of exhaustion and recovery 
(Cardini & Freund, 2019a). Particularly relevant to this paper is the proposition that 
perceived increases in opportunity costs indicate exhaustion and serve as a motivational cue 
for disengagement from the exhausting activity (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). Taken together, 
these studies aim at providing more insight into people's beliefs (Study 1) and experiences 
(Study 2) governing the allocation of energy for goal pursuit across adulthood.  
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Study 1 
Study 1 explored age-related differences in the subjective availability of energy in 
general and for different functional domains in particular. Based on the work outlined above, 
we hypothesized that older adults report to have less energy available for physically and 
mentally demanding activities in general, but comparable (or more) energy for self-selected 
physically and mentally demanding activities in which they typically engage in their 
everyday lives. This should be the case because we assume that older adults select activities 
in their everyday lives that match their level of available resources. Furthermore, we explored 
the possibility that older adults have more energy available for socially and emotionally 
demanding activities.  
The study design presented us with a set of challenges. Because older adults are more 
selective in their goal pursuits (Freund, 2008), it was important to distinguish between 
available energy for activities in general and for activities that are representative of a person’s 
everyday life (and thus personally relevant). For instance, an older adult might believe that 
running a marathon is nearly impossible due to physical limitations, but that climbing the 
stairs of the apartment building is appropriately demanding for the amount of energy they feel 
they have at their disposal. Furthermore, to ensure comparability of the energy ratings across 
age groups, we included a frame of reference to which participants could compare their 
currently available energy. In particular, we asked participants to relate their currently 
available energy to the maximum amount of energy they believe to have possessed (if the 
peak lies in the past), should possess currently (if it lies in the present), or will possess (if it 
lies in the future). Furthermore, we took great care (1) not to restrict the age group of younger 
adults to a homogenized student sample, and (2) to include a sample of middle-aged adults, to 
avoid problems associated with extreme-group comparisons (Freund & Isaacowitz, 2013).  
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Method 
The research reported in this manuscript adhered to the guidelines of the local ethics 
committee, including the signing of an informed consent form and the administering of a 
debriefing. We report all measures of interest, exclusions, and statistical analyses in the main 
text.  
Participants. We determined the sample size based on a-priori power analysis with the 
pwr-package in R (Champely, 2018), which revealed a minimum sample size of 84 
participants per age group (N = 252) to detect a medium effect of interest (f = .25) with  = 
.05 and 95% power. We further based our sample size estimation on Schönbrodt and Perugini 
(2013), who suggest a minimum of 250 participants to detect stable correlation estimates. Our 
only inclusion criterion was that participants had to be between 18 and 100 years old.  
Initially, 426 participants were recruited from two participant pools of the Department 
of Psychology and the Life-Management lab of the University of Zurich (Switzerland) and 
gave their informed consent to participate. Of those, 334 persons completed the 
sociodemographic questionnaire, 279 answered the main variables of interest pertaining to 
subjective energy availability, and 276 filled out the dispositional measures, resulting in a 
final sample of N = 276 participants who completed the study and who were included in the 
statistical analyses. Of those, n = 92 were younger (20-35 years; 54% women), n = 92 
middle-aged (36-64 years; 54% women), and n = 92 older adults (65-92 years; 54% women). 
As reimbursement, we raffled 10 Amazon vouchers worth 30 Swiss francs among 
participants. In addition, participants received a descriptive overview of the results. 
Dispositional sample characteristics are reported in Table 3.  
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Measures. The means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of the study 
variables are depicted in Tables 3-5. All items reported in this study were either translated or 
created in German.  
Lay beliefs about energy. We included an adapted version of the 6-item theories about 
willpower scale (Job et al., 2010; Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2015). This scale 
consists of three items measuring people’s endorsement of a limited account of willpower 
(e.g., “After a strenuous mental activity my energy is depleted and I must rest to get it 
refueled again”) and three items measuring people’s endorsement of a nonlimited account of 
willpower (e.g., “My mental stamina fuels itself; even after strenuous mental exertion I can 
continue doing more of it”). Importantly, because the original scale mainly refers to mental 
energy, we removed every instance of the word “mental.” We did this so that the scale 
reflects a more domain-general measure of energy availability. Responses were provided on a 
6-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items referring to the 
limited-energy account were reverse-scored so that higher values represent greater agreement 
with the nonlimited-energy account. Responses to all items were averaged, such that higher 
scores on this composite indicate stronger endorsement of the nonlimited energy account ( = 
.90). 
Domain-specific energy. To assess the degree to which people differentiate between 
the energy for physical, mental, social, and emotional activities, we included four items: 
“Compared to the peak of your life, how much energy do you have currently available for 
physical [mental] [social] [emotional] activities?” on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (much 
less) to 5 (the same).  
In addition, we included a more idiographic measure of energy availability by asking 
participants first to list two demanding activities for each domain that are typical for them, 
and then to answer the same items with respect to these activities. For example, if a person 
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indicated that exercising and biking were physically demanding for her, the corresponding 
two items for the physical domain would read “Compared to the peak of your life, how much 
energy do you have currently available for exercising [biking]?” We averaged the two 
domain-specific items to create a composite score for each of the four domains (s between 
.66 and .75). 
Within- and cross-domain energy spillover. Do people perceive to have a single or 
multiple pool(s) of energy available for activities affecting different domains? For instance, 
does exercising at the gym influence the amount of energy available for writing a manuscript 
or meeting with friends? To explore such spillover effects, we included the following items: 
“After demanding physical [mental] [social] [emotional] activities, how much energy do you 
have available for physical [mental] [social] [emotional] activities?” on a 7-point scale 
ranging from -3 (much less), 0 (the same), to +3 (much more). This resulted in a total of 4 
(strained domain) x 4 (spillover domain) = 16 items. In addition to exploring perceived cross-
domain spillover, this also enabled us to examine within-domain spillover (e.g., “After 
demanding physical activities, how much energy is available to you for further physical 
activities?”).  
Dispositional exhaustion and recovery. The General Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
(Cardini et al., 2019) measures dispositional exhaustion and recovery as two separate 
dimensions. The exhaustion dimension consists of 8 items (e.g., “In general, I feel weak”; α = 
.87). The recovery dimension consists of 5 items (e.g., “In general, I feel energized”; α = 
.80).  Items were measured on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
We computed mean scores for the exhaustion and recovery subscales.  
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Table 3 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations for Dispositional Measures.  
 
 
Note. N = 276. The critical correlation coefficient for  = .05 (two-tailed) is .12. Bold 
correlation coefficients remain significant (p < .05) after correcting for multiple testing 
(Holm-Bonferroni). 
aMeasured on a 6-point scale from 0 (lower expression) to 5 (higher expression). 
bMeasured on a 7-point scale from 0 (lower expression) to 6 (higher expression). 
cHigher scores indicate higher agreement with the non-limited energy belief. 
 
Dispositional mood state. The Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (German 
short version; Steyer et al., 1997) measures three bipolar dimensions of psychological 
functioning: Wakefulness (vs. tiredness; 4 items, α = .85), good mood (vs. bad mood; 4 
items, α = .86), and calmness (vs. nervousness; 4 items, α = .79) on a 6-point scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Sample items include “In general, I feel rested” for 
Measure M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Recoverya 3.24 (0.94) –        
2. Exhaustiona 1.21 (0.94) -.60 –       
3. Positive Mooda 3.82 (0.91) .64 -.77 –      
4. Wakefulnessa 3.11 (1.07) .61 -.72 .75 –     
5. Calmnessa 3.34 (1.00) .41 -.56 .67 .59 –    
6. Life satisfactionb 4.50 (1.10) .47 -.60 .69 .53 .46 –   
7. Physical healthb 4.36 (1.13) .39 -.42 .46 .42 .33 .46 –  
8. Energy beliefac 2.47 (1.11) .47 -.30 .30 .39 .19 .19 .24 – 
9. Age in years 50.40 (20.20) .18 -.39 .38 .43 .43 .31 .07 .19 
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wakefulness, “In general I feel content” for positive mood, and “In general, I feel composed” 
for calmness. We computed mean scores for the wakefulness, positive mood, and calmness 
subscales. 
Procedure. The study consisted of an online questionnaire that was programmed and 
administered on the SoSci Survey platform (www.soscisurvey.de). Upon giving informed 
consent, participants first filled out a sociodemographic questionnaire followed by the 
adapted theories about willpower scale (Job et al., 2010; Job et al., 2015). Next, they were 
familiarized with the concept of spending energy in the physical, mental, social, and 
emotional domain. More specifically, we gave examples of how energy might be spent for 
activities typically associated with these domains (e.g., climbing the stairs as physical, doing 
crossword puzzles as mental, spending time with friends as social, and experiencing certain 
emotions as emotional activities). They then rated the degree of energy they had currently 
available to spend on the different domains compared with their perceived “energy peak.” We 
made sure to specify that one’s energy peak for a certain domain might be located in the past, 
present, or future. Next, for each domain they listed two demanding activities that they 
typically encounter in their daily lives, and again rated their current energy availability for 
these activities compared with their peak energy availability. In a next step, we introduced 
them to the possibility of energy spillover, namely that people might perceive to have 
different “energy pools” available for the different domains or conversely, that people might 
perceive to draw energy from a single pool no matter which domain is affected. Participants 
then rated the extent to which they experienced such within- and cross-domain spillover in 
their daily lives. Lastly, they filled out dispositional measures of recovery and exhaustion 
(Cardini et al., 2019), as well as mood, wakefulness, and calmness (Steyer et al., 1997). After 
the debriefing, participants were offered the opportunity to enter a raffle of ten Amazon 
vouchers à 30 Swiss francs. 
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Statistical analysis. We used Pearson product-moment correlations to examine the 
degree of interdependence among the variables of interest. Spearman's rank correlations 
yielded the same pattern of results. Thus, we only report the Pearson correlation coefficients. 
We conducted all analyses in R (R Core Team, 2018) using the psych package (Revelle, 
2018) for descriptive statistics and the stats package (R Core Team, 2018) for the 
correlations.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. The variables of interest had no missing data, with one 
exception: Because people might differ in the extent to which they perceive activities of a 
certain domain as effortful, we gave them the option not to list any domain-specific 
demanding activities. For the physical domain, n = 6 people listed no such activities and n = 
20 people listed only one activity (mental: n = 8 and n = 22; social: n = 10 and n = 37; 
emotional: n = 27 and n = 68). Four persons did not list any demanding activities. Thus, for 
the statistical analyses dealing with the idiographic measures of domain-specific energy 
availability, we excluded those persons who did not report any demanding activities in the 
respective domain. 
Lay beliefs about energy, age, and subjective well-being. As can be seen in Table 3, 
we found a small positive correlation between endorsing the nonlimited energy account and 
age. Table 3 further reveals small and medium positive correlations of both age and 
endorsing the nonlimited energy account with various indicators of subjective well-being: 
Older people as well as people who endorse a nonlimited energy account generally reported 
to be more recovered, less exhausted, in a better mood, more awake, calmer, and more 
satisfied with their lives. 
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Table 4 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations for Domain-Specific Energy.  
 
 
Note. N = 276. The critical correlation coefficient for  = .05 (two-tailed) is .12. Bold 
correlation coefficients remain significant (p < .05) after correcting for multiple testing 
(Holm-Bonferroni). 
aEffective sample size varies due to pairwise deletion.  
bMeasured on a 6-point scale from 0 (much less) to 5 (the same). 
 
Domain-specific energy availability and age. 
Activities in general. As can be seen in Table 4, as expected, we found a small negative 
correlation between available energy for physical activities and age. Contrary to our 
expectation, the perceived availability of energy for mental activities did not change with age. 
  
 General  Idiographica 
Available energy for... 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
1. Physical activitiesb –     –    
2. Mental activitiesb .20 –    .41 –   
3. Social activitiesb .20 .36 –   .44 .43 –  
4. Emotional activitiesb .15 .34 .43 –  .43 .40 .50 – 
5. Age in years -.22 .07 .13 .12  .05 .20 .18 .14 
M  3.07 3.93 3.44 3.78  3.56 3.92 3.64 3.83 
SD 1.36 0.92 1.25 1.18  1.24 1.00 1.18 1.19  
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Table 5 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations for Within- and Cross-Domain 
Energy Spillover.  
 
 
Note. N = 276. The critical correlation coefficient for  = .05 (two-tailed) is .12. Bold 
correlation coefficients remain significant (p < .05) after correcting for multiple testing 
(Holm-Bonferroni).  
aMeasured on a 7-point scale from -3 (much less), 0 (the same), to +3 (much more). 
 
After Physical Exertion  After Mental Exertion 
Available energy for... 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
1. Physical activitiesa –     –    
2. Mental activitiesa .36 –    .23 –   
3. Social activitiesa .37 .62 –   .33 .36 –  
4. Emotional activitiesa .31 .59 .74 –  .25 .33 .54 – 
5. Age in years .02 -.10 -.19 -.16  -.11 .27 -.18 .10 
M  -1.09 0.26 0.26 0.32  0.35 -0.47 0.06 -0.08 
SD 1.43 1.33 1.30 1.30  1.34 1.32 1.24 1.13 
 After Social Exertion  After Emotional Exertion 
Available energy for... 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
1. Physical activitiesa –     –    
2. Mental activitiesa .40 –    .45 –   
3. Social activitiesa .33 .53 –   .37 .59 –  
4. Emotional activitiesa .20 .40 .58 –  .26 .57 .67 – 
5. Age in years -.18 .02 .00 .02  -.03 .23 .08 .15 
M  0.10 0.04 -0.49 -0.20  0.09 -0.40 -0.41 -0.60 
SD 1.25 1.10 1.34 1.28  1.44 1.29 1.38 1.44 
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Idiographically chosen activities. Table 4 further shows that when asked about the 
energy available for individually selected physical activities, older adults no longer reported 
to have less energy available. In contrast, older adults reported to have more energy available 
for individually listed mental and social activities.  
Within- and cross-domain energy spillover and age. 
Within-domain. As can be seen in Table 5, people generally reported to have less 
energy available for activities after having been engaged in activities of that same domain 
beforehand. For instance, the mean energy available for physical activities after prior physical 
exertion was -1.09 on a scale from -3 (much less) to +3 (much more). This mean value 
significantly differed from the scale midpoint (which corresponds to 0 [the same]), t(275) = -
12.71, p < .001, 95% CI of the mean difference [-1.26, -0.92], d = -0.77. In comparison, 
although significant (all ps < .001), the mean deviations from the scale midpoint in the other 
domains had small effect sizes (ds between -0.36 and -0.42).  
We found small positive correlations between mental and emotional within-domain 
spillover with age. In other words, after prior mental and emotional exertion, older adults 
reported to have more energy available for further mental and emotional activities. 
Cross-domain. Table 5 further shows that people reported little to no cross-domain 
energy spillover (ds between -0.31 and 0.26). However, we found domain-specific age 
effects: After physical exertion, older adults reported to have less energy available for social 
and emotional activities. Similarly, after mental exertion, older adults reported to have less 
energy available for social activities. After social exertion, older adults reported to have less 
energy available for physical activities. Finally, after emotional exertion, older adults 
reported to have more energy available for mental activities.  
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Brief Discussion 
Energy can be viewed as a general-purpose resource as almost all goal pursuit requires 
the investment of energy. Study 1 investigated if energy is one of the resources that people 
perceive to decline with age. Do older adults feel generally more exhausted because their 
subjective energy level is lower than that of younger age groups? Moreover, we explored if, 
similar to willpower, people differ regarding their subjective beliefs about energy as a 
domain-general resource, such that spending it for a goal in one life domain also depletes it 
for pursuit of a goal in a different life domain versus energy as domain-specific.  
The results of Study 1 suggest that, as people grow older, they are more likely to 
believe that energy – similar to willpower (Job et al., 2018) – is a nonlimited resource for 
goal pursuit, and also perceive to have more energy available for personally relevant mental 
activities. Furthermore, consistent with the important role of social relations in old age 
(Antonucci et al., 2010; Carstensen et al., 1999), older adults perceive to have more energy 
available than younger age groups for social activities in their daily lives. However, older 
adults also perceive to have less energy available for physical activities in general, but not for 
the physical activities that they select for themselves. One reason for this pattern of findings 
might be that older adults – faced with declines in physical and cognitive functioning (Baltes 
et al., 2006; Baltes & Smith, 2003) – become increasingly selective in the engagement of 
effort (Hess, 2014; Hess et al., 2016) into goals (Freund, 2008). If older adults perceive to 
have less energy available for physical activities in general, they might select their most 
important physical and mental activities on which they focus their remaining energy. As a 
consequence, these activities then correspond to the available energy levels well into old age. 
Older adulthood is associated with more pronounced cross-domain energy spillover, 
predominantly in the physical domain: After physical exertion, older adults perceive to have 
less energy available for social, emotional and, to a lesser degree, mental activities. This 
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finding is in line with our proposition (Cardini & Freund, 2019a) that older adults, who are 
increasingly motivated to maintain their current level of functioning and prevent further 
losses (Freund & Baltes, 1998; Freund et al., 2012), are more sensitive toward opportunity 
costs. We argue that an increase in opportunity costs experienced during an ongoing activity 
is an indication that the activity's cost-benefit ratio has turned unfavorable, and that one's 
energy is better spent on a more valuable activity. Thus, the hypothesized heightened 
sensitivity toward opportunity costs might be adaptive for older adults because it allows them 
to disengage earlier from demanding activities that incur high energy costs and, as a result, to 
protect their remaining goal-relevant resources for more fruitful goal pursuits. As a next step, 
we conducted a study testing more directly the hypothesized age-differential effects of 
opportunity costs during and after a demanding physical activity. 
Study 2 
Based on the findings in Study 1 demonstrating that older adults generally do not report 
to overextend their energy levels, in Study 2 we tested the hypothesis that older adults are 
more sensitive toward opportunity costs than younger age groups (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). 
If, as we interpret the pattern of results in Study 1, older adults do in fact shield their 
subjective energy by selecting activities that match their perceived available energy, they 
should be particularly sensitive regarding the amount of energy they spend on a given activity 
compared to alternative activities. In other words, in order to preserve their subjective energy, 
older adults are expected to be more sensitive to opportunity costs than younger age groups. 
A strong test of this hypothesis is that older adults are generally more sensitive to opportunity 
costs than younger age groups, even when activities do not require any particular investment 
of energy.  
Based on these considerations, we designed Study 2 as follows: Participants first 
completed a demanding physical activity (i.e., a 20-minute high-intensity interval training), 
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which served as a physical exhaustion induction. They were then given the opportunity to 
recover from this induced exhaustion (i.e., listen to a 20-minute relaxing mindfulness 
instruction video; The Honest Guys – Meditations – Relaxation, 2016). During the exhaustion 
and recovery period, we repeatedly assessed subjective exhaustion and recovery, opportunity 
costs, and other variables associated with exhaustion and recovery. We expected that older 
adults, compared to younger adults, report a steeper increase in opportunity costs and 
exhaustion during the exhaustion period, as a motivational cue for disengagement (Cardini & 
Freund, 2019a).  
To avoid age-based stereotype threat (Hess, Growney, & Lothary, 2019; Lamont, Swift, 
& Abrams, 2015), we made sure to keep the data collections of the younger and middle-aged 
adults separate from those of the older adults. Furthermore, younger and older adults might 
perceive the chosen physical exercise as differently demanding. Therefore, to maximize the 
equivalence in perceived effort across age groups and to address issues of external validity 
(Freund & Isaacowitz, 2013), we instructed participants to exert the maximum amount of 
effort that they would also be willing to spend for a similar activity in their everyday lives. 
Furthermore, we settled on a duration of 20 minutes for the physical exercise, because older 
adults prefer to engage in physical activity continuously for up to 30 minutes (e.g., Amireault, 
Baier, & Spencer, 2019).  
Method 
Participants. We determined the sample size based on an a priori power analysis with 
G*Power (Version 3.1; Faul et al., 2009), which revealed a minimum sample size of 50 
participants per age group (N = 150) to detect a small effect of interest (f = .10) with  = .05 
and 95% power for a repeated measures ANOVA with within-between person interactions. 
Our inclusion criteria for this study were as follows: Participants had to be between 18 and 
100 years old, must not have taken part in prior similar studies (see Cardini & Freund, 
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2019b), and had to be physically healthy, as determined by various questions related to 
cardiovascular health (e.g., not suffer from high blood pressure, breathing difficulties, pain 
after physical exertion, blood pressure irregularities).  
Initially, 232 participants were recruited from two participant pools of the Department 
of Psychology and the Life-Management lab at the University of Zurich, local gyms, and 
senior citizen’s sport clubs, and filled out the online screening questionnaire. Of those, 153 
persons took part in the main study. Two participants had to be excluded: One person reacted 
negatively toward the male voice in the mindfulness video and withdrew participation; one 
person did not fill out the paper-pencil items correctly. Furthermore, the paper-pencil data 
from four persons could not be matched with their data from the online screening 
questionnaire. This resulted in a final N of 147 participants who completed the study and who 
were included in the statistical analyses. Of those, n = 49 were younger (18-34 years; 76% 
women), n = 48 middle-aged (35-59 years; 56% women), and n = 50 older adults (60-86 
years; 42% women). As reimbursement, participants received 15 Swiss francs or course 
credit. Upon request, they received an instruction manual on how to continue the exercises at 
home and were given the YouTube link to the mindfulness-based video.  
Measures. The means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of the study 
variables are depicted in Table 6. Again, all items reported in this study were either translated 
or created in German. 
Dispositional exhaustion, recovery, and mood. We again included the General 
Exhaustion and Recovery Scale (Cardini et al., 2019) and the Multidimensional Mood State 
Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997) as dispositional measures. Reliabilities (s) ranged 
between .68 and .89. 
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Table 6 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations for Dispositional Measures. 
 
 
Note. N = 147. The critical correlation coefficient for  = .05 (two-tailed) is .16. Bold 
correlation coefficients remain significant (p < .05) after correcting for multiple testing 
(Holm-Bonferroni). 
aMeasured on a 6-point scale from 0 (lower expression) to 5 (higher expression). 
 
Situational exhaustion, recovery, and opportunity costs. Due to practical constraints, 
we administered the state items during the exhaustion and recovery period using paper-pencil 
questionnaires. For the sake of brevity, we operationalized each item as a bipolar visual 
analogue scale ranging from -5 to +5, with a neutral zero point in the middle (Russell & 
Carroll, 1999). We used visual analogue scales because they have some advantages over 
Likert-type scales (e.g., Chang & Little, 2018; Sung & Wu, 2018). We decided for a bipolar 
and against a bivariate approach because, as Russell (2017, p. 116) put it, “in most 
circumstances a person feels either good or bad but not both,” adding that mixed emotions 
Measure M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Recoverya 3.08 (0.76) –        
2. Exhaustiona 0.84 (0.82) -.44 –       
3. Positive Mooda 4.03 (0.79) .52 -.74 –      
4. Wakefulnessa 3.46 (0.91) .58 -.72 .74 –     
5. Calmnessa 3.51 (0.82) .33 -.60 .68 .65 –    
6. Life satisfactiona 3.86 (0.79) .31 -.49 .71 .44 .44 –   
7. Physical healtha 3.82 (0.88) .44 -.38 .49 .34 .33 .49 –  
8. Fitnessa 3.32 (0.90) .43 -.31 .37 .36 .23 .32 .68 – 
9. Age in years 48.41 (20.26) .06 -.32 .24 .37 .23 .10 -.07 -.04 
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occur only in rare events, such as “when a stimulus event is highly salient (a powerful film, 
college graduation and so on).”  
We assessed subjective exhaustion and recovery with two items targeting the physical 
and mental domain with, “How do you feel right now physically [mentally]?” on a scale 
ranging from -5 (very exhausted) and +5 (very recovered), and perceived opportunity costs 
with, “Right now, would you rather…” with -5 (continue this activity?) and +5 (do something 
else?) as verbal anchors. Within-person reliabilities were good (RCns between .84 and .86; 
Cranford et al., 2006), indicating that systematic change over time was reliably measured by 
these variables. 
Time-varying covariates. Although not the focus of this study, we included mood and 
time perception as time-varying covariates because we have proposed them as further 
indicators of exhaustion and recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019a): “What is your momentary 
mood?” with -5 (very bad) to +5 (very good) and, “How does time pass for you right now?” 
with -5 (very slowly) to +5 (very fast) as verbal anchors. Furthermore, we included a measure 
of boredom/interest: “How do you perceive this activity right now?” with -5 (very boring) and 
+5 (very interesting) as verbal anchors. The results concerning these variables are reported in 
Tables A6 and A7 in Appendix A.  
Time as independent variable. We coded the time variable for the exhaustion period 
from 0 to 10, such that 0 represents the baseline measurement occasion (i.e., immediately 
before the exercise) and 10 represents the last measurement occasion of the exhaustion period 
(i.e., 20 minutes into the exercise). Because of the seamless transition between the exhaustion 
and recovery period, the first measurement occasion of the recovery period coincided with 
the last measurement occasion of the exhaustion period (i.e., 20 minutes into the exercise). 
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The last measurement occasion of the recovery period was located 18 minutes into the 
mindfulness video. Therefore, we coded the time variable for the recovery period from 0 to 9.  
The time points were equally spaced (i.e., two minutes). This scaling of time implies 
that a linear slope for time estimates the change in the dependent variable from one 
measurement occasion to the next (i.e., every two minutes).  
Procedure. Participants first read a detailed description of the study, the inclusion 
criteria, and gave their informed consent for participation. They were then screened for their 
cardiovascular health. Next, they filled out a sociodemographic questionnaire. Finally, they 
reported on their perceived physical fitness, weekly exercise frequency, dispositional 
exhaustion and recovery (Cardini et al., 2019), as well as mood, wakefulness, and calmness 
(Steyer et al., 1997). All of these variables were assessed online. 
The main part of the study was conducted in a laboratory room in groups with up to 
eight participants. After having been familiarized with the visual analogue scale items 
through a brief demonstration, participants filled out the paper-pencil questionnaire for the 
first time, serving as the baseline measure. Next, they participated in the 20-minute high 
intensity interval training (adopted from Kaftan & Freund, 2019), which consisted of five 4-
minute training units. One training unit consisted of a bout of physical exercises (e.g., 
jumping jacks, push-ups, plank, sit-ups). Each exercise was maintained for 20 seconds and 
followed up with 10 seconds of rest. The exercises were displayed on a video in front of the 
participants. The video was accompanied by motivational music. The experimenter (either 
the first author, a trained student assistant, or a trained intern) participated in the physical 
exercise, to further motivate participants to spend effort. Every two minutes, the experimenter 
paused the video and prompted participants to quickly fill out the next paper-pencil 
questionnaire before resuming the exercises.  
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Immediately upon finishing the training, participants filled out the last paper-pencil 
questionnaire pertaining to the exhaustion period. This measurement occasion simultaneously 
served as the baseline for the recovery period. Participants were then instructed to lie down 
on yoga mats and make themselves as comfortable as possible. They were told that they 
would now have the opportunity to recuperate from the physical exercise through listening to 
a relaxing video. As soon as all participants were lying down, the experimenter started the 
mindfulness-based relaxation video (The Honest Guys – Meditations – Relaxation, 2016). 
This video consisted of a very calm male voice giving mindfulness instructions. The video 
was accompanied by tranquil music, and the sounds of splashing waves and seagulls. Every 
two minutes, participants were gently prompted by the experimenter to fill out the next batch 
of paper-pencil items. The timing of the instructions was carefully chosen, so as to coincide 
with muted parts of the video. The video ended after 20 minutes, and participants were 
debriefed and given their preferred reimbursement (15 Swiss francs or course credit).  
Statistical analysis. To address the research question of this study, we focused on age-
related differences in physical and mental exhaustion and opportunity costs during the 
exhaustion period (see Appendix A for the analyses concerned with age-related differences in 
mood, subjective time perception, and interest during the exhaustion period [Table A6] and 
for all time-varying variables during the recovery period [Table A7], as well as analyses of 
the correlated change between these variables [Tables A8 and A9]). We analyzed age-related 
differences in the time course of the variables of interest using univariate conditional 
multilevel growth curve models with measurement time (11 time points during the exhaustion 
period), the mean-centered continuous age variable, and the interaction between time and age 
serving as independent variables. Because these data were longitudinal, we allowed for a 
simple autocorrelative error structure (AR[1]) and, where applicable, accounted for 
heteroscedasticity of the variables over time.  
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We conducted all analyses in R (R Core Team, 2018). We used the psych package 
(Revelle, 2018) for descriptive statistics, the nlme package (Pinheiro et al., 2018) for the 
multilevel model parameter estimations, and the r2glmm package (Jaeger, 2017) for 
calculating a suitable R2 for our models. We followed the suggestions of Bolger and 
Laurenceau (2013) for reporting multilevel analyses.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. The initial multilevel analysis dataset consisted of 147 
(participants) x 11 (measurement occasions) = 1,617 observations. Due to inattention, one 
person did not fill out the paper-pencil items at one measurement occasion. Thus, the final 
analysis dataset consisted of 1,616 observations.  
Model building. All time-varying variables showed substantial between-person 
variance (ICCs between .50 and .64), confirming the nested structure of the data 
(measurement occasions nested in persons) and necessitating the use of multilevel modeling 
(Bliese, 2000). We began the model building process by comparing random-intercept-only 
models to random-intercept-and-slope models. In a next step, we added an autocorrelative 
error structure (AR[1]) to the models. Then, we tested for heteroscedasticity. Given that these 
models are nested, we decided on the best-fitting model using the chi-square likelihood ratio 
test under restricted maximum likelihood estimation. The best-fitting models across all time-
varying variables were random-intercept-and-slope models that account for autocorrelation, 
but not for heteroscedasticity. In other words, participants varied substantially on all time-
varying variables with regard to their initial intercepts (i.e., baseline measurement before the 
exercise), as well as in their rate of change over the exhaustion period.  
To examine the shape of the growth curves, we tested which polynomial degree (i.e., 
linear, quadratic, cubic) best represented the regression line of the time-varying variables. For 
each variable, we compared the model with a linear fixed effect of time with a model 
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encompassing both a linear and quadratic fixed effect of time, and so on. Given that these 
comparisons involve non-nested models (i.e., different fixed effects structures), we decided 
on the best-fitting model using the AIC and BIC under maximum likelihood estimation, with 
lower values indicating better model fit. 
Modeling the time courses. The results for the time courses are shown in Table 7 
(fixed effects of time) and the left panels of Figure 5. Table 7 depicts two sets of parameter 
estimates. The first set, the fixed effects, are the results for the average person in the sample. 
The fixed effects of time are represented by the thick black lines in the left panels of Figure 5. 
The second set in Table 7 lists the random effects. These random effects describe variation at 
two levels of analysis: At the between-person level, they model the extent to which persons 
deviate from the typical person in the sample. At the within-person level, they model the 
extent to which the raw data varies from the model-predicted values. The between-person 
random effects are visualized in the left panels of Figure 5 by the variability in individual 
regression lines (thin grey lines) around the average regression line.  
Main effects of time, age, and their interaction. 
Physical recovery. As can be seen in Table 7, there was a significant main effect of all 
polynomials of time on physical recovery: The typical participant in the sample reported an 
initial decrease in physical recovery, followed by a period of less steep decrease, and at the 
end again reported a steeper decrease in physical recovery (see Figure 5A). In contrast, there 
was no significant main effect of age on physical recovery. All Age x Time interactions were 
significant. However, the effect sizes of the interactions of age with the quadratic and cubic 
polynomials of time were near zero. Therefore, we only interpret the interaction of age with 
the linear polynomial of time, which represents age-related differences in the initial rate of 
change. 
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To better understand these cross-level interactions and to test for significant differences 
between younger and older adults, we replaced the continuous age predictor with the 
discontinuous age group predictor (coded 0 = younger adults, 1 = middle-aged adults, 2 = 
older adults) and reran the analysis. The results are visualized in Figure 5B. Compared to 
younger and middle-aged adults, older adults showed a steeper initial decrease in physical 
recovery, followed by a more pronounced flattening of the curve, and at the end of the 
exercise again reported a steeper decline in physical recovery (all ps < .001). In contrast, the 
younger and middle-aged adults did not significantly differ in their time courses (ps between 
.16 and .44).  
Mental recovery. There were also statistically significant, although less pronounced, 
main effects of all polynomials of time on mental recovery: The typical participant in the 
sample reported a slight initial increase in mental recovery, followed by a slight decrease (see 
Figure 5C). There was a significant main effect of age on mental recovery. The Age x Time 
interactions were significant. 
As can be seen in Figure 5D, compared to younger adults, older adults showed a less 
pronounced initial increase in mental recovery (p = .007) and a less pronounced later decline 
(p = .001). The same pattern of results held when comparing younger to middle-aged adults 
(p = .014 and p = .005, respectively). In contrast, middle-aged and older adults did not 
significantly differ in their time courses (p = .817 and p = .744, respectively).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
 
110 
 
Table 7 
 
Multilevel Growth Curve Models for Physical Recovery, Mental Recovery, and Opportunity 
Costs During the Exhaustion Period as a Function of Time, Age, and Their Interaction. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Fixed Effects Physical Recovery Mental Recovery Opportunity Costs 
Intercept 1.79 [1.52, 2.06] 1.98 [1.69, 2.27] -2.04 [-2.42, -1.65] 
Time -0.99 [-1.15, -0.84] 0.17 [0.09, 0.26] -0.45 [-0.65, -0.25] 
Time2 0.12 [0.09, 0.15] -0.02 [-0.03, -0.02] 0.13 [0.09, 0.17] 
Time3 -0.01 [-0.01, -0.00] – -0.01 [-0.01, -0.00] 
Age 0.01 [-0.00, 0.02] 0.02 [0.01, 0.04] -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] 
Age x Time -0.02 [-0.03, -0.01] -0.01 [-0.01, -0.03] 0.03 [0.02, 0.04] 
Age x Time2 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] -0.01 [-0.01, -0.00] 
Age x Time3 -0.00 [-0.00, -0.00] – 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 
Random effects    
Between-person    
   Intercept 1.40 1.70 1.98 
   Time 0.60 0.41 0.63 
   Time2 0.05 0.03 0.05 
   Time3 0.00 – –a 
Within-person    
   Residual 0.92 0.87 1.33 
   AR(1) .26 .21 .52 
Marginal R2 .13 .01 .07 
Conditional R2 .85 .79 .79 
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Note. N = 147, 11 measurement occasions, 1,616 observations. Time is coded 0 to 10. Age is 
mean-centered. The fixed effects are reported as unstandardized regression coefficients (their 
95% CIs in brackets). The fixed effects in bold are significant (their 95% CIs do not include 
0). The random effects are reported as standard deviations and correlations. Marginal R2 
depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R2 depicts the 
proportion of variance explained by the fixed and random effects combined (Nakagawa & 
Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014).  
aDue to model convergence issues, we had to omit this random effect parameter.  
 
Opportunity costs. The main effects of all polynomials of time on perceived 
opportunity costs were significant: The typical participant in the sample reported an initial 
decrease in opportunity costs, followed by a period of increase in opportunity costs, and at 
the end reported a less pronounced increase in opportunity costs (see Figure 5E). There was 
no significant main effect of age on opportunity costs. All Age x Time interactions were 
significant. 
Figure 5F indicates that compared to younger and middle-aged adults, older adults 
reported a steeper initial increase in opportunity costs, a less pronounced increase afterwards, 
and again a more pronounced increase in the end (all ps < .001). In comparison, middle-aged 
adults did not significantly differ from younger adults in their time course (ps between .736 
and .957).  
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Figure 5. Spaghetti plots of the fixed and random effects of time (panels A, C, E) and Age x 
Time interaction plots (panels B, D, F). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Brief Discussion 
Study 2 partly supported our hypothesis that older adults are more sensitive toward 
opportunity costs (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). Compared to younger adults, older adults 
reported a steeper initial increase in exhaustion and opportunity costs during demanding 
physical exercise. Contrary to our expectations, however, younger and older adults again 
ended up at similar levels of exhaustion and opportunity costs shortly before the completion 
of the exercise (see Figure 1D and 1F). Thus, it seems that the hypothesized age-related 
differences in the rate of change in exhaustion and opportunity costs are especially prevalent 
at the beginning stages, but less so at the advanced stages of short-term goal pursuit. 
Study 2 further showed that older adults reported nearly stable levels of mental 
recovery during the physical exercise, whereas younger adults reported more pronounced 
changes in mental recovery over time. This result is in line with the finding of Study 1 that 
older adults are more likely to endorse a nonlimited account of mental energy, due to their 
enhanced autonomy related to the engagement in demanding tasks (Job et al., 2018).  
General Discussion 
A central tenet of lifespan psychology holds that development entails the joint 
occurrence of gains and losses in all phases of life (Baltes, 1987; Labouvie-Vief, 1981). 
Older adulthood is characterized by normative declines in physical and cognitive functioning 
(Baltes et al., 2006; Baltes & Smith, 2003), yet at the same time is accompanied by a marked 
increase in autonomy and positive emotional experience (e.g., Carstensen et al., 2011; Ryff, 
1995). Here, we examined if this age-related changing ratio of gains and losses is reflected in 
older adults’ lower subjective availability of energy for goal pursuits across different 
functional domains (i.e., physical, mental, social, emotional activities). We found that older 
adults perceive to have less energy available for physical activities in general. However, older 
adults did not report having less energy available for physical activities that are personally 
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relevant to them, and reported having even more energy available for personally relevant 
mental and social activities. We further found that older adults, compared to younger adults, 
report a steeper initial increase in subjective exhaustion and opportunity costs during a 
demanding physical activity, but show comparable levels again of both at the close.  
Age-Related Differences in Subjective Energy Availability Vary Across Domains 
Compared to younger adults, older adults perceive to have more energy available for 
individually selected social activities. This might be due to the change in goal priorities 
across adulthood: According to socio-emotional selectivity theory younger adults are more 
likely to pursue future-oriented growth goals aimed at optimizing knowledge, whereas older 
adults tend to prioritize present-oriented goals aimed at maximizing emotional meaning 
(Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen et al., 1999).  
In line with selective engagement theory (Hess, 2014) and lifespan models of 
developmental regulation (e.g., Freund, 2008; Freund & Baltes, 2000), the increasing 
adaptiveness of carefully selecting one’s goals based on one’s remaining energy in older 
adulthood might explain the discrepancy between older adults' available energy for physical 
and mental activities in general compared to those that are personally relevant to them. 
Because of their increasing resource constraints, older adults might choose (1) not to engage 
in or (2) not to spend a lot effort on very demanding physical and mental activities. Instead, 
they might opt to engage only in physical and mental activities that they deem manageable at 
their current level of functioning and that are personally relevant to them. The present 
findings align with propositions that older adults remain highly functioning in settings that 
are important to them (Artistico, Cervone, & Montes Garcia, 2019; Baltes, 1997; Cornelius & 
Caspi, 1987; Blanchard-Fields, 2007), perhaps due to enhanced pragmatic wisdom in 
handling everyday life challenges (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). 
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While people generally do not report high levels of cross-domain energy spillover, the 
finding that older adults tend to report more cross-domain energy spillover could be 
explained by the fact that older adults tend to differentiate less between functional domains, 
perhaps “because they might have experienced the actual connectedness of functioning in 
different life domains (e.g., physical health facilitates getting together with friends and might, 
thereby, contribute to social relationships)” (Mustafić & Freund, 2012b, p. 69).  
One alternative explanation for these results is that older adults might be affected by 
self-worth enhancing biases that contribute to more optimistic beliefs about their current level 
of functioning across various domains, especially when comparing themselves to their same-
aged peers (Hess, 2006; Riediger, Voelkle, Schaefer, & Lindenberger, 2014). We tried to 
address this concern by having participants rate their currently available energy for a domain 
compared to their own energy peak for that domain, and we anticipated that this instruction 
would lessen the impact of such social downward comparison biases on older adults’ ratings.  
Age-Related Differences in Exhaustion and Opportunity Costs During Physical Exercise  
Despite having similar baseline values, older adults showed a steeper initial increase in 
subjective exhaustion and opportunity costs during demanding physical exercise than 
younger adults, but showed comparable levels again at the end of the exercise. This pattern of 
results partly supports our hypothesis that older adults, compared to younger adults, feel 
exhausted faster during short-term demanding activity, because they are more sensitive 
toward increases in opportunity costs (Cardini & Freund, 2019a).  
Because we did not assess measures of task performance or task difficulty, we can only 
speculate about the potential causes of the finding that older and younger adults reported 
comparable levels of exhaustion and opportunity costs at the end of the exercise. After 
investing initial physical effort, older adults might have down-regulated their level of 
engagement by withdrawing further effort to conserve their remaining energy (Brehm, 1975). 
Part III 
 
116 
 
According to motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989; Richter et al., 2016), the 
amount of effort one invests into a task is proportional to that task’s perceived difficulty, 
conditional on the expectancy and value of succeeding at said task. In our study, we let 
participants set their own performance standards for the physical exercise (e.g., number of 
push-ups they completed during one trial). Thus, the difficulty of the exercises was not fixed 
but determined individually. In such a malleable scenario, motivational intensity theory 
predicts that people aim for the highest level of performance that they deem possible and 
worthwhile. Assuming that older people show a general tendency to conserve their remaining 
resources, this could have resulted in older adults’ withdrawing effort over time.  
Alternatively, an unintended consequence of the instruction for the physical exercise 
(e.g., “please exert as much effort as possible”) might have resulted in older adults adopting a 
goal orientation geared towards optimizing their performance. Freund (2006) demonstrated 
that older adults show higher persistence (operationalized as invested time and effort) on 
demanding tasks if the associated goal is to maintain their current level of functioning and 
prevent losses of goal-relevant resources (e.g., energy), whereas younger adults show higher 
persistence on demanding tasks when their goal is to optimize their performance. Importantly, 
these results were shown to be independent of perceived task difficulty. Thus, older adults’ 
withdrawing effort over time might have been a consequence of an induced motivational 
orientation towards optimization during the physical exercise.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present set of studies has at least two limitations. First, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of selection bias, especially for the sample of older adults in Study 2. For instance, 
there was no correlation between perceived physical fitness and age (see Table 6), suggesting 
that the recruited sample of older adults might have been a selective subsample consisting of 
particularly healthy individuals. Given the normative declines in physical and cognitive 
Part III 
 
117 
 
functioning with age (Baltes et al., 2006; Baltes & Smith, 2003), it is thus likely that the 
participants of Study 2 are not representative of older adults. This limits the generalizability 
of the findings of Study 2. Furthermore, it might be possible that we did not find more 
pronounced age-related differences in the increase of exhaustion and opportunity costs in 
Study 2 because the potential selectivity of the sample of older adults. Supporting this notion, 
prior research has found that older adults who tend to endorse negative beliefs about aging 
(e.g., who believe that energy declines with age) are less likely to engage in physical activity 
(Meisner, Weir, & Baker, 2013). However, note that we did find evidence for initial age-
related differences in the increase of exhaustion and opportunity costs during a demanding 
activity, despite a potential selection bias. Thus, although preliminary, we regard this finding 
as promising and worthy of further investigation. 
One possible remedy to avoid a selection bias in a study investigating the investment 
and perceived levels of energy might be to examine such age-related differences in subjective 
energy availability in everyday life contexts using the experience sampling method (Larson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). First, less physically active older adults might be more inclined to 
take part in a study about physical or mental effort when they can provide assessments from 
the comfort of their own homes. Second, capturing the experiences of older adults as they go 
about their daily routines and move through their personal environments might be more 
externally valid, as they would mostly provide energy ratings on personally meaningful 
activities. However, such a “from lab to life” approach comes with its own pitfalls: Contrary 
to the laboratory setting employed in Study 2 and absent a specific intervention, an 
experience sampling design allows for less controllability of the type of activities that 
younger, middle-aged, and older adults engage in, thus making between-person comparisons 
difficult.  
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Second, the present studies are correlational in nature. Thus, we cannot determine why 
older adults perceive to have more energy available for personally relevant mental and social 
activities, or why they report initial increases in exhaustion and opportunity costs during 
demanding physical exercise. Note that this limitation cannot be solved simply by employing 
an experience sampling design (although some approaches might approximate causal 
inference; Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). Thus, another possible avenue for future work is to 
examine the psychological mechanisms that might underlie these age-related differences by 
manipulating them in an experiment (Freund & Isaacowitz, 2013). For instance, recent work 
has shown that perceived opportunity costs can be efficiently manipulated in a laboratory 
setting (Cardini & Freund, 2019b; Hofmann et al., 2019). If one is interested in understanding 
whether an increase in opportunity costs leads to the assessment that the current activity is 
incurring more costs (e.g., draining energy) than benefits (e.g., goal progress), one could 
manipulate opportunity costs before or during a demanding activity and study the impact of 
this manipulation on feelings of effort, exhaustion, or activity utility.  
Despite these limitations, this set of studies provides the as-yet most comprehensive 
examination of age-related differences in the subjective availability of energy for goal 
pursuits targeting different functional domains. Furthermore, it represents the first empirical 
insight into age-related differences in perceived opportunity costs – a construct of central 
importance in more recent research on self-regulation, effort, and exhaustion (e.g., Cardini & 
Freund, 2019a; Hofmann et al., 2019; Kurzban et al., 2013).   
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Abstract 
Leisure experiences impact recovery from everyday life demands. Testing a recent 
motivational model of recovery, we examined if this also applies to recovery from 
accumulated strain during a vacation. In the current daily diary study, 147 university students 
reported their daily recovery, mood, opportunity costs, and subjective time perception over 
21 consecutive days (2,342 observations) during the summer break. Multilevel analyses 
showed that students reported higher recovery on days when they were in a better mood and 
perceived lower opportunity costs than usual. These results held after controlling for the 
passage of time and well-established covariates of recovery (i.e., psychological detachment, 
relaxation, mastery, and control). Supporting the motivational model of recovery, positive 
mood, the absence of opportunity costs and, to a lesser degree, the perception of time passing 
quickly contribute to daily recovery during a vacation.   
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Introduction 
Leisure is important for recovery (Kuykendall, Tay, & Ng, 2015; Sonnentag et al., 
2017). Be it short breaks during work (Hunter & Wu, 2016), lunch breaks (Bosch, Sonnentag, 
& Pinck, 2018), evenings (Bennett, Bakker, & Field, 2018), or weekends (Binnewies, 
Sonnentag, & Mojza, 2010) – the way we spend and experience our free time markedly 
impacts how successfully we recover from the demands of everyday life. Yet, not all leisure 
activities promote recovery equally well. For instance, hitting the gym after a stressful day at 
work may feel reinvigorating for some people, but leave others even more drained. 
Addressing these individual differences, research suggests that recovery mainly depends on 
how people experience their leisure activities (Newman et al., 2014; Sonnentag & Fritz, 
2007). For example, leisure activities facilitate recovery if they enable a person to mentally 
disengage from work (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2015) or if they satisfy a person’s need for 
autonomy, meaning, and affiliation (Newman et al., 2014).  
Different to the research on short-term recovery, surprisingly little is known about how 
recovery unfolds on larger time scales such as vacations (Sonnentag et al., 2017). An 
established finding in this area is that people tend to report higher levels of health and well-
being at the end compared to the beginning of a vacation, but these benefits fade out soon 
after work is resumed (De Bloom, Geurts, & Kompier, 2012; De Bloom, Geurts, & Kompier, 
2013; De Bloom et al., 2011; De Bloom et al., 2010; De Bloom et al., 2009; Kühnel & 
Sonnentag, 2011; Syrek, Weigelt, Kühnel, & De Bloom, 2018).  
The processes underlying the increase in health and well-being over the course of a 
vacation remain poorly understood, because prior research has largely neglected to 
investigate the time period during a vacation. To put it in the words of De Bloom et al. (2013, 
p. 615), “it is essential to open up the black box of vacationing and to study what vacationers 
actually do and experience during vacation.” Thus, in the present study we aim to close this 
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gap by examining what kinds of experiences people have on a given vacation day, and how 
these experiences might contribute to recovery from accumulated strain. Taking a novel, 
holistic approach to recovery, we integrate two distinct strands of literature (i.e., recovery 
from work and motivational approaches to recovery), which we will introduce in turn next.  
Recovery from Work 
In their influential work on recovery, Sonnentag and Fritz (2007) introduced the 
Recovery Experience Questionnaire assessing four factors contributing to recovery. Focusing 
on the interplay between work and leisure, the authors posit that psychological detachment 
(i.e., the process of “switching off” from daily stressors and forgetting about them), 
relaxation (i.e., a state of low sympathetic arousal), mastery (i.e., the feelings of success or 
achievement that result from prevailing in challenging situations), and control (i.e., the 
experience of deciding for oneself what to do during the day and how to do it) play a 
prominent role in recovering from work. Drawing on conservation of resources (COR, 
Hobfoll, 1989) and effort–recovery theory (Meijman & Mulder, 1998), the authors 
conceptualize recovery as the process of reducing or eliminating physiological and mental 
strain reactions due to high job demands and stressful events at work (Sonnentag & Fritz, 
2015).  
Importantly, the authors argue that “it is not primarily the acute stress reaction that is 
detrimental for an organism but rather the sustained activation, even when the stressor is no 
longer present” (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2015, p. 75). Thus, in order to successfully recover from 
accumulated strain, it is essential for people to experience psychological detachment, 
relaxation, mastery, and control during leisure. Empirical studies support this notion: People 
who experience more psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control during 
leisure feel better, are more satisfied with their lives, and report less work-family conflict 
(Sonnentag et al., 2017). The more people detach from work in the evening, the better their 
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mood at bedtime and the more recovered they feel the following morning (Sonnentag et al., 
2017). In their more recent stressor-detachment model, Sonnentag and Fritz (2015) single out 
psychological detachment as the primary prerequisite of recovery: Encountering high levels 
of stressors at work (e.g., time pressure and workload) leads to less effective psychological 
detachment during leisure, which in turn leads to more accumulated strain, making recovery 
increasingly difficult (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2015).  
Most of the research on recovery focuses on short-term processes after work. Only little 
is known about how detachment relates to recovery during longer periods of leisure such as a 
vacation. Given that work stressors are mostly absent during a vacation, one might wonder if 
psychological detachment is as effective a strategy for recovery during vacations as it is on 
the evenings of a work day. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that people who experienced 
more relaxation and control but, importantly, not more psychological detachment during their 
summer vacations also reported a steeper increase in health and well-being (De Bloom et al., 
2013; but see Syrek et al., 2018). Thus, feeling relaxed and in control during vacations might 
be most important for enabling recovery in the vacation context.  
A Motivational Perspective on Recovery 
Anecdotally, one often hears that people need a certain amount of time during their 
vacations until the process of recovery even starts. During this time, detachment might be 
particularly important and, once detachment is achieved, people might feel that they truly 
start to recover and do not only counteract the accumulated work-related strain. The notion 
that some kind of “pre-recovery” period is necessary before the actual recovery process starts 
seems somewhat odd as this phase would seem to be part of the recovery process. However, 
it seems that people do not yet perceive to be recovering during this “pre-recovery” period. 
This leads to the question of how people determine when they are recovered.  
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We (Cardini & Freund, 2019a) recently proposed that a person’s mood, opportunity 
costs (i.e., the perceived costs of forgoing attractive alternatives vs. the benefits of staying 
engaged in the focal activity), and subjective time perception experienced during an ongoing 
activity provide the person with valuable information about her current state of exhaustion 
and recovery. Drawing on the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account (Huntsinger et al., 2014), 
the opportunity cost model of subjective effort (Kurzban et al., 2013), and the time-as-
information approach (Zakay, 2014), we argued that people perceive their current 
environment as contributing to their recovery when they are in a good mood, experience no 
opportunity costs and an accelerated sense of time. This pleasant state is thought to reflect a 
favorable cost-benefit ratio of the current environment (i.e., the perceived benefits outweigh 
the perceived costs; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017), and 
incentivizes the person to stay engaged in the current activity. Conversely, once the cost-
benefit ratio of the current environment turns unfavorable, a gradual decrease in mood, 
increase in opportunity costs, and expansion of the sense of time ensues. This progressively 
aversive state, in turn, is experienced by the person as exhaustion and incentivizes the person 
to disengage from the focal activity (see also van der Linden, 2011).  
In our view, this approach to exhaustion and recovery is valuable for three reasons: 
First, it dispels the notion that exhaustion and recovery are mere processes of resource 
depletion and restoration (e.g., Kaplan & Berman, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Ryan 
& Deci, 2008), which has recently come under scrutiny (Carter et al., 2015). Instead, it aligns 
itself with more promising motivational models of exhaustion (e.g., Hockey, 2013; Inzlicht et 
al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Second, it substantially extends these models of exhaustion 
by bringing into the equation its counterpart – recovery. Third, it provides an explanation for 
what Inzlicht et al. (2018) have termed the “effort paradox” (i.e., why exerting effort is 
sometimes perceived as pleasant, despite an apparent general consensus that effort is 
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aversive; Kurzban, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017): When spending effort on a task is inherently 
valuable to a person or is expected to lead to valued outcomes, then effort is weighed as a 
benefit towards the cost-benefit ratio of said task, thus generating a pleasant state and 
shielding the person from the aversive state that non-valued effort would otherwise effectuate 
(i.e., when it is weighed as a cost towards the cost-benefit ratio).  
Applied to the vacation context, the model predicts that when a person evaluates to 
what extent the concluding vacation day has contributed to her recovery, she will take into 
account how good or bad the day has made her feel (daily mood), how attractive it would 
have been for her to spend the day differently (daily opportunity costs), and how quickly or 
slowly she perceived the day to have passed (daily time perception). The current study was 
designed to test these hypotheses. 
The Present Study 
The present study expands previous work on recovery in three substantial ways. First, 
we aimed to investigate the motivational model of recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019a) by 
examining the role of daily mood, opportunity costs, and subjective time perception for 
recovery in the vacation context. To gauge the value of the model’s contribution to our 
understanding of recovery, we included as covariates other well-established factors 
influencing recovery (i.e., daily psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control; 
Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007). Doing so allowed us to compare the relative importance between 
these experiences for explaining daily fluctuations in recovery. Second, we used a daily diary 
design of 21 consecutive days, starting on the first day of vacation. This intensive short-term 
longitudinal design allowed us to model how recovery and related experiences unfold in a 
naturalistic recovery setting (i.e., students’ summer break after the demanding exam period). 
We chose this recovery setting because university students typically report high levels of 
exhaustion at the end of an academic semester and being in need of a vacation (e.g., Law, 
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2007; Schaufeli, Martinez, Pinto, Salanova, & Bakker, 2002). Third, in addition to assessing 
subjective recovery, we included a measure of people’s perceived closeness to their optimal 
recovery on any given day. This allowed us to distinguish between daily fluctuations in 
recovery and longer-term progress towards one’s aspired recovery level. While we expected 
both measures to be closely associated (i.e., people should perceive themselves closer to their 
optimal recovery on a day when they also feel more recovered), we were primarily interested 
in examining whether people weigh their daily experiences differently towards their 
assessments of daily recovery and longer-term recovery progress. 
Based on the potential of vacations to enhance people’s health and well-being (e.g., De 
Bloom et al., 2009), we hypothesized that daily recovery and proximity to the aspired 
recovery level increase over the course of the vacation. Furthermore, we hypothesized that 
daily mood and time perception are positively, and opportunity costs negatively associated 
with daily recovery, and that out of these three indicators, mood shows the strongest 
association with recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019b). Furthermore, the same general pattern 
should hold for daily evaluations of optimal recovery proximity: According to feedback 
control models of self-regulation, positive mood signals a faster-than-expected progress 
towards one’s goal (Carver & Scheier, 2004). It follows that a person should feel closer to her 
goal of optimal recovery when she’s in a good mood on a given day. Finally, we explored the 
relative importance between the psychological indicators we have proposed (Cardini & 
Freund, 2019a) and the factors identified by Sonnentag and Fritz (2007) for explaining daily 
fluctuations in recovery. 
Method 
Participants 
Students were recruited via mailing lists, online advertisements, and posters at different 
universities in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. Students were eligible for participation if 
Part IV 
 
127 
 
they intended to take a break from their studies and work for at least two weeks after the last 
exam. The recruitment advertisement included a link to an online screening questionnaire 
programmed with SoSci Survey (www.soscisurvey.de). Based on power simulations by 
Bolger and Laurenceau (2013) for estimating within-person relationships in daily diary 
designs, we aimed for a sample of at least 120 participants. Because we suspected that a 
substantial number of participants might drop out of a study taking place during their 
vacation, we recruited an initial sample of N = 176 students who filled out the online 
screening and signed up to receive the daily questionnaires. Of those, n = 21 did not fill out 
any and n = 8 only filled out one daily questionnaire; they were excluded from further 
analyses. The excluded subsample did not differ substantially from the rest on various trait 
measures (e.g., age, gender, recovery, exhaustion, and mood; ps between .20 and .95). The 
final sample consisted of N = 147 undergraduate students (M = 24.14 years, SD = 3.88; 85% 
women) from the fields of psychology (58%), medicine (20%), or law (5%).  
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants provided sociodemographic information 
and reported on various dispositional variables (e.g., exhaustion, recovery, mood, 
wakefulness, and calmness). They then rated their degree of recovery, exhaustion, mood, 
time perception, and opportunity costs with respect to the concluding academic semester and 
estimated how many days they would need to fully recover from it (M = 10.91 days, SD = 
9.43, range = 0-60). Finally, they indicated the date of their last exam and whether they had 
planned to stay at home (61%) or go on vacation (39%) in their summer break. On average, 
students filled out the online screening 19.57 days (SD = 20.14) before their last exam. A 
small number of students (n = 10) filled out the screening two to eight days after their last 
exam. All other participants started the diary part the day after their last exam. They were 
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asked to fill out a daily questionnaire on their smartphones for 21 consecutive days. The 
questionnaires were sent out each day at five p.m. via SMS or email prompts.  
The daily questionnaires assessed students’ daily recovery, mood, time perception, 
opportunity costs, distance to their optimal recovery, detachment, relaxation, mastery, 
control, and activities. The item presentation order was randomized. To prevent participants’ 
end-of-day tiredness from influencing their daily ratings, we only considered questionnaires 
that were completed between the “downtime” of five p.m. and 7:30 p.m. (N = 2342). We 
incentivized adherence to this time window by giving students one raffle ticket for every 
timely submitted questionnaire. The raffle took place at the end of the study (15 x 20, 10 x 
50, 5 x 100 Swiss francs or Euros). We excluded 63 questionnaires that were completed 
before five p.m. and 229 after 7:30 p.m. On average, students filled out 17.32 valid 
questionnaires (SD = 3.61, range: 2-21). At the end of the study, all students received 
personalized feedback on their recovery time course and related experiences, were debriefed, 
and notified if they had won at the raffle.  
Measures 
Dispositional exhaustion and recovery. The General Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
(Cardini et al., 2019) measures dispositional exhaustion and recovery as two separate 
dimensions. The exhaustion dimension consists of 8 items (e.g., “In general, I feel weak”; α = 
.88). The recovery dimension consists of 5 items (e.g., “In general, I feel energized”; α = 
.81). Items were measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The means, 
standard deviations, and correlations between the study variables are depicted in Table 8.  
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Table 8 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between Dispositional and Daily Measures.  
Note. N = 147 persons, 21 days, 2,332-2,342 observations. Daily measures are aggregated across persons and measurement occasions. The 
critical correlation coefficient for a significance level of  = .05 (two-tailed) is .16 
Measure M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Trait recovery 2.63 (0.90) –             
2. Trait exhaustion 1.79 (1.00) -.73 –            
3. Trait wakefulness 2.42 (1.05) .61 -.69 –           
4. Trait good mood 3.43 (0.97) .62 -.77 .72 –          
5. Trait calmness 2.53 (1.14) .50 -.62 .65 .70 –         
6. Daily recovery 0.57 (2.68) .09 -.21 .32 .31 .19 –        
7. Daily goal proximity 0.85 (2.59) .14 -.28 .29 .30 .24 .78 –       
8. Daily mood 2.04 (2.28) .23 -.31 .27 .42 .19 .66 .62 –      
9. Daily opportunity costs -1.24 (2.99) -.19 .29 -.21 -.30 -.23 -.45 -.41 -.60 –     
10. Daily time perception 1.51 (2.56) .10 -.17 .21 .24 .12 .47 .39 .54 -.41 –    
11. Daily detachment 2.89 (1.71) .18 -.23 .25 .31 .26 .54 .45 .54 -.53 .36 –   
12. Daily relaxation 2.90 (1.51) .19 -.21 .26 .31 .22 .66 .54 .60 -.59 .41 .69 –  
13. Daily mastery 1.62 (1.42) .20 -.16 .16 .07 .09 .06 .14 .06 .06 -.06 -.02 .00 – 
14. Daily control 3.38 (1.41) .28 -.34 .31 .39 .19 .61 .55 .71 -.66 .50 .59 .75 .10 
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Dispositional mood state. The Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (German 
short version; Steyer et al., 1997) measures three bipolar dimensions of psychological 
functioning: Wakefulness (vs. tiredness; 4 items, α = .86), good mood (vs. bad mood; 4 
items, α = .87), and calmness (vs. nervousness; 4 items, α = .89) on a scale from 0 (not at all) 
to 5 (very much).  
Daily recovery and optimal recovery proximity. The dependent variables were: (1) 
Daily recovery (“How much has this day exhausted or recovered you?”) measured on a 
bipolar visual analogue scale ranging from -5 (very exhausted) to +5 (very recovered), and 
(2) daily optimal recovery proximity (“How far away from or close to your optimal recovery 
are you today?”) with -5 (very far away) to +5 (very close). Within-person reliabilities were 
good (RCn of .87 for recovery and .86 for optimal recovery proximity; Cranford et al., 2006), 
indicating that these items are sensitive to detecting interindividual differences in 
intraindividual variability.  
Daily psychological indicators of recovery. To examine and compare the effects of 
the psychological indicators of recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019a) on daily recovery and 
optimal recovery proximity, we modeled each as a time-varying independent variable. We 
assessed daily mood with the item “How was your mood today?” on a bipolar visual analogue 
scale ranging from -5 (very bad) to +5 (very good), daily opportunity costs with “Would you 
have preferred to do something different today?” with -5 (not at all) to +5 (something 
completely different), and daily time perception with “How slowly or fast did this day pass?” 
with -5 (very slowly) to +5 (very fast). Within-person reliabilities were good (RCns of .86 for 
mood and time perception and .87 for opportunity costs). 
Daily experiences influencing recovery. To assess as time-varying covariates the four 
previously identified factors impacting recovery, for each factor we used the item with the 
highest factor loading as reported by Sonnentag and Fritz (2007): (1) Psychological 
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detachment (“Today I forgot about work”), (2) relaxation (“Today I kicked back and 
relaxed”), (3) mastery (“Today I sought out intellectual challenges”), and (4) control (“Today 
I felt like I could decide for myself what to do”). Items were measured on a Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5 (a lot). Within-person reliabilities were good (all RCns = .86).  
Daily activities. At each measurement occasion, students indicated if they had been 
engaged in one or more of the following activities during the day: Sports (n = 489), relaxation 
(n = 1210), friends and family (n = 1347), culture (n = 267), work (n = 637), and other (n = 
726). On average, students were engaged in 1.99 activities per day (SD = 0.60). 
Statistical Analysis 
We followed the suggestions of Bolger and Laurenceau (2013) for reporting 
multilevel analyses. In a first step, we analyzed the time courses of the daily measures using 
unconditional multilevel growth curve models with measurement occasion (21 days, coded 
from 0 to 20, such that 0 indicates the first day after the last exam) as the sole independent 
variable, allowing for a simple autocorrelative error structure (AR[1]) and, where applicable, 
accounting for heteroscedasticity of the measures over time. In a second step, we extended 
these analyses to conditional multilevel growth curve models. This allowed us to estimate and 
compare the extent to which the psychological indicators of recovery (i.e., mood, opportunity 
costs, time perception) are associated with both daily recovery and optimal recovery 
proximity, while controlling for important time-varying covariates (i.e., psychological 
detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control).  
Importantly, because these daily measures varied both between and within persons 
and we were primarily interested in the estimation of within-person associations, we 
disaggregated these variables into their respective between- and within-person components, 
taking into account the unbalanced design of the data and the variables’ relationship with 
time. Specifically, we used the traditional approach (i.e., person-mean centering) only when 
Part IV 
 
132 
 
the variable was unrelated to time. If a variable was systematically related to time, we instead 
used the detrending approach (Curran & Bauer, 2011) by first regressing the variable on time 
separately for each person using ordinary least squares and then subtracting the raw values 
for each person at each measurement occasion from the model-implied slope value at that 
occasion (i.e., retaining the time-specific residuals from the regression). A positive regression 
coefficient of the between-person component of an independent variable can be interpreted as 
follows: Students with higher average values of the independent variable (across all days) 
also tend to have higher average values of the dependent variable (across all days). A positive 
regression coefficient of the within-person component of an independent variable can be 
interpreted as follows: Students who report higher than usual values of the independent 
variable (on a specific day) also tend to report higher than usual values of the dependent 
variable (on that specific day).  
We conducted all analyses in R (R Core Team, 2018). For the time course analyses, 
we used the nlme package (Pinheiro et al., 2018). For the time–varying covariates analyses, 
we used the Bayesian brms package (Bürkner, 2017), as this package tends to converge more 
reliably for multilevel models with complex variance-covariance matrices. 
Results 
The initial multilevel analysis dataset consisted of 2,342 observations. Inspection of the 
scatterplots, person by person, indicated that due to a very infrequent technical failure, two 
persons had missing data for one measurement occasion for optimal recovery proximity and 
eight persons had missing data for one measurement occasion for psychological detachment, 
relaxation, mastery, and control. Thus, we conducted the following analyses on a total 
ranging between 2,332 and 2,342 observations. 
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Modeling the Time Courses 
Model building. All daily measures showed substantial between-person variance (ICCs 
between .18 and .36), confirming the nested structure of the data (days nested in students) and 
necessitating the use of multilevel modeling. We began the model building process by 
comparing the ordinary least squares null model to a random-intercept null model for the 
daily measures. Given that these models are nested, we decided on the better-fitting model 
using the chi-square likelihood ratio test under restricted maximum likelihood estimation. 
The random-intercept model fit the data better in all instances, indicating that students 
differed in their initial intercepts (i.e., the day after the last exam) on all daily measures.  
We then added time as a single fixed effect independent variable in the models. Since 
the models with time were not nested in the random-intercept model (i.e., had a different 
fixed effect structure), we decided on the better fitting model using the AIC and BIC under 
full maximum likelihood estimation, with lower values indicating better model fit. The model 
with linear time as independent variable fit the data better for daily recovery, optimal 
recovery proximity, psychological detachment, and mastery (the model including a quadratic 
fixed effect of time fit the data worse in all instances). Thus, students on average reported 
systematic linear changes in these variables across the study period. 
 In a next step, we added a random slope for time to the models, comparing them to 
the prior models using chi square likelihood ratio tests. These models fit the data better in all 
instances except for time perception, indicating that students differed with regard to their 
individual time courses for every daily measure except time perception.  
As a last step, we added a simple autocorrelative error structure (AR[1]) to the models 
and tested whether they should account for heteroscedasticity. The models accounting for 
autocorrelation but not for heteroscedasticity fit the data better in all instances.  
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The final models for each daily measure are depicted in Figure 6, which visualizes the 
time courses using two sets of parameter estimates. The first set, the fixed effects of time, 
estimate the time courses for the average student in the sample. These fixed effects are 
represented by the thick black lines. The second set are the between-person random effects of 
time, which estimate the extent to which the time courses of single students deviate from the 
time course of the typical student in the sample. These random effects are represented by the 
variability in individual regression lines (thin grey lines) from the average regression line. 
Fixed effects of time. As expected, both daily recovery and daily optimal recovery 
proximity increased on average during the vacation, b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.02, 0.07] 
and b = 0.09, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.06, 0.11], respectively. Daily mood, opportunity costs, 
and time perception did not systematically change over time. Daily psychological detachment 
and mastery slightly increased, b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.04] and b = 0.02, SE = 
0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03], respectively, while relaxation and control remained constant.  
Random effects of time. As can be seen in Figure 6, all daily measures showed 
substantial between-person variability in intercepts and slopes (except for time perception, 
which showed no variability in slopes). The variation in intercepts of the daily measures 
ranged between 0.65 and 1.92 standard deviations, meaning that approximately 68% of the 
model-implied individual intercepts were located within ±0.65 up to ±1.92 units from the 
average initial intercepts. In addition, approximately 68% of the model-implied individual 
slopes for time were located within ±0.03 up to ±0.11 units from the average slopes. The 
within-person variability (i.e., the residuals of the individual regression lines) ranged between 
1.11 and 2.69 standard deviations. This means that, across time and students, approximately 
68% of the raw data points deviated ±1.11 up to ±2.69 units from the model-implied 
individual regression lines. 
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Figure 6. Spaghetti plots of the fixed and random effects of time for the daily measures. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the fixed effects.  
 
Main Analyses 
To test the hypothesis that daily mood and time perception are positively and 
opportunity costs negatively related to daily recovery and optimal recovery proximity, we ran 
four Bayesian multilevel models. We first estimated the sole impact of daily mood, 
opportunity costs, and time perception on daily recovery and optimal recovery proximity, 
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without controlling for other factors (Baseline Models in Table 9). Next, we included daily 
detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control as time-varying covariates in the models 
(Covariates Models in Table 9).  
The left part of Table 9 summarizes the multilevel models for daily recovery as a 
function of the psychological indicators of recovery and other factors, controlling for time. 
As can be seen, daily mood, opportunity costs, and time perception independently explained 
variance in daily recovery, albeit with varying strength. As expected, daily mood had the  
strongest impact on daily recovery, b = 0.35, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.28, 0.41], followed by 
opportunity costs, b = -0.21, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.16]. In comparison, daily time 
perception was only weakly associated with daily recovery, b = 0.08, SE = 0.03, 95% CI 
[0.02, 0.14]. Thus, on days when people reported better mood, lower opportunity costs, and 
faster time perception than usual, they also tended to report higher levels of recovery than  
usual. Importantly, these relationships remained substantial even after we included the other 
factors as further time-varying covariates in the model. Only relaxation (b = 0.61, SE = 0.06, 
95% CI [0.49, 0.74]) and control (b = 0.12, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24]) uniquely 
explained variance in daily recovery. 
The right part of Table 9 summarizes the multilevel models for daily optimal recovery 
proximity. Again, daily mood, opportunity costs, and time perception independently 
explained variance in daily optimal recovery proximity, with daily mood showing the 
strongest association (b = 0.19, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.14, 0.24]), followed by opportunity 
costs (b = -0.12, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.08]), and time perception showing a 
comparably weak association (b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.005, 0.07]). However, unlike 
daily recovery, time perception did not explain unique variance in recovery in the Covariates 
Model anymore, b = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.06]. As expected, out of all the 
covariates, daily recovery showed the strongest association with optimal recovery proximity. 
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Table 9 
 
Bayesian Multilevel Model Estimates for Daily Recovery and Optimal Recovery Proximity as a Function of Daily Mood, Opportunity Costs, 
Time Perception, Psychological Detachment, Relaxation, Mastery, and Control. 
 
 Daily Recovery  Daily Optimal Recovery Proximity 
 Baseline Model  Covariates Model  Baseline Model  Covariates Model 
   95% CI    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
Predictors Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper 
Fixed Effects                    
Intercept -0.48 0.15 -0.77 -0.19  -2.59 0.40 -3.37 -1.80  -0.05 0.21 -0.45 0.37  -1.93 0.49 -2.91 -0.98 
Time 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07  0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07  0.09 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.09 0.01 0.07 0.12 
Mood 0.35 0.03 0.28 0.41  0.24 0.04 0.17 0.31  0.19 0.03 0.14 0.24  0.16 0.03 0.11 0.21 
Opportunity Costs -0.21 0.03 -0.26 -0.16  -0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.03  -0.12 0.02 -0.15 -0.08  -0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 
Time Perception 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.13  0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07  0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.06 
Detachment - - - -  0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.09  - - - -  0.07 0.03 0.01 0.13 
Relaxation - - - -  0.61 0.06 0.49 0.74  - - - -  0.16 0.04 0.08 0.23 
Mastery - - - -  0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.15  - - - -  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14 
Control - - - -  0.12 0.06 0.01 0.24  - - - -  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.17 
Recovery - - - -  - - - -  0.35 0.02 0.30 0.39  0.30 0.02 0.25 0.34 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 Daily Recovery  Daily Optimal Recovery Proximity 
 Baseline Model  Covariates Model  Baseline Model  Covariates Model 
   95% CI    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
Predictors Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper 
Random Effects                    
Intercept 0.85 0.08 0.70 1.00  0.77 0.07 0.64 0.92  1.21 0.09 1.04 1.40  1.07 0.08 0.93 1.23 
Time 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.10 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.16 0.01 0.13 0.18  0.15 0.01 0.12 0.17 
Residual 1.96 0.03 1.90 2.03  1.75 0.03 1.69 1.82  1.22 0.02 1.18 1.27  1.13 0.02 1.09 1.18 
AR(1) 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.14  0.09 0.03 0.03 0.15  0.12 0.03 0.06 0.18  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14 
LOO–IC 10168 77.20 - -  9236 80.00 - -  8190 105.10 - -  7561 96.30 - - 
Marginal R2 .28     .40     .42     .51    
Conditional R2 .43     .57     .77     .80    
Note. N = 147 persons, 21 days, 2,332-2,342 observations. Est = Estimate. Depicted are the unstandardized regression coefficients for the within-
person fixed effects and the standard deviations and correlations for the random effects. LOO–IC = Approximate leave-one-out cross-validation 
information criterion based on the posterior likelihood (smaller values indicate better model fit). Marginal R2 depicts the proportion of variance 
explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed and random effects combined. Time is 
mean-centered (0 represents day 10 after the final exam). The default priors of the brms R-package (Bürkner, 2017) were used. Depicted are the 
within-person fixed effects (the between-person fixed effects and within-person random effects were included in the analyses; see Table A10 in 
Appendix A for the full table containing all model parameters).  
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Discussion 
This extensive daily diary study tracking students’ recovery experiences during a 
vacation demonstrates that daily mood, opportunity costs, and – to a lesser degree – 
subjective time perception independently contribute to fluctuations in daily recovery: People 
felt more recovered on days when they were in a better-than-usual mood, experienced less-
than-usual opportunity costs, and perceived the day to have passed more quickly than usual. 
Crucially, these associations held even when controlling for the passage of time and other 
well-established factors influencing recovery, namely psychological detachment, relaxation, 
mastery, and control (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007). These results provide empirical support for 
the motivational model of recovery in the context of a vacation (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). 
Feeling relaxed and in control of the daily program, while important factors for recovery in 
and of themselves, are not sufficient to explain daily fluctuations in recovery during a 
vacation. This study has demonstrated that additional affective (i.e., mood) and cognitive 
(i.e., opportunity costs) indicators of recovery need to be considered to paint a clearer picture 
of the recovery process. This finding is in line with other research demonstrating that 
savoring and deriving pleasure from leisure activities can contribute to one’s health and well-
being during a vacation (De Bloom et al., 2013).  
Increasing the Recovery Potential of Vacations 
Given that people report being more recovered on days when they are in a better mood, 
the question arises as to which strategies they can employ to enhance their mood on a given 
vacation day. Research on mood regulation suggests that exercising, listening to music, and 
engaging in meaningful social interactions play an important role in elevating one’s mood 
(Thayer et al., 1994). Thus, creating opportunities to meet other people (e.g., going out with 
friends or traveling), sticking to one’s workout routine, and frequently listening to one’s 
favorite songs might prove beneficial for recovery in the vacation context. Supporting this 
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notion, more than half of the mentioned daily activities in the present study related to social 
interactions (58%), and one in five of them related to physical exercise (21%). Prior empirical 
research has also demonstrated that physical exercise can be beneficial for recovery (e.g., 
Rook & Zijlstra, 2006). Interestingly, it seems that mood moderates the relationship between 
physical activity and recovery: The amount of time spent on physical activities after work is 
positively related to recovery at bedtime only when people report being happy during these 
activities (Oerlemans, Bakker, & Demerouti, 2014). Furthermore, in addition to enhancing 
one’s mood, listening to music might also induce a state of relaxation by facilitating the 
deactivation of the sympathetic nervous system (Finn & Fancourt, 2018), hence contributing 
to recovery in more than one way. 
Research on the experience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) demonstrates that people 
thrive in environments that contain high opportunities for action (i.e., perceived challenges), 
are matched with people’s own capacities to act (i.e., perceived skills), and provide frequent 
feedback about one’s progress. Be it work or leisure: The more people are approximating the 
conditions of flow in a given situation, the more they perceive the situation as pleasant (e.g., 
Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989). Thus, engaging in challenging, yet manageable activities 
that foster the monitoring of one’s progress towards a goal might constitute another pathway 
to happiness throughout a vacation day. On a related note, frequent monitoring of one’s goal 
progress enhances the likelihood of goal attainment (Harkin et al., 2016), which should 
further contribute to positive mood.  
A critical question given the high correlation of positive mood and recovery is if they 
represent the same construct. Feeling recovered might be an important aspect of positive 
mood, and feeling exhausted might be an aspect of negative mood. Note, however, that a 
strong correlation does not imply the identity of a construct. We (Cardini & Freund, 2019a) 
maintain that the process of recovery from exhaustion leads to an increase in positive mood. 
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However, there are many other variables contributing to a good mood that might not directly 
influence the recovery process (e.g., good weather, spending time with a good friend, etc.). 
Similarly, one can easily think of situations in which one is exhausted yet in a good mood 
(e.g., after having finished a marathon or a difficult exam). Thus, positive mood and recovery 
are theoretically – and empirically - related yet denote different psychological constructs.  
Given that experiencing opportunity costs is negatively related to daily recovery: How 
can people keep daily opportunity costs at a low level? Planning one’s vacation day in 
advance might prove an effective strategy. Put simply, planning facilitates daily goal pursuit 
because it helps people to stay committed to their goals in the face of distractions, obstacles, 
and setbacks (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Achieving more of one’s daily goals, in turn, will 
likely lead to more positive evaluations of that day (e.g., “Today was a great day because I 
have done what I set out to do”), thereby reducing thoughts about how the day could have 
been spent in a better way. In addition, planning might also contribute to recovery through 
enhancing the feeling of being in control of the daily program, which was positively related 
to daily recovery in our study.  
Limitations 
This study has at least three limitations. First, retrospective biases cannot be completely 
ruled out with the current daily diary design. For instance, when asked to rate their mood on a 
given day, it is not clear if the answer reflects persons’ averaged evaluations of their mood on 
that day up to the time of testing, or if it reflects one or more particularly salient mood states 
that they experienced on that day (e.g., peak-end heuristic; Kahneman, Frederickson, 
Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993). We tried to address this issue by framing our items so that 
they encourage an accumulated evaluation of one’s daily experiences, which most closely 
captures normative experiences (Miron-Shatz, 2009).  
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Second, to achieve an acceptable trade-off between brevity and complexity of the daily 
questionnaires, we relied on single-item measures of the daily variables. We reasoned that 
people probably do not like to be bothered with lengthy questionnaires when on vacation. 
However, everything else being equal, single-item measures have worse psychometric 
properties than multi-item measures. Despite this, the use of single-item measures also has its 
merits, especially so in daily diary designs and particularly when used during a vacation 
when people do not want to be bothered by having to fill out lengthy questionnaires, because 
it minimizes respondent burden, reduces criterion contamination (i.e., uses less construct-
irrelevant and more clearly worded, easy-to-understand items), and enhances face validity 
(Fischer, Matthews, & Gibbons, 2016). Supporting this notion, single-item measures have 
been shown to be appropriate for assessing various constructs such as global life satisfaction 
(Cheung & Lucas, 2014), self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001), quality of life 
(De Boer et al., 2004), and job satisfaction (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). Furthermore, 
in the current study, we found that the daily single-item measures are precise in detecting 
interindividual differences in intraindividual variability (RCns between .86 and .87; Cranford 
et al., 2006).  
Third, we cannot rule out the possibility of inflated correlations due to common method 
variance (i.e., variance that is due to the measurement method rather than due to the 
constructs the measures represent; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
Anticipating this problem, we took the following steps to try and reduce common method 
bias in the present study: (1) randomizing of the item presentation order, (2) varying of the 
item scale anchors of the predictor and criterion variables, (3) varying of the item scale 
formats of the predictor variables, (4) clear wording of the items. 
Despite these limitations, to the authors’ knowledge, this daily diary study provides the 
as-yet most comprehensive insight into the dynamics of recovery during a vacation. Given 
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that most biological and social processes are nonergodic (i.e., between-person differences do 
not always mirror within-person change over time; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009), by 
disaggregating within- and between-person variability in the daily measures, we were able to 
depict a more fine-grained picture of the within-person recovery process (Bolger & 
Laurenceau, 2013; Curran & Bauer, 2011). Furthermore, by collecting daily measurements 
from the first day of vacation for up to three weeks thereafter, we substantially expanded 
prior work investigating the temporal patterns of recovery over the course of a vacation (e.g., 
De Bloom et al., 2013; Nawijn, 2010; Syrek et al., 2018). Finally, the application of Bayesian 
multilevel analysis with the efficient brms R-package (Bürkner, 2017) allowed us to fully 
model the complex variance-covariance matrices of the multilevel regression models depicted 
in Table 2 (i.e., estimating all the random effects of the within-person independent variables). 
With this, we were able to increase the proportion of variance explained in daily recovery and 
to reduce time-specific residual variance.  
Future Directions 
As correlation does not allow causal inferences, experimental research is necessary to 
enhance our understanding of the causal antecedents and consequences of recovery during a 
vacation. However, we were unable to come up with an experimental design that allows for 
the manipulation of mood or opportunity costs during a vacation. To test the causal effect of 
mood and opportunity costs on recovery more directly, future studies could try to induce 
exhaustion and recovery in an experimental setting. Importantly, the experiment would need 
to include a manipulation of mood or opportunity costs between the exhaustion and recovery 
period. However, to prevent the manipulation from interfering with the recovery process, it 
would need to be very short. While we are less convinced of the possibility to manipulate 
mood in such a short amount of time, recent research has demonstrated efficient ways to 
manipulate opportunity costs (Cardini & Freund, 2019b; Hofmann et al., 2019).  
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A more realistic possible avenue for future field-based studies is to focus on more 
clearly distinguishing the temporal associations between recovery and its influencing factors. 
For instance, using an intensive experience sampling design, one could assess mood and 
opportunity costs multiple times throughout a day and recovery in the evening (preferably 
using multi-item and multi-method measures to further enhance their psychometric properties 
and reduce common method variance), which would enable the investigation of more 
directional relationships between the measures of interest.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine age-differential effects of daily mood 
and opportunity costs on recovery. For instance, given their increased focus on maintaining 
their current level of functioning and preventing further losses (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 2000), 
older adults might weigh daily opportunity costs more negatively towards their assessment of 
recovery (Cardini & Freund, 2019a). It seems to us that expanding the experience sampling 
design proposed above to include different age groups might be the best way forward in field 
research on recovery. 
Conclusion 
In accordance with Kuykendall et al. (2015), we found that recovery is not simply the 
result of elapsed time but also depends on the kinds of experiences people have on a given 
vacation day. Feeling relaxed and in control of the daily program – while in and of 
themselves important for recovery – might only be part of the story. This study identified 
positive mood and the absence of opportunity costs as important additional facilitators of 
daily recovery. Thus, filling one’s vacations with highly valued activities that contribute to 
one’s happiness and planning one’s vacation days in advance might be effective strategies to 
increase their recovery value. 
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Abstract 
Most existing self-report measures depict exhaustion and recovery as opposite ends on a 
bipolar dimension. However, recent findings of only weak to moderate correlations between 
the constructs highlight the need for a scale that assesses exhaustion and recovery as separate 
factors. Based on existing questionnaires, we developed and validated a general Exhaustion 
and Recovery Scale in a series of three studies. We began by selecting items from established 
questionnaires that best represent the various functional domains in which exhaustion and 
recovery may occur (Study 1). The selected items showed excellent reliability and were best 
described by a correlated two-factor structure representing exhaustion and recovery (Study 
2). The two-factor structure was cross-validated on an independent data set using 
confirmatory factor analysis (Study 3). Finally, the scale showed good concurrent validity 
(Study 4). Taken together, the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale is a psychometrically sound, 
easily administered, and brief self-report measure of momentary feelings of exhaustion and 
recovery. 
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Introduction 
Everybody knows the feeling of exhaustion after a long day of being engaged in highly 
demanding tasks, and the associated need for recovery (e.g., Sonnentag & Zijlstra, 2006). Be 
it cognitively taxing work demands, physically tiring exercise routines, or emotionally 
draining encounters – exhaustion can arise from a variety of sources (Maslach & Jackson, 
1981; Smets et al., 1995). Boksem and Tops (2008), focusing on cognitive exhaustion, define 
it as the feeling during or after a prolonged period of cognitive activity encompassing 
tiredness, an aversion to continue with the current activity, and a decrease in commitment to 
the activity at hand. Wright and Cropanzano (1997, p. 486) define emotional exhaustion as “a 
chronic state of physical and emotional depletion that results from excessive job demands and 
continuous hassles.” Finally, taking a broader perspective, Smets and colleagues (1995, p. 
315) define exhaustion as “a normal, everyday experience that most individuals report after 
inadequate sleep or rest, or after exertion of physical power,” adding that cognitive effort can 
also contribute to exhaustion. Taken together, these definitions encompass multiple sources 
and expressions of exhaustion. Thus, we view exhaustion as a multi-faceted psychological 
construct comprising physical (e.g., increased tiredness), cognitive (e.g., aversive experience 
of effort), emotional (e.g., negative mood), motivational (e.g., reduced activity commitment), 
and behavioral (e.g., reduced activity performance) dimensions.  
The counterpart of exhaustion is recovery and denotes the process of reducing or 
removing the feeling of exhaustion and its expression on different levels of functioning 
(Zijlstra & Sonnentag, 2006). In their effort-recovery model, Meijman and Mulder (1998) 
argue that recovery in one functional domain can only occur once a person ceases all effortful 
activities that contribute to that domain’s exhaustion. For instance, a person is more likely to 
recover from one-hour of running by temporarily avoiding physically effortful activities. 
Similarly, a person dealing with cognitively taxing work demands may best unwind by 
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engaging in activities that require no additional cognitive effort. Recuperating from these 
daily strains is important because it prevents the development of more harmful and chronic 
exhaustion states (Maslach & Jackson, 1981; Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007) or exercise-induced 
injuries (Järvinen et al., 2007).  
How can one measure the multidimensionality of exhaustion and recovery? There are 
only few questionnaires that assess more than one dimension of these constructs (e.g., 
Demerouti, Bakker, Vardakou, & Kantas, 2003; Smets et al., 1995). Most existing self-report 
measures focus on one specific dimension of exhaustion and recovery. For example, the 
Maslach Burnout Inventory includes an emotional dimension of exhaustion that is used to 
assess levels of work-related stress (Maslach & Jackson, 1981). Moreover, most existing 
scales only measure either exhaustion or recovery but not both because of the underlying 
assumption that they constitute opposite poles on one bipolar dimension. However, this 
assumption conflicts with empirical findings of only small to moderate correlations between 
exhaustion and recovery, both at the state and trait level (e.g., Demerouti, Bakker, Sonnentag, 
& Fullagar, 2012). This suggests that exhaustion and recovery might be best measured as two 
separate (yet related) constructs. However, except for one questionnaire focusing exclusively 
on the work context (Winwood, Winefield, Dawson, & Lushington, 2005), to date no 
measure exists that includes exhaustion and recovery as separate constructs. This paper aims 
to close the gap by documenting the development and initial validation of a scale that 
includes exhaustion and recovery as separate dimensions. The main aim of this paper is to 
present a valid measure of exhaustion and recovery that can be applied to adults in various 
everyday life situations. For this purpose, we selected items with good psychometric 
properties of several well-established exhaustion and recovery questionnaires. In the next 
section, we will introduce the existing measures of exhaustion and recovery that served as the 
basis for the current studies.  
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Current Self-Report Measures of Exhaustion and Recovery 
We identified seven questionnaires that are aimed at measuring exhaustion and 
recovery: There are two questionnaires that assess exhaustion and recovery relatively 
broadly, namely (1) the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979) that 
includes aspects of exhaustion in the form of loss of concentration, feelings of nervousness 
and unhappiness, failure to start a new activity, and depressive symptoms. Regarding 
recovery, it measures physical shape, mental alertness, affection for others, and the degree of 
happiness. (2) The Checklist Individual Strength (Vercoulen, Alberts, & Bleijenberg, 1999) 
provides a multidimensional assessment with measures of exhaustion severity, concentration, 
motivation, and physical activity level. Relevant recovery aspects are degree of activation, 
motivation to engage in pleasant activities, feeling rested, and one’s physical shape. 
We further selected three scales that measure work-related aspects of exhaustion and 
recovery: (3) The scale by Sonnentag and Kruel (2006) measures a person’s state of recovery 
in the morning, distinguishing both physical and cognitive aspects. (4) The Need for 
Recovery Scale (Sluiter, 1999), developed to examine the short-term effects of a work day on 
a person’s need for recovery, assesses work-related exhaustion. (5) The Utrecht Work 
Engagement Scale (Schaufeli, Salanova, González-Romá, & Bakker, 2002b) measures three 
recovery-related dimensions in the work context: vigor, dedication, and absorption. Here, 
recovery is formulated as persevering at work and resilience to high job demands.  
Finally, there are two questionnaires that tap into more extreme cases of exhaustion. (6) 
The Maslach Burnout Inventory (Maslach & Jackson, 1981) measures severe emotional 
exhaustion. Note, however, that this measure only includes an emotional component of 
exhaustion stemming from stressful work demands, and does not necessarily translate into a 
person’s physical or mental strains. The scale measures aspects of recovery such as feeling 
energetic, feeling exhilarated after working with customers, and being successful in dealing 
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with emotional problems at work. (7) The Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (Demerouti et al., 
2003) combines several dimensions of exhaustion: Here, exhaustion is further divided into 
physical, cognitive, and emotional components. Recovery aspects include successfully 
overcoming work pressures and having sufficient energy left after work.  
Taken together, these scales provide measures for certain aspects of exhaustion and 
recovery that target different life contexts (e.g., work or leisure context). However, none of 
these scales provide a broad and general measure of both constructs that is applicable to a 
wide variety of situations in everyday life. To construct such a broad measure of exhaustion 
and recovery, we combined the items of the above described questionnaires, including items 
that target different functional levels of exhaustion and recovery (i.e., physical, cognitive, 
emotional, social, motivational, behavioral functional domains).  
The Present Studies 
In a series of four studies, we developed and provided initial validation of the 
Exhaustion and Recovery Scale. In Study 1, we searched the literature and selected 
exhaustion and recovery items from existing self-report measures. We then used a 
combination of classical item analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and a face validity 
procedure to select conceptually relevant items with good psychometric properties. In Study 
2, we examined the selected items by assessing their reliability (internal consistency) and 
extracting their factor structure using exploratory factor analysis. In Study 3, we cross-
validated the factor structure found in Study 2 on a new data set using confirmatory factor 
analysis. Exploring the factor structure of a set of items using exploratory factor analysis and 
subsequently validating this factor structure using confirmatory factor analysis on an 
independent data set is a generally accepted procedure of scale development and validation 
(e.g., Brown, 2015). Finally, in Study 4 we assessed the convergent and discriminant validity 
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of the scale. For all studies, we followed the guidelines of the local ethics committee, 
including informed consent and debriefing of participants.  
Study 1 
We began by conducting a literature review with the aim of identifying relevant 
measures related to exhaustion and recovery. Out of these measures, we selected all items 
that are associated with the constructs of general exhaustion and recovery, and excluded 
domain-specific items. Items collected this way served as our initial item pool. To account for 
the multidimensionality of the constructs, we distinguished between several functional 
domains of exhaustion and recovery (i.e., physical, cognitive, emotional, social, and 
motivational exhaustion and recovery). We were interested in exploring whether persons 
differentiate between these functional domains in their subjective conceptualizations of 
exhaustion and recovery. 
 The aims of Study 1 were to (1) examine the item difficulties for the selected items, (2) 
convergence and differences between different functional domains of exhaustion and 
recovery, and (3) select those items that are representative of specific functional domains for 
further scale building.  
Method 
Participants. A total of N = 455 adults (44% female) aged between 18 and 72 years (M 
= 45.83, SD = 15.55) participated in this study. The sample was German speaking. We 
recruited the participants from an online access panel provided by a German research agency 
(Respondi AG). Participants from such panels are experienced in filling out online surveys 
and must adhere to severe guidelines aimed at producing and maintaining high quality 
responses. Participants were reimbursed according to the agency’s regulations.  
Materials and procedure. We programmed an online questionnaire with the software 
package SoSci Survey. We presented participants with a list of all the exhaustion and 
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recovery items that we had previously identified in our literature review (see the eight 
instruments described above), which led to a pool of 47 exhaustion items and 36 recovery 
items. 
To ensure consistency, we slightly reworded some items so that they captured 
momentary states of exhaustion and recovery. In addition, we presented each item five times; 
once for each functional domain of exhaustion and recovery that we had identified in the 
literature review (i.e., physical, cognitive, emotional, social, motivational). To familiarize 
participants with these different domains, we gave them specific everyday life examples (i.e., 
we told them that physical exhaustion can arise from a body workout, cognitive exhaustion 
can arise from a difficult concentration task, emotional exhaustion can arise from an intense 
argument with a partner, social exhaustion can arise after having spent a lot of time with 
other people, motivational exhaustion can arise after having resisted a temptation for a longer 
period of time). An example item for physical exhaustion was “When I am physically 
exhausted, I feel burnt out.” A sample item for cognitive recovery was “When I am 
cognitively recovered, I feel like doing all kinds of nice things.” Participants gave their 
responses on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (does not apply at all) to 6 (applies fully). In 
addition, we asked participants to indicate the frequency with which they experience 
instances of physical, cognitive, emotional, social, and motivational exhaustion and recovery 
in their everyday lives on a scale of 0 (never) to 6 (very often).  
Statistical analysis. We administered item and reliability analyses for each of the five 
functional domains of exhaustion and recovery. To reduce the number of items, we followed 
the criteria provided by Moosbrugger and Kelava (2012): We eliminated items with extreme 
item difficulties (p < .15 and p > .85) and weak item discriminations (corrected item-total 
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correlation coefficients < .20). Furthermore, we eliminated items that, when excluded, 
yielded higher Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (Cronbach, 1951).  
Results and Discussion 
Overall, most participants had experienced the different dimensions of exhaustion in 
their lives: 100% had encountered physical exhaustion, 98.4% cognitive exhaustion, 95.3% 
emotional exhaustion, 88.6% social exhaustion, and 86.4% motivational exhaustion. Physical 
exhaustion (M = 3.74, SD = 1.37), cognitive exhaustion (M = 3.24, SD = 1.59), motivational 
exhaustion (M = 3.11, SD = 1.66), and emotional exhaustion (M = 3.08, SD = 1.61) occurred 
fairly frequently in people’s lives, but less frequently social exhaustion (M = 2.87, SD = 
1.69).  
Initial inspection of the data revealed satisfactory item difficulties for the exhaustion 
items, with all of them falling in the range of p > .15 and < .85. However, nearly all recovery 
items had difficulties higher than p = .85. This means that participants generally tended to 
endorse the recovery items. In addition, all exhaustion and recovery items had corrected item-
total correlations of over .20. Thus, we could not remove any items based on the outlined 
criteria. Therefore, in a next step we ran five principal axis factor analyses with a forced one-
factor solution for all functional domains of exhaustion and recovery, respectively. Our aim 
was to remove items with factor loadings under .40 for any of the functional domains. 
However, the analyses revealed that all item factor loadings exceeded the critical value of 
.40.  
In summary, then, the results of this study did not allow us to reduce our initial item 
pool based on the criteria set by Moosbrugger and Kelava (2012). Therefore, in a next step 
we rated the items based on their face validity by consensus among the three authors of this 
paper. We classified each item to one functional domain of exhaustion and recovery. For 
example, we classified the exhaustion item “Being with other people puts a strain on me” as 
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social, the item “I have trouble concentrating” as cognitive, the item “I am in a bad mood” as 
emotional. As an additional criterion, we only selected items that were suited equally well for 
trait and state measures. For example, the item “I’m in a bad mood” can be used as a general 
measure (“In general…”) or as a situational measure of exhaustion (“Right now…”). 
Through this procedure, we selected 17 exhaustion and 9 recovery items (see Table 10).  
Study 2 
In the second study, we examined the reliability and factor structure of the exhaustion 
and recovery items selected in Study 1. In particular, we explored whether the selected items 
can be defined by a two-factor structure.   
Method 
Participants. A total of N = 119 adults (50% female) aged between 18 and 98 years (M 
= 48.81, SD = 17.88) participated in this study. Participants were recruited by the same 
research agency as in Study 1 with the inclusion criterion of not having participated in Study 
1. Ten participants did not fill out the exhaustion and recovery items, and were therefore 
excluded from further analyses. The final sample size was N = 109 participants. 
Materials and procedure. As part of a larger study unrelated to this manuscript, we 
included the exhaustion (n = 17) and recovery (n = 9) items selected in Study 1 in a state 
version. For each item, we asked participants to rate their current feelings on a 6-point scale 
ranging from 0 (does not apply at all) to 5 (applies fully). A sample item for exhaustion is 
“Right now I feel tired.” A sample item for recovery is “Right now I feel refreshed.”  
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Table 10 
 
Factor Loadings and Item Communalities for Study 2 (N = 104) and Study 3 (N = 180).  
 
 Study 2   Study 3 
 Item λ R2  β R2 
Factor 1: Exhaustion 
  1. I feel burned out .87 .79 
 
.83 .68 
  2. I feel like I’m at the end of my rope .88 .74 .82 .68 
  3. I feel weak .81 .78 .78 .60 
  4. I find everything getting on top of me .90 .74 .74 .54 
  5. I’m in a bad mood .83 .65 .66 .44 
  6. I feel sickened by everything .91 .78 .74 .54 
  7. I feel nervous .86 .68 Dropped 
  8. I’m indifferent toward everything .82 .65 .58 .33 
  9. I feel like doing nothing .85 .72 .80 .64 
10. Being with other people puts a strain on me .80 .63 
Items did  
not meet 
inclusion 
criterion of  
λ > .80 
11. I find it hard to show interest in other people .78 .57 
12. People should leave me alone for some time .79 .62 
13. It takes me longer to accomplish things .79 .68 
14. I have trouble concentrating .69 .63 
15. I’m too tired to start other activities .76 .69 
16. I feel tired .66 .65 
17. I feel no desire to do anything .75 .55 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
 
Note. λ = Pattern matrix factor loadings. β = Standardized factor loadings.  
Parameter estimates for Study 2 are the result of a principal axis factor analysis with promax 
rotation and a forced two-factor solution. Parameter estimates for Study 3 are the result of a 
two-factor CFA based on robust maximum likelihood estimation with the Satorra-Bentler 
scaling correction, excluding exhaustion item 7 and including an error covariance between 
exhaustion items 5 and 6. The goodness-of-fit indices for this CFA model are reported in 
Table 11.   
 Study 2  Study 3 
 Item λ R2  β R2 
Factor 2: Recovery 
  1. I feel energized .91 .81  .86 .73 
  2. I feel refreshed .88 .77  .80 .64 
  3. I feel that I’m doing things better than usual .81 .60  .58 .34 
  4. I could tolerate the pressure very well .84 .64  .60 .36 
  5. I could stay active for a long time .82 .69  .77 .60 
  6. I feel rested .72 .58  Items did  
not meet 
inclusion 
criterion of  
λ > .80 
  7. I feel like doing all kinds of nice things .46 .24  
  8. I’m able to concentrate on what I’m doing .75 .56  
  9. I tend to persevere, even if things don’t go well .59 .40  
Factor correlation 
 r = –.35  r = –.74 
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Statistical analysis. In this study, all exhaustion and recovery items were non-normally 
distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk tests (all ps < .01). Therefore, we followed the 
guidelines by Costello and Osborne (2005) for conducting exploratory factor analysis using 
principal axis factoring with a promax (oblique) rotation, allowing for the extracted factors to 
be correlated. We determined the most appropriate factor solution by combining the scree test 
(Cattell, 1966), the Kaiser-Guttman rule (i.e., keep factors with eigenvalues higher than one; 
Kaiser, 1991), parallel analysis (Horn, 1965), strength of parameter estimates (i.e., keep items 
with factor loadings > .80) and the general interpretability of the factors. In addition, we 
measured the internal consistency of the scales using the Cronbach’s alpha correlation 
coefficient. 
Results and Discussion 
Both scales showed excellent reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 for the 
Recovery scale and .97 for the Exhaustion scale. Corrected item-total correlations ranged 
from .49 to .85 for the Recovery scale and from .73 to .88 for the Exhaustion scale.  
A principal axis factor analysis with a promax rotation revealed a satisfactory Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy of .91 and a statistically significant Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity (p < .01). The factor analysis initially extracted three factors with 
eigenvalues higher than 1. However, an inspection of the scree plot of the eigenvalues (see 
Figure 1) revealed that the scree begins at the third factor, suggesting that only the first two 
factors should be retained. Thus, we re-analyzed the data by forcing a two-factor solution for 
the rotated principal axis factor analysis. The results provide evidence of factorial validity: 
The first extracted factor represents exhaustion and accounts for 49% of the variance. The 
second extracted factor represents recovery and accounts for 18% of the variance. Inspecting 
the pattern matrix revealed that some items fell short of loading higher than .80 on their  
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Figure 7. Scree plot of the eigenvalues for the principal axis factor analysis in Study 2. Based 
on the responses of N = 109 participants. Simulated data depict the output of a parallel 
analysis with randomly generated eigenvalues (Horn, 1965). 
 
respective factor (see Table 10). Based on our outlined criteria, we removed those items with 
factor loadings of .80 or below from further analyses.   
Taken together, these results indicate excellent reliability and provide preliminary 
evidence for a two-factor structure for the selected exhaustion and recovery items. However, 
due to theoretical and statistical limitations, exploratory factor analysis cannot provide 
conclusive results regarding the construct validity of a scale (e.g., Costello & Osborne, 2005). 
Thus, in a next step we conducted confirmatory factor analysis to further test the two-factor 
structure of the items selected in Study 2.  
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Study 3 
In the third study, we examined the construct validity of the two-factor structure using 
confirmatory factor analysis on a new data set unrelated to Study 2. Our a priori hypothesis 
was that a two-factor measurement model would fit the data better than a one-factor 
measurement model. We also expected a moderate to strong negative correlation between the 
latent exhaustion and recovery variables based on our findings in Study 2 and others’ prior 
work (e.g., Demerouti et al., 2012).  
Method 
Participants. Participants filled out the exhaustion and recovery items immediately 
before and after an introductory Psychology lecture lasting 90 minutes. Initially, our inclusion 
criteria were that participants should fill out the questionnaires within 15 minutes after the 
lecture had begun (T1) and within 15 minutes after the lecture had ended (T2). However, of 
the 180 participants who met the 15-minute criteria for T1, only 65 also met the 15-minute 
criteria for T2. Thus, we did not include T2 in the confirmatory factor analyses and focused 
exclusively on T1. The final sample consisted of 180 Psychology students (72% female) aged 
between 18 and 37 years (M = 21.83, SD = 3.46). 
Materials and procedure. Upon entering the lecture hall, students saw a link to the T1 
online questionnaire projected on the front screen. The lecturer asked students if they were 
willing to fill out the questionnaire and made sure to mention that they should do so before 
the lecture started. The link led participants to a brief description of the study and the 
informed consent prompt. After consenting, participants indicated their age, gender, general 
life satisfaction and physical fitness. Then they were presented with the n = 9 exhaustion 
items and n = 5 recovery items selected in Study 2 (see Table 10). Items were worded and 
coded exactly as in Study 2. At the end of the lecture, the link to the T2 online questionnaire 
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consisting of the same items was projected on the front screen, and the lecturer again asked 
the students if they were willing to fill out the questionnaire within the next minutes. 
Statistical analysis. We conducted confirmatory factor analysis using the lavaan 
package (Rosseel, 2012) in R (R Core Team, 2018). To test our hypothesis, we compared the 
single factor model with a two correlated factors model. We determined the best-fitting 
model using the chi-square difference test, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and its 90% confidence interval, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), as well as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). 
Regarding the construct validity of the two-factor model, we adhered to the guidelines by Hu 
and Bentler (1999), who suggest that for continuous data, RMSEA should be close to .06 or 
below, SRMR should be close to .08 or below, and CFI as well as TFI should be close to .95 
or above. Regarding reliability, we excluded items with poor communalities (R2 < .30) from 
the measurement model. When an item was indexed to be excluded, we compared the model 
without the item against the model with the item using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and favored the model with lower values on 
these indices. Regarding post hoc model modification, we examined the standardized 
residuals and modification indices to detect potential sources of misfit. Standardized residuals 
exceeding the critical z-score of 2.58 and modification indices exceeding the critical chi-
square difference of 3.84 were deemed significant. Finally, we deemed the measurement 
model to have acceptable convergent and divergent validity if the Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) for the latent variables was higher than .50.  
Results and Discussion  
The data violated the assumption of multivariate normality (Mardia’s test of 
multivariate kurtosis = 32.34, p < .001). Therefore, we used a robust maximum likelihood 
estimation with the Satorra-Bentler scaling correction to the chi-square test statistic (Satorra 
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& Bentler, 2001) in all confirmatory factor analyses. The results of the model comparisons 
are depicted in Table 11. In line with our hypothesis, the two-factor model with correlated 
latent variables fit the data better than the single-factor model, scaled ∆χ2(1) = 83.98, p < 
.001. However, as can be seen in Table 11, the overall goodness-of-fit measures of the two-
factor model indicate a poor fit to the data. Thus, in a next step we looked at the item 
communalities to decide if we should exclude any unreliable items. All items had 
communalities higher than .30, except for the exhaustion item “Right now I feel nervous”, 
which had a value of .16. As the model without this item had lower AIC and BIC values 
compared to the model with the item included (see Table 11), we decided to exclude the item 
from further analyses. Nevertheless, the resulting model still did not have an acceptable fit to 
the data. To detect potential sources of misfit, we next looked at the standardized residuals 
and modification indices. The error covariance between the exhaustion items “Right now I’m 
in a bad mood” and “Right now I feel sickened by everything” had a significant standardized 
residual score (z = 3.23) and the largest modification indices value (∆χ2(1) = 20.04). We 
deemed a free estimation of this otherwise restricted parameter as warranted, because both 
items may share common sources of error variance due to their semantic similarity. The 
model with the error covariance fit the data better than the model without the error 
covariance, scaled ∆χ2(1) = 6.22, p < .05. Including this error covariance in the model 
resulted in an acceptable overall model fit, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.047, .092], SRMR = .04,  
CFI = .96 and TLI = .95. The AVE was .53 for the latent recovery variable and .55 for the 
latent exhaustion variable, therefore we deemed this model to have acceptable convergent 
and divergent validity. The standardized factor loadings, item communalities, and factor 
correlation for this model are reported in Table 10. The complete model with the additional 
unstandardized factor loadings, factor (co)variances, and error (co)variances, is depicted in 
Figure 2.  
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Table 11 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Indicators of Nested and Non-Nested Models for Exhaustion and Recovery (N = 180).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Estimates are based on robust maximum likelihood estimation with the Satorra-Bentler scaling correction. 
The Two Factors – Item Drop model excludes the nervousness exhaustion item based on its poor communality. The Two Factors – Error Cov 
model additionally allows for an error covariance between the “bad mood” and “sickened by everything” exhaustion items.  
*** p < .001. * p < .05
Model χ² df ∆χ² RMSEA [90% CI] SRMR CFI TLI AIC BIC 
Hypothesis Test 
Single Factor 268.59*** 77 – .15 [.136, .170] .62 .76 .72 7245.9 7380.0 
Two Factors – Uncorrelated 234.70*** 77 – .12 [.102, .137] .24 .85 .83 7120.3 7254.4 
Two Factors – Correlated 155.94*** 76 83.98*** .09 [.066, .105] .05 .93 .91 7024.1 7161.4 
Model Modification 
Two Factors – Item Drop 124.47*** 64 – .08 [.060, .103] .05 .94 .93 6437.0 6564.7 
Two Factors – Error Cov  108.27*** 63 6.22* .07 [.047, .092] .04 .96 .95 6413.7 6544.6 
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The results of this study provide further evidence for a correlated two-factor structure 
for the exhaustion and recovery items. Based on the results reported in this study, we 
finalized the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale with n = 8 exhaustion items and n = 5 recovery 
items (see Appendix B).  
Study 4 
In Study 4, we assessed participants’ exhaustion and recovery ratings immediately 
before and after a period of effortful cognitive activity, along with their ratings on momentary 
mood, wakefulness, and calmness. Doing so allowed us to test whether the scale could detect 
changes in psychological functioning resulting from cognitive effort, as well as the degree to 
which the scale corresponds to conceptually similar constructs (i.e., concurrent validity).  
We expected that persons report higher levels of exhaustion and lower levels of 
recovery after compared to before the period of effortful cognitive activity. Based on the 
mood regulation perspective of recovery (e.g., Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007), we also expected a 
positive (negative) relationship between recovery (exhaustion) and mood. Furthermore, given 
that sleepiness and exhaustion are typically confounded (e.g., Balkin & Wesensten, 2011), we 
also expected the same pattern for wakefulness. Finally, we did not expect a strong 
relationship between recovery and exhaustion with calmness, since one can also feel 
recovered and tense (tense energy) or exhausted and calm (calm tiredness; Thayer, 1989).  
Method 
Participants. One hundred and two persons aged between 19 and 74 years (M = 27.27, 
SD = 10.85; 46% female) participated in this study.  
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Figure 8. Path diagram of the correlated two-factor measurement model without the “I feel nervous” item (ex7) and with a freely estimated error 
covariance between the “I’m in a bad mood” (ex5) and “I’m sickened by everything” (ex6) items in Study 3. Based on the responses of N = 180 
participants. The standardized parameter estimates are reported in brackets. All parameter estimates are statistically significant at p < .001. The 
item communalities are listed below the item descriptions. Full item descriptions are reported in Table 10. Goodness-of-fit indices for this model 
are reported in Table 11.  
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Materials and procedure. This study was part of a larger experiment measuring the 
relationship between subjective time perception and exhaustion. Participants completed a 
series of effortful cognitive tasks (Kreuzpointner, Lukesch, & Horn, 2013)2. Immediately 
before and after the tasks, participants filled out the finalized Exhaustion and Recovery scale 
that was worded exactly as in Studies 2 and 3. In addition, they filled out the 
Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997). This questionnaire assesses 
psychological functioning on three bipolar dimensions: Good mood (vs. bad mood), 
wakefulness (vs. tiredness), and calmness (vs. nervousness). Each dimension was measured 
with four items on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). An example item is “Right now I 
feel happy” for good mood, “Right now I feel rested” for wakefulness, and “Right now I feel 
at ease” for calmness.  
Statistical analysis. We assessed the pre-post difference in scale means using a 
dependent samples t test. To examine the degree of association between the scales and the 
related constructs, we computed the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the 
two scale means of the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale and the three dimensions of the 
Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire.  
 
2 The experiment included two conditions: The “time flies” condition (n = 41) was told 
that the tasks would last 70 minutes, and the “time drags” condition (n = 61) was told that the 
tasks would last 50 minutes. In actuality, the tasks always lasted exactly 60 minutes for both 
conditions. As a manipulation check, participants were then asked to indicate how slowly or 
fast time had passed for them during these tasks on a scale of 0 (rather slowly) to 6 (rather 
quickly). As both conditions did not differ regarding this rating with t(97.88) = 1.07, p = .29, 
we concluded that the manipulation had not been successful and thus collapsed both 
conditions into one sample for the subsequent analyses. 
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Results and Discussion 
The Exhaustion and Recovery Scale was sensitive to detecting changes in 
psychological functioning brought about by working on a series of cognitive tasks for one 
hour. People felt more exhausted after (M = 1.44, SD = 1.10) compared to before (M = 1.11, 
SD = 0.88) the tasks, t(101) = -3.23, 95% CI of the mean difference [-0.53, -0.13], d = -0.23. 
Conversely, people felt less recovered after (M = 2.03, SD = 0.94) compared to before (M = 
2.38, SD = 0.86) the tasks, t(101) = 4.05, 95% CI of the mean difference [0.18, 0.51], d = 
0.29. Due to insufficient sample size, we were not able to test for measurement invariance 
across the two time points, so these results need to be interpreted with caution.  
The Pearson product-moment correlations are depicted in Table 12. As expected, the 
recovery subscale was positively associated with both good mood and wakefulness, while 
exhaustion was negatively associated with good mood and wakefulness, before and after the 
cognitive tasks. There were no substantial associations between recovery and exhaustion with 
calmness, except for a small negative correlation between exhaustion and calmness before the 
tasks.   
General Discussion 
The aim of this research was to combine various heterogeneous self-report measures of 
exhaustion and recovery into a single, general exhaustion and recovery scale. A series of four 
studies revealed excellent reliability of the selected items, a robust two-factor structure with 
generally high item factor loadings and communalities, as well as first evidence for 
concurrent validity.  
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Table 12 
 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients of the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
Means and the Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire Subscales (Study 4). 
 
Scale mean 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Recovery – -.45*** .42*** .58*** .02 
2. Exhaustion -.48*** – -.66*** -.70*** -.05 
3. Mood .49*** -.72*** – .57*** -.15 
4. Wakefulness .58*** -.53*** .55*** – .11 
5. Calmness .08 -.23* .08 .33*** – 
 
Note. Correlations below the main diagonal were obtained before the cognitive tasks, 
correlations above the main diagonal were obtained after the cognitive tasks. 
*** p < .001. * p < .05 
 
Applicability of the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
The generality of the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale allows for its implementation in 
various everyday life situations. For example, the scale’s brevity could prove advantageous 
for assessing multiple measurement occasions throughout a day. This enables researchers to 
examine daily fluctuations of exhaustion and recovery levels in various life domains, such as 
in the work or leisure context. In addition, the scale takes into account the 
multidimensionality of the constructs and enables a more refined and complete assessment of 
exhaustion and recovery compared to previous measures. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 The presented studies have some limitations worth noting. First, we did not assess 
measures of scale reliability other than internal consistency. As Henson (2001) notes, 
Part V 
 
168 
 
“internal consistency coefficients are not direct measures of reliability, but rather are 
theoretical estimates derived from classical test theory” (p. 177). Hence, future studies should 
establish more direct measures of scale reliability (e.g., test-retest reliability) to address open 
questions such as the stability of individual scores over time.  
 Second, researchers interested in measuring exhaustion and recovery within-persons 
over multiple time points should first establish the scale’s longitudinal measurement 
invariance. Similarly, researchers interested in assessing age-related differences in exhaustion 
and recovery should also first establish the scale’s measurement invariance across these 
different age groups.   
Conclusion 
Overall, the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale is a psychometrically sound, easily 
administered, and brief self-report measure of momentary feelings of exhaustion and 
recovery. The novel contribution is that it combines items from several existing self-report 
measures into a single, general scale of exhaustion and recovery. Whereas prior 
questionnaires have mainly viewed exhaustion and recovery as opposite ends of a bipolar 
construct, the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale assesses both constructs separately – an 
important step forward considering recent findings of moderate to strong, but not perfect 
correlations between exhaustion and recovery. 
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OVERALL DISCUSSION 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to (1) examine the role of mood, perceived 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception as psychological indicators of exhaustion 
and recovery, and (2) investigate age-related differences in exhaustion, recovery, and their 
proposed indicators. In this section, I provide a brief overall summary of the main results and 
evaluate their implications for the proposed motivational account of exhaustion and recovery. 
I then discuss the necessity to consider physical and mental aspects of exhaustion and 
recovery separately. Afterwards, I shed more light on the cost-benefit mechanism that is 
thought to underlie the phenomenology of exhaustion and recovery by (1) reviewing the role 
of effort, interest, and boredom as select inputs that might be particularly relevant in the 
context of exhaustion and recovery, and (2) discussing the role of goal focus for shaping the 
value of effort. Thereafter, I outline possible boundary conditions of the proposed account, 
address general methodological limitations of the current studies, and make suggestions for 
future research. Finally, I provide some practical implications of the present work before 
ending with the final conclusions.  
Summary of the Main Findings 
Part I introduced a comprehensive motivational account of exhaustion and recovery 
addressing the question of how people determine when an activity has helped them to recover 
or when it has exhausted them. We hypothesized that changes in mood, perceived 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception during an ongoing effortful or relaxing 
activity provide valuable information about one’s current state of exhaustion and recovery. 
Specifically, we maintained that as long as an activity’s cost-benefit ratio is favorable (i.e., 
the activity nets more benefits than costs), a person experiences positive mood, negligible 
opportunity costs, and an accelerated sense of the pace of time. In this motivational state, the 
person perceives the activity as contributing to her ongoing recovery (relaxing activity) or not 
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yet exhausting (effortful activity). The behavioral response is continued activity engagement. 
We further maintained that if an activity’s cost-benefit ratio turns unfavorable (i.e., nets more 
costs than benefits), a person experiences a gradual decrease in positive mood, an increase in 
perceived opportunity costs, and an extension of the felt pace of time. In this motivational 
state, the person perceives the activity as not contributing to her recovery anymore (relaxing 
activity) or as increasingly exhausting (effortful activity). The behavioral response is 
disengagement from the activity. Furthermore, taking a life-span developmental perspective, 
we derived two different age hypotheses: Older adults, as compared to younger adults, might 
feel exhausted and recovered faster, because they more readily detect increases in opportunity 
costs during an ongoing effortful or relaxing activity. Alternatively, older adults might feel 
exhausted more slowly and feel recovered faster, because they perceive time as passing more 
quickly during an effortful or relaxing activity compared to younger adults.  
Part II sought to empirically examine one part of the proposed account. Specifically, 
Part II focused on the role of mood, opportunity costs, and subjective time perception as 
indicators of recovery from exhaustion. Study 1 explored people’s lay beliefs about what 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors indicate to them exhaustion and recovery. The central 
finding of Study 1 is that people think of changes in mood, but not of changes in perceived 
opportunity costs or in subjective time perception, as a salient indicator of exhaustion and 
recovery. Study 2 experimentally induced a state of exhaustion by means of a 20-minute high 
intensity interval training and examined the time courses of recovery, mood, perceived 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception during a subsequent 20-minute relaxation 
video, as well as the correlated within-person change between these variables (i.e., the extent 
to which these variables “travel together” over time). The central finding of Study 2 is that 
within-person variability in mood, but not in perceived opportunity costs or in subjective time 
perception, was related to within-person variability in recovery – despite a pronounced 
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average increase in opportunity costs and a pronounced extension of the pace of time during 
the relaxation video. Studies 3 and 4 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 2 and 
additionally tested the hypothesis that perceived opportunity costs are causally related to 
recovery from exhaustion by experimentally inducing high or low opportunity costs between 
the exhaustion and recovery period and testing the impact of this between-person 
manipulation on the subjective speed of recovery. Despite a successful manipulation of 
opportunity costs in Study 4, perceiving high vs. low opportunity costs during the recovery 
period did not have an impact on recovery.  
Part III focused on age-related differences in the subjective availability of energy for 
goal pursuit as well as in short-term exhaustion, recovery, and their proposed indicators. 
Study 1 examined age-related differences in (1) people’s lay beliefs about energy, (2) the 
perceived amount of energy available for activities related to different functional domains 
(i.e., physical, mental, social, emotional), and (3) within- and cross-domain energy spillover. 
With increasing age, people were more likely to endorse a non-limited belief of energy, were 
more likely to report to have less energy available for physical activities in general (but not 
for personally relevant physical activities), and were more likely to report cross-domain 
energy spillover after engaging in demanding physical activities, such that they reported to 
have less energy available for subsequent social and emotional activities. Aiming to better 
understand these results, Study 2 harkened back to the laboratory study design employed in 
Part II, Studies 2-4, and examined age-related differences in the role of mood, perceived 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception as indicators for both exhaustion and 
recovery. The central finding of Study 2 is that older adults reported a steeper initial increase 
in exhaustion and opportunity costs during a 20-minute high intensity interval training, but 
converged again with the younger age groups at the close of the exercise.  
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Part IV examined the role of mood, perceived opportunity costs, and subjective time 
perception as indicators of recovery at a different time scale: the day level. Focusing on 
university students’ summer break after a demanding exam period, Part IV employed a daily 
diary design and assessed students’ retrospective judgments about their daily recovery, mood, 
opportunity costs, and subjective time perception, controlling for relevant covariates of daily 
recovery over 21 consecutive days. The central finding of Part IV is that within-person 
variability in daily mood and opportunity costs was related to variability in recovery, such 
that on days on which students reported higher-than-usual mood and lower-than-usual 
opportunity costs, they also reported higher-than-usual recovery, over and above daily 
psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007).  
Part V was concerned with the development and initial validation of a domain-general 
exhaustion and recovery scale that can be assessed both as a trait and state measure. Study 1 
generated a pool of items from existing exhaustion and recovery questionnaires. Study 2 
tested the reliability and the factorial structure of the selected items using exploratory factor 
analysis. Study 3 cross-validated the factorial structure on an independent data set using 
confirmatory factor analysis. Study 4 established the sensitivity of the scale in detecting 
short-term fluctuations in exhaustion and recovery, and assessed its concurrent and divergent 
validity. The resulting scale was included in all the studies reported in Parts II-IV as a trait 
measure of exhaustion and recovery (except for Study 1 in Part II). Notably, Study 4 also 
included a between-person manipulation of retrospective time perception following a 
demanding 90-minute cognitive task. However, the manipulation check indicated that the 
manipulation had not been successful in altering participants’ retrospective judgments about 
the felt pace of time during the task. Accordingly, the manipulation did not influence 
perceived exhaustion and recovery after compared to before the demanding task.  
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Psychological Indicators of Exhaustion and Recovery: Weighing the Evidence 
What does the accumulated empirical evidence in Parts II-V tell us about the proposed 
role of mood, perceived opportunity costs, and subjective time perception as psychological 
indicators of recovery and exhaustion outlined in Part I? In the following, I relate the central 
findings of this thesis to the proposed motivational account of exhaustion and recovery. 
Mood 
Across all studies and different time scales, we consistently found support for the 
hypothesized positive relationship between mood and recovery: Being in a positive mood 
(e.g., “feeling good”) was the most frequently mentioned indicator of recovery (Part II, Study 
1). At the activity level, interindividual differences in intraindividual variability in mood were 
positively related to variability in recovery, such that people who reported a steeper increase 
in mood during a relaxing activity (i.e., watching an aquatic documentary or listening to a 
mindfulness-based relaxation video) also reported a steeper initial increase in recovery (Part 
II, Studies 2-4 and Part III, Study 2). At the day level, students reported higher recovery on 
days on which they were in a better-than-usual mood during their summer break, over and 
above other covariates of daily recovery (Part IV). Finally, at the dispositional level, people 
who generally report higher levels of positive mood also tend to report feeling more 
recovered and less exhausted in their daily lives (Part II, Studies 2-4, Part III, Part IV, and 
Part V, Study 4).  
We also found support for the hypothesized negative relationship between mood and 
exhaustion: Being in a negative mood (e.g., “feeling bad”) was the fifth highest mentioned 
indicator of exhaustion (Part II, Study 1). At the activity level, interindividual differences in 
intraindividual variability in mood were negatively associated with variability in exhaustion, 
such that people who reported a steeper decrease in mood during a 20-minute high-intensity 
interval training also tended to report a steeper increase in exhaustion (Part III, Study 2). 
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Lastly, people who generally report higher levels of negative mood also tend to report feeling 
more exhausted and less recovered in their daily lives (Part II, Studies 2-4, Part III, Part IV, 
Part V, Study 4).  
Taken together, then, people mostly endorse the belief that being in a good mood (bad 
mood) provides valuable information about their current state of recovery (exhaustion). This 
pattern is also mirrored in people’s actual experiences during an ongoing effortful and 
relaxing activity, such that changes in mood are related to changes in recovery and 
exhaustion. These findings are in line with previous work stressing the importance of mood 
regulation for recovery (Larsen, 2000; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Sonnentag & Fritz, 
2007; Thayer et al., 1994). However, whereas prior research has provided evidence for the 
temporally delayed relationship between mood and recovery (e.g., Oerlemans et al., 2014; 
Sonnentag et al., 2008; Sonnentag & Zijlstra, 2006) and has assessed this relationship mainly 
at the between-person level (Sonnentag et al., 2017), this thesis provides compelling evidence 
for the concurrent within-person associations between mood, recovery, and exhaustion.  
However, correlation does not imply causation. With the current empirical evidence, 
we cannot draw firm conclusions about the direction of these relationships. For instance, does 
mood inform one’s recovery progress, or does the extent of recovery influence one’s current 
mood? Despite our strong theoretical position that people take the valence of their mood as 
information about the goodness or badness of their current environment (Clore et al., 2001; 
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Huntsinger et al., 2014; Schwarz, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2003) 
and that the valence of people’s mood is implicated in their decisions to stay engaged or 
disengage from a goal (Martin, 2001; Martin et al., 1993), the current studies cannot provide 
a strong test of these directed hypotheses. Thus, absent a mood manipulation, as of yet we 
cannot draw a decisive conclusion regarding the causality of the mood-recovery and mood-
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exhaustion relationship (but see the problems involved with manipulating mood in the present 
studies discussed in Part II).  
Furthermore, the present studies cannot provide a strong test of the hypothesis that 
positive mood begins to gradually decline once people have sufficiently recovered (i.e., 
attained their goal of recovery), as a motivational cue for goal disengagement (Part I). A 
strong test of this dynamic hypothesis would necessitate a behavioral measure of goal 
disengagement (e.g., participants press a button once they feel sufficiently recovered and 
want to do something else) to pinpoint the exact point in time when the net benefits of 
disengaging surpass the net benefits of staying engaged in the relaxing activity, rather than 
relying on indirect information about goal attainment through participants’ subjective 
recovery time courses. For instance, a person might feel that the relaxing activity has 
sufficiently contributed to her recovery but might nevertheless be motivated to stay engaged 
in the activity past the point of recovery because of an inherent interest in, or enjoyment of, 
the activity itself (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Therefore, while the current studies have 
established a positive association between mood and ongoing recovery, they cannot speak to 
the hypothesized negative association between mood and recovery after goal attainment.  
Perceived Opportunity Costs 
Overall, the accumulated empirical evidence does not provide support for the 
hypothesis that perceived opportunity costs are related to recovery. First, people do not 
perceive thinking about or wanting to engage in attractive alternatives as a salient indicator of 
recovery (Part II, Study 1). Second, despite a steep average increase of opportunity costs 
during a relaxing activity, interindividual differences in intraindividual variability in 
opportunity costs were not associated with variability in recovery (Part II, Studies 2-4 and 
Part III, Study 2). Third, and perhaps most telling, experimentally manipulating opportunity 
costs (i.e., thinking about an attractive vs. an unattractive alternative activity) before a 
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relaxing activity and keeping these costs salient during the activity was unrelated to the 
subjective speed of recovery (Part II, Study 4). Only at the day level did we find the expected 
relationship between opportunity costs and recovery: Students reported higher recovery on 
days when they perceived lower-than-usual opportunity costs (operationalized as the extent to 
which one would have wanted to experience a closing day differently), over and above other 
covariates of daily recovery (Part IV).  
In comparison, the empirical evidence for the hypothesis that opportunity costs are 
related to exhaustion is more favorable: Although small in effect size (ds between 0.14 and 
0.20), perceived opportunity costs were consistently higher on average immediately after 
compared to before effortful physical activity (Part II, Studies 2-4). Perceived opportunity 
costs also markedly increased during physical exercise on average (Part III, Study 2). 
Furthermore, interindividual differences in intraindividual variability in opportunity costs 
were positively related to variability in exhaustion during physical exercise, such that persons 
who reported a steeper increase in opportunity costs also tended to report a steeper increase in 
exhaustion (Part III, Study 2).  
Taken together, then, perceiving an increase in opportunity costs during a relaxing 
activity does not provide information about one’s recovery progress. In contrast, perceiving 
an increase in opportunity costs during an effortful activity is associated with feelings of 
exhaustion. Furthermore, experiencing less day-level opportunity costs is related to feeling 
more recovered on that day. However, it remains unclear to what extent activity-level 
opportunity costs are comparable to day-level opportunity costs, because prior research (e.g., 
Hockey, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2019; Kurzban, 2016; Kurzban et al., 2013) has exclusively 
focused on the former. To the author’s knowledge, this thesis provides the first attempt at 
operationalizing day-level opportunity costs. As such, the construct of day-level opportunity 
costs necessitates further theoretical and empirical validation before drawing any firm 
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conclusions about its impact on recovery. It is interesting to note, however, that day-level 
opportunity costs explained variation in daily recovery over and above feelings of control 
(i.e., feeling that one can decide for oneself what to do on a given day), suggesting that 
wanting to experience a closing day differently is a qualitatively different experience than the 
mere feeling of being in control that day.  
Similar to mood, the direction of the relationship between activity-level opportunity 
costs and exhaustion remains elusive. Although prior theoretical work has positioned 
opportunity costs as an antecedent of exhaustion, such that opportunity costs lead to 
exhaustion through an increase in perceived effort (e.g., Hockey, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2019; 
Kurzban, 2016; Kurzban et al., 2013), as of yet there exists no empirical evidence for this 
proposition. For instance, Hofmann et al. (2019) have shown that experiencing opportunity 
costs leads to an increase in the sense of effort and a devaluation of the current activity, but 
their work has not examined the direct influence of opportunity costs on subjective 
exhaustion. In the present work, we sought to experimentally manipulate opportunity costs 
before a recovery period, but not before an exhaustion period. Therefore, one way to test for 
causality in the present study design would be to administer the opportunity costs 
manipulation from Part II, Study 4 immediately before the exhaustion period, and to keep 
these induced opportunity costs salient throughout. According to the proposed theoretical 
account (Part I), people should feel exhausted faster if they perceive high compared to low 
opportunity costs, provided that opportunity costs are indeed taken as an indicator of 
exhaustion. 
Subjective Time Perception 
Across studies, we found no strong support for the hypothesis that the felt pace of time 
is related to recovery. First, people do not perceive a subjective acceleration of time as a 
salient indicator of recovery (Part II, Study 1). Second, despite a marked average extension of 
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subjective time perception during a relaxing activity, interindividual differences in 
intraindividual variability in subjective time perception were not associated with variability in 
recovery (Part II, Studies 2-4 and Part III, Study 2). The one exception occurred at the day 
level: Students reported higher recovery on days that they felt had passed faster than usual 
(Part IV). However, this positive within-person association did not remain significant after 
controlling for other covariates of daily recovery.  
The varying contribution of subjective time perception to recovery across different time 
scales may – at least in part – be explained by the differential mechanisms underlying 
prospective and retrospective time perception. In particular, the repeated micro-assessments 
of subjective time perception during a relaxing activity in Part II, Studies 2-4 and Part III, 
Study 2 might have progressively directed participant’s attention away from their external 
environment and toward their “inner clock,” thereby resulting in the aversive feeling that 
“time drags” (Zakay & Block, 1997). In such a state, people are more likely to feel bored 
(Bench & Lench, 2013; Westgate & Wilson, 2018; Zakay, 2014). Indeed, we found medium 
to large within-person associations between subjective time perception and boredom, such 
that people who reported a steeper extension of the pace of time during the recovery period 
also tended to report a steeper increase in boredom (Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 2). In 
comparison, people’s daily retrospective judgments about how quickly or slowly their day 
has passed (Part IV) might have been mainly based on the number of recalled events during 
the day. According to the contextual change model (Block & Reed, 1978), the less contextual 
changes (i.e., events) are recalled during a specific time period, the faster that time period 
seems to have passed in retrospect. This is because encountering only few changes during a 
day results in a less rich memory trace that, in turn, decreases the remembered duration of the 
day. Perhaps, then, the positive association between daily time perception and recovery can 
be explained by this account: When people recalled less contextual changes or events 
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throughout a specific day, they might have deemed that day less busy and stressful, and might 
therefore have concluded that this day was helping them to recover.  
With regard to exhaustion, people do not perceive a subjective extension of the pace of 
time as a salient indicator of exhaustion (Part II, Study 1). However, interindividual 
differences in intraindividual variability in subjective time perception were negatively related 
with variability in exhaustion, such that people with a steeper extension of the pace of time 
also tended to report a steeper increase in exhaustion during physical exercise (Part III, Study 
2). An attempt at manipulating subjective time perception during an effortful mental activity 
with a retrospective time perception paradigm did not prove successful (Part V, Study 4); 
therefore, as of yet no strong conclusions can be drawn about the causality of this 
relationship. Note, however, that in a recent study employing a similar retrospective time 
perception paradigm, Dillard et al. (2019) found that people who had been led to believe that 
time had passed faster than expected during a 30-minute vigilance task did not report 
different levels of task enjoyment, perceived workload, and stress as compared to those 
people who had been led to believe that time had passed slower than expected (cf. Gable & 
Poole, 2012; Sackett et al., 2010). This finding calls into question the causal influence of 
retrospective time perception on subjective exhaustion. It is still open, however, if the felt 
extension of time during an effortful activity causally relates to subjective exhaustion.  
Age-Related Differences in Exhaustion and Recovery 
Part I introduced two age hypotheses that were partially tested in Part III, Study 2: (i) 
Older adults more readily detect opportunity costs during an ongoing exhausting or recovery 
activity, and therefore feel exhausted and recovered faster compared to younger adults, and 
(ii) older adults perceive time as passing more quickly during an ongoing exhausting or 
recovery activity, and therefore feel exhausted more slowly or recovered faster compared to 
younger adults. With respect to the first hypothesis, older adults reported a steeper initial 
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increase in perceived opportunity costs and subjective exhaustion during an exhausting 
activity (i.e., 20-minute high-intensity interval training). However, the older and younger age 
groups converged again in their levels of opportunity costs and exhaustion at the close of the 
exercise (see Part III for a discussion on potential theoretical and methodological 
explanations for these results). There were no age-related differences in the level and rate of 
change in perceived opportunity costs or subjective recovery in a subsequent recovery 
activity (i.e., listening to a 20-minute mindfulness-based relaxation video).  
Why were there no age-related differences in the initial level of subjective recovery 
after exhaustion? One reason for this initial similarity might be that older adults, as compared 
to younger adults, generally perceive to have similar levels of energy available for activities 
after having exerted themselves physically (except for social and emotional activities, for 
which older adults report to have less energy available; Part III, Study 1). This finding is also 
in line with the overpowering hypothesis, which states that age-related differences in 
affective responding are particularly pronounced in unpleasant environments that are complex 
(i.e., highly resource-demanding situations that older adults cannot properly handle at their 
current level of functioning; Wrzus, Müller, Wagner, Lindenberger, & Riediger, 2013; see 
also Labouvie-Vief, Gilet, & Mella, 2014). The physical exercise employed in Part III, Study 
2 might not have constituted a sufficiently complex environment; therefore, the sampled 
older adults might not have perceived an overtaxing of their capacities (see also the 
possibility of selection bias discussed in Part III). Furthermore, the similar rate of change in 
subjective recovery between the age groups is in line with research showing that the self-
reported time needed to recover from high-arousing negative affect following a stressful 
situation does not change with age (Wrzus, Müller, Wagner, Lindenberger, & Riediger, 
2014). Taken together, it seems that the extent and rate of subjective recovery does not differ 
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with age (but see Wrzus et al., 2014, for potential age-related differences in physiological 
reactivity and recovery).  
Alternatively, the fact that the average initial increase in recovery (i.e., the linear 
change from the first to the second measurement occasion) during the recovery period was 
much more pronounced in Part III, Study 2 (b = 2.15) as compared to the prior studies (bs 
between 0.67 and 1.06 in Part II, Studies 2-4) might be an indication that we were 
unsuccessful at targeting the sensitive time period during which these age-related differences 
might have occurred (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). In particular, the 2-minute time interval 
between the first and second measurement occasion might have been too large to capture any 
meaningful age-related differences in the within-person change in recovery, as it seems that a 
substantial amount of the recovery progress unfolded during these first two minutes of the 20-
minute mindfulness-based relaxation video.  
With regard to the second hypothesis, Part III, Study 2 further revealed a small cross-
level main effect of age on the felt pace of time during both the exhaustion and recovery 
period, such that older adults overall tended to perceive time as passing more quickly 
compared to younger adults. To better understand this result, a follow-up analysis (not 
reported in Part III and thus elaborated in more detail here) directly comparing the age groups 
of younger and older adults (coded: 0 = younger adults, 1 = older adults) revealed a non-
significant main effect of age on time perception for the exhaustion period (b = 0.53, 95% CI 
[-0.09, 1.15]) and a significant main effect for the recovery period (b = 0.87, 95% CI [0.14, 
1.62]). However, this effect did not remain significant when all measurement occasions were 
combined to increase power (N = 2940 observations; b = 0.59, 95% CI [-0.02, 1.19]). 
Therefore, overall, the current data does not provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
older adults perceive time as passing more quickly during an effortful or relaxing activity as 
compared to younger adults.  
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This null finding seemingly contradicts the well-known adage that “time seems to 
speed up as we get older.” However, the current data is consistent with past research that has 
also found no differences in the felt pace of time during everyday life activities between 
younger and older adults using experience sampling methodology (Droit-Volet & Wearden, 
2015, 2016). Nevertheless, the relationship between subjective time perception and aging 
might be more nuanced: John and Lang (2015) found that the type of activity moderates the 
relationship between subjective time perception and age, and that this moderation can partly 
be explained by a limited future time perspective. In particular, the authors found that older 
adults reported an acceleration of the subjective progression of time during everyday life 
activities that were categorized as productive (i.e., activities that serve a longer-term 
outcome, such as paid work or social engagement), but no association between time 
perception and age for activities that were categorized as regenerative-consumptive (i.e., 
activities that serve immediate need satisfaction, such as resting, eating, or self-care; Klumb 
& Baltes, 1999). John and Lang (2015, p. 1836) conclude that “the experience that time 
passes quickly when trying to attain long-term goals in everyday life reflects older adults’ 
awareness of lifetime constraints on goal attainment in daily life.” Hence, older adults might 
only perceive a subjective acceleration of the passage of time in contexts where they are 
confronted with their limited remaining time in life – an assumption that is unlikely to have 
been met while listening to a 20-minute mindfulness-based relaxation video.  
On the Divergence of Physical and Mental Exhaustion and Recovery 
As we set out to conceptualize our account in Part I and ran the first two exercise 
studies in Part II, we did not deem it necessary to make a distinction between physical and 
mental aspects of exhaustion and recovery, believing them to be “two sides of the same coin” 
(Evans et al., 2016; Müller & Apps, 2019; but see Inzlicht & Marcora, 2016). However, as 
became clear in Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 2, the distinction between physical and 
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mental recovery and exhaustion proved necessary indeed: In these studies, within-person 
changes in both functional domains were only weakly to moderately positively correlated (rs 
between .25 and .48) and, more importantly, showed differential between-person time 
courses during the exhaustion and recovery periods. Next, I provide some potential 
explanations for this divergent pattern of results. 
First, the inverted U-shape of the average mental recovery time course during physical 
exercise (Part III, Study 2) is in line with more recent neurocognitive perspectives on the 
acute exercise–cognition interaction: Schmit and Brisswalter (2018) propose that the 
efficiency of executive functioning during prolonged physical activity is dynamic, such that 
its efficiency first increases and later decreases. Briefly, at the beginning of exercise, 
physiological arousal increases rapidly, which in turn up-regulates prefrontal cortex activity 
(e.g., through an increase in the release of noradrenaline and dopamine in the prefrontal 
cortex), resulting in enhanced executive functioning and self-regulation (Ramos & Arnsten, 
2007). In these early stages of the workout, participants might thus have perceived an 
increase in mental recovery. However, as time-on-task progresses, physiological constraints 
due to exercising (e.g., muscle soreness and pain, impaired respiration) become more salient. 
As a consequence, executive functioning is increasingly allocated towards regulating this 
afferent feedback (e.g., by inhibiting muscle pain, monitoring bodily sensations, and 
regulating respiration; Meeusen et al., 2016). At some point in time, the exercise-induced 
arousal effect becomes insufficient to counteract the increasing regulatory demands put on 
the prefrontal cortex information processing system. In these later stages of the workout, 
participants might thus have perceived a decrease in mental recovery.  
Second, with respect to the recovery period, compared to the steep initial average 
increase in physical recovery, there was a less pronounced initial average increase in mental 
recovery (b = 2.15 and b = 0.69, respectively; Part III, Study 2), or even no average change in 
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mental recovery at all (b = -0.02; Part II, Study 4). These findings are in line with people’s 
beliefs about cross-domain energy spillover: After a demanding physical activity, people 
generally do not perceive to have substantially less energy available for mental activities 
(Part III, Study 1). Therefore, people should not feel a strong need to recover in the mental 
domain when recovering from physical exercise. This line of reasoning is further supported 
by the effort-recovery model (Meijman & Mulder, 1998), which states that recovery in one 
functional domain (e.g., physical domain) is best achieved by ceasing all effortful activity in 
that domain, but does not preclude spending effort in another functional domain (e.g., mental 
domain). In fact, a series of studies has shown that acute physical exercise can even enhance 
subsequent mental performance (Chang, Labban, Gapin, & Etnier, 2012; Hogan, Mata, & 
Carstensen, 2013; Ludyga, Gerber, Brand, Holsboer-Trachsler, & Pühse, 2016; McSween et 
al., 2019; Roig, Norbrandt, Geertsen, & Nielsen, 2013). Conversely, and contrary to the 
predictions of the effort-recovery model, mental exertion can have a detrimental effect on 
endurance performance in subsequent physical exercise – a relationship that is in part 
mediated by an increase in the sense of effort during the physical exercise due to prior mental 
exertion (van Cutsem et al., 2017; but see McMorris, Barwood, Hale, Dicks, & Corbett, 
2018). Alas, to date the relationship between physical and mental exhaustion and recovery 
remains poorly understood and is in dire need of further theoretical and empirical inspection.  
Elucidating Potential Inputs to the Cost-Benefit Mechanism 
The motivational account proposed in the present thesis assumes the (predominantly) 
unconscious weighing of subjective costs and benefits as the central mechanism underlying 
the phenomenology of exhaustion and recovery (for a detailed discussion on this, see Part I). 
The numerous costs and benefits associated with everyday life activities are without a doubt 
highly idiosyncratic, time-sensitive, and context-dependent. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
provide some deliberations as to the kinds of costs and benefits that might be particularly 
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relevant in the context of exhaustion and recovery, and how they relate to the proposed 
account in Part I. Arguably, the ultimate price of engaging in any activity is the time forgone 
on the next-best alternative – a direct consequence resulting from the fact that a person’s 
executive functions can only be allocated toward a limited amount of activities at any given 
point in time (Kurzban et al., 2013; but see Dunn, Inzlicht, & Risko, 2017). Indeed, in the 
hectic rush of modern life, this time cost is likely to weigh particularly heavy on the 
dynamics of daily multiple goal pursuit. This section introduces three similarly ubiquitous 
subjective experiences (i.e., effort, interest, and boredom) as further contenders for 
psychological inputs to the cost-benefit mechanism.  
Effort 
To date, the phenomenology of effort has predominantly been conceptualized as 
aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Kurzban, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017; Westbrook & 
Braver, 2015) and inherently costly (Kool & Botvinick, 2013, 2018; Kurzban et al., 2013; 
Navon & Gopher, 1979). This traditional view of effort is perhaps best illustrated in the long-
held notion of humans as “cognitive misers” who, when given the choice between two 
otherwise equivalent tasks, prefer to choose the less demanding one (Allport, 1954; Hull, 
1943; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; for a study on physical effort, see 
Hartmann, Hager, Tobler, & Kaiser, 2013). Nevertheless, people clearly vary in their 
dispositional motivation to engage in effortful activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and in the extent to which they devalue effort (Westbrook, 
Kester, & Braver, 2013). Indeed, as with emotional experience more broadly (Barrett, 2013), 
recent work has demonstrated that “feelings arising during controlled performance are both 
heterogeneous and related to the objective efficacy of goal‐directed actions” (Saunders, 
Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2015, p. 1213), calling for a more nuanced and fine-grained 
perspective on subjective effort. Inzlicht et al. (2018) have coined the term “effort paradox” 
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to illustrate that the experience associated with spending effort can vary from costly to 
valued, mainly depending on two factors. First, according to the effort heuristic, the outcome 
associated with an activity can become more valuable the more effort one invests for 
achieving it (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004; Loewenstein, 1999; Norton, 
Mochon, & Ariely, 2012; Olivola & Shafir, 2013). Second, through the process of learned 
industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992) or the experience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975), the 
very notion of spending effort on a demanding activity can become valuable in its own right 
(see also Deci, 1975; Kruglanski et al., 2018). Thus, exerting effort can sometimes add value 
through increasing the probability of achieving attractive external rewards, through 
facilitating intrinsic incentives, or through enhancing the activity’s perceived instrumentality 
for goal attainment and thus making it more desirable (Labroo & Kim, 2009).  
How, then, is effort registered in the subjective cost-benefit ratio that is proposed to 
underlie the phenomenology of exhaustion and recovery? I maintain that perceiving an 
activity as effortful will not always be registered as a cost and, consequently, does not 
inevitably lead to exhaustion (cf. Müller & Apps, 2019). Rather, effort may sometimes be 
registered as a benefit, depending, for instance, on a person’s dispositional motivation to seek 
out effort (Cacioppo et al., 1996) or the perceived rate of progress toward the desired 
outcome (Carver & Scheier, 2004). In fact, the proposed account of exhaustion and recovery 
in Part I provides a novel explanation as to why the sense of effort is sometimes perceived as 
aversive and other times as pleasant: When exerting effort on a task is inherently valuable to 
a person or is expected to lead to valued outcomes, then effort is registered as a benefit in the 
cost-benefit ratio of said task, thus contributing to a pleasant state and shielding the person 
from the aversive state that non-valued effort would otherwise effectuate (i.e., when it is 
registered as a cost in the cost-benefit ratio).  
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Although the present exercise studies did not assess subjective effort directly, there is 
evidence that indirectly supports this proposition: Across these studies, a small subsample of 
participants consistently reported stable or even higher levels of recovery after compared to 
before the physical exercise (Part II, Studies 2-4 and Part III, Study 2). Note that this 
phenomenon persisted even when we introduced the measure of mental recovery as a means 
to differentiate physical exertion from mental activation (Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 
2). One potential yet highly speculative reason for this finding might be that these people 
experienced their exerting effort as inherently valuable, which in turn might have shielded 
them from feeling exhausted, because spending effort was registered as a benefit in their 
respective cost-benefit ratios.  
Interest and Boredom 
Contrary to effort, the present exercise studies included a measure of interest and 
boredom (assessed as two opposite ends on a bipolar dimension), which has emerged as an 
important covariate: People with a steeper increase in interest (steeper decrease in boredom) 
during the recovery period also reported a steeper increase in mental recovery and positive 
mood, a more pronounced acceleration of subjective time perception, and a less steep 
increase in perceived opportunity costs (Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 2). The same 
pattern held for the exhaustion period in Part III, Study 2, with the addition that interest was 
negatively (boredom positively) related to physical exhaustion. In light of these findings, how 
might interest and boredom relate to the proposed account in Part I? 
First, research has shown that interest can lead to greater exertion of effort and greater 
persistence in demanding tasks than mere task pleasantness (Thoman et al., 2011). This 
finding is corroborated by Milyavskaya, Galla, Inzlicht, and Duckworth (2018), who found 
that compared to non-interested people, interested people are more likely to exert greater 
effort on a mentally demanding task, all the while reporting lower feelings of exhaustion. 
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Thus, it seems as though interest is distinguishable from mere enjoyment (see also Silvia, 
2008), and might shield a person from feelings of exhaustion and motivate her to persist 
longer on demanding tasks.  
This proposal is in line with research on autonomous motivation (i.e., interest inherent 
in a task; Deci & Ryan, 2000): People who are intrinsically motivated to engage in a 
demanding self-regulation task show less decrements in task performance, reduced feelings 
of exhaustion, and increased feelings of so-called “vitality” (Ryan & Deci, 2008). 
Furthermore, inherent or autotelic interest in a task itself is also a core assumption of flow 
theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). The experience of 
flow (also known as the “optimal experience”) can arise if one is “engaging challenges at a 
level appropriate to one’s capacities” (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 90), and if the 
desired goal is specific and feedback about one’s progress toward it is immediate. Flow, then, 
is characterized by a focus on the process of goal pursuit (see also Freund & Hennecke, 
2015), the sense that one is in control of the situation, a loss of reflective self-consciousness, 
an accelerated subjective time perception, and the experience of the activity as intrinsically 
rewarding (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014).  
Second, in an experience sampling study, Milyavskaya, Inzlicht, Hope, and Koestner 
(2015) found that when people were currently engaging in want-to goals (i.e., goals that 
reflect a person’s genuine interest and values and are personally important and meaningful), 
they reported fewer and weaker conflicting desires along with a stronger resistance toward 
these desires as compared to when they were currently engaging in have-to goals (i.e., goals 
that are mainly pursued due to external incentives or introjects such as shame; Inzlicht et al., 
2014). Similarly, Sheldon and Elliot (1998) found that people who reported more 
autonomous motivation for their personal goals were more likely to achieve them, because 
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they invested more effort compared to people who reported more “controlled” motivation for 
their goals. 
Taken together, I maintain that the desirable characteristics pertaining to interest and, 
by extension, to the experience of flow, are registered as a benefit in the cost-benefit ratio of 
an activity, and hence lead to positive mood (Thoman et al., 2011), an accelerated subjective 
time perception (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), and an enhanced value of the focal 
activity along with a decreased value of competing goals (Milyavskaya et al., 2015), thus 
keeping opportunity costs at a low level. As a consequence, interest and flow are likely to 
facilitate recovery and shield against exhaustion.  
The flip side of interest is boredom, “the aversive state of wanting, but being unable, to 
engage in a satisfying activity” (Eastwood, Frischen, Fenske, & Smilek, 2012, p. 483). 
Recent research has shown that bored people who work on a very easy task report higher 
subsequent feelings of exhaustion than non-bored people who work on a difficult task 
(Milyavskaya et al., 2019). It seems that boredom arising from understimulation and 
meaninglessness (van Tilburg & Igou, 2012) contributes to the subjective sense of exhaustion 
(but see Westgate & Wilson, 2018, for an overview of the different kinds of boredom). In 
addition to boredom being aversive and exhausting, studies have found that the experience is 
accompanied by an extended subjective time perception (Danckert & Allman, 2005) and 
motivates people to seek out more valuable activities (Westgate & Wilson, 2018). Taken 
together, then, experiencing boredom during an ongoing activity is likely registered as a cost 
in its cost-benefit ratio, contributing to an increase in negative mood, extended subjective 
time perception, and an increase in perceived opportunity costs, thereby facilitating feelings 
of exhaustion (for a conceptual distinction between boredom and exhaustion, see Part I).  
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The Curious Case of Goal Focus and Effort 
When people pursue a goal, they can at any given point in time focus more on the 
process or outcome of goal pursuit. Process focus denotes the degree to which people attend 
to the “how” of pursuing a goal; outcome focus denotes the degree to which people attend to 
the “why” of pursuing a goal (Freund & Hennecke, 2015; Freund et al., 2012; Kaftan & 
Freund, 2018). In short, the process of goal pursuit entails a focus on the more proximal and 
concrete means (e.g., going for a run), takes place in specific contexts (e.g., on the treadmill 
at home or in the forest outside), and guides goal-related actions (e.g., by focusing one’s 
attention on controlled breathing). In comparison, the outcome of goal pursuit entails a focus 
on the more distal and abstract ends (e.g., enhancing one’s physical attractiveness), provides 
a clear standard of comparison between the actual and desired future state (e.g., how does one 
look like now compared to how one wishes to look like), and gives direction and meaning 
(Freund & Hennecke, 2015). Here, I propose two opposing possibilities on how goal focus 
might affect the salience and perceived value of effort during goal pursuit.  
On the one hand, when people focus more on the process of goal pursuit, the effort one 
invests into goal-related activities (e.g., running) should become more salient. At first glance, 
this might result in a decrease in the hedonic valence of the activity, because effort is usually 
experienced as aversive (Kurzban, 2016; but see Inzlicht et al., 2018). However, people often 
make use of the effort heuristic, according to which the more effort they perceive themselves 
investing into the pursuit of a goal, the more valuable they perceive the associated outcome to 
be (Kruger et al., 2004). In turn, the more valuable an outcome, the more persistently people 
strive to attain it (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Thus, one might argue that people who adopt a 
process focus during the pursuit of an activity might ascribe more value to the invested effort 
and perceive the phenomenology of effort as more pleasant, which – ceteris paribus – might 
shield them longer from feelings of exhaustion and enable prolonged activity engagement.  
Overall Discussion 
 
191 
 
Indeed, people with the goal to start exercising regularly reported more positive affect, 
a higher exercise frequency and regularity, and an overall higher goal attainability over a 
period of four months when they were focusing more on the process as compared to the 
outcome of goal pursuit (Freund, Hennecke, & Riediger, 2010). Similarly, in a 6-week 
longitudinal study on weight loss in overweight women, Freund and Hennecke (2012) found 
that focusing more on the process of dieting (e.g., dietary behaviors) was positively and 
focusing more on the outcome of dieting (e.g., weight loss) was negatively related to actual 
weight loss. Finally, in an 8-week longitudinal study on the role of goal focus for adherence 
to a high-intensity interval training, Kaftan and Freund (2019) found that people who focused 
more on the process of exercising were more likely to achieve their self-selected workout 
goals and were overall more satisfied with their workout compared to people who focused 
more on the outcome of exercising.  
On the other hand, adopting an outcome focus is more likely to direct attention toward 
the higher-order goal, hence making it more accessible (Freund & Hennecke, 2015). In turn, 
“an accessible goal evokes a need to assess the usefulness or instrumentality of a particular 
means [activity] in fulfilling that goal” (Labroo & Kim, 2009, p. 133). According to the 
instrumentality heuristic, people perceive the accompanying sense of effort as indicating that 
the activity is instrumental for achieving the desired goal, hence increasing its value and 
hedonic valence (see also the “affective transfer” effect; Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 
2004), and thus shielding the person from feelings of exhaustion. In fact, in their exercise 
adherence study, Kaftan and Freund (2019) found that focusing on the outcome of exercising 
was positively related to the perceived importance and pleasantness of the workout and 
contributed to positive mood, over and above focusing on the process of exercising.  
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Boundary Conditions of the Proposed Account 
The proposed motivational account of exhaustion and recovery is not universally valid 
and comes with a number of non-negligible boundary conditions. For instance, by taking an 
affect-as-information approach (Clore et al., 2001; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Huntsinger et 
al., 2014), we have argued that people use their positive and negative mood as information 
about the goodness or badness of the current activity, and judge their extent of exhaustion and 
recovery based on their momentary affective experience. However, this approach might only 
be valid in situations in which people perceive the ongoing activity as the source of their 
mood. As Huntsinger et al. (2014, p. 602) aptly state, “the information conveyed by affect, 
and its consequences for judgment and cognitive processing, depend on how the experience 
of affect is attributed [emphasis added].” What happens if a person running a marathon 
attributes her mood to another source (e.g., to accessible pleasant or distressing thoughts, the 
temperature, or the weather; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) instead of the ongoing activity? In such 
a situation, it becomes less likely that the person perceives negative changes in her mood as 
an indication that running is starting to feel exhausting (or, conversely, that watching TV is 
no longer contributing to her recovery). As a consequence, the person might persist longer in 
an ongoing activity that has started to net more costs than benefits.  
Another boundary condition pertains to the nature of the subjective stop rule people 
employ to determine when they should disengage from an activity. For instance, in a classic 
study conducted by Martin et al. (1993), participants in either positive or negative moods 
were given a pile of cards containing behavioral statements about a fictitious person and were 
instructed to form an impression of the person based on these statements. Half of the 
participants were told to read the statements until they felt that they had acquired enough 
information for forming their impression (i.e., “enough information” condition), whereas the 
other half were told to continue reading the statements until they no longer enjoyed the task 
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(i.e., “enjoy” condition). Consistent with the idea that positive mood serves as a “go” signal 
and negative mood as a “stop” signal, happy persons in the “enjoy” condition took their 
positive mood as information that they were still enjoying the task, and thus the implication 
was that they should continue reading the statements. In contrast, sad persons took their 
negative mood as information that they were not enjoying the task, and consequently they 
stopped sooner. Importantly, these effects reversed in the “enough information” condition. 
That is, happy persons stopped reading the statements sooner than did sad persons, because 
their positive mood implicated that their stop rule had been fulfilled. This finding implies that 
the influence of mood on cognition and behavior is not fixed but malleable (Huntsinger et al., 
2014); that is, positive and negative mood might act as a “go” and “stop” signal for any 
cognitively accessible mental content in a given situation (e.g., a specific stop rule). Thus, 
contrary to the fixed predictions of the proposed account, persons who rely on a “enough 
recovery/exhaustion” as compared to a “enjoy” stop rule to determine their momentary state 
(i.e., “Have I recovered enough/Am I exhausted yet?” as compared to “Am I still enjoying 
this activity?”) might disengage faster from the ongoing activity if they are in a good mood, 
as opposed to a bad mood, and might therefore underestimate their current extent of recovery 
and exhaustion (Martin, 2001).  
On a related note, in their cybernetic control theory, Carver and Scheier (2004) argue 
that experiencing positive (negative) mood during the pursuit of a goal is an indication that 
the rate of progress toward goal attainment is faster (slower) than expected. In this view, the 
mood experienced during an ongoing activity is indicative of goal progress, rather than of the 
favorableness of the activity’s cost-benefit ratio. As a consequence, according to this theory, 
people in a good mood are more likely to reduce effort (i.e., “coast”) and people in a bad 
mood are more likely to increase effort, in an attempt to minimize the discrepancy between 
the perceived and the expected or desired rate of progress toward the goal. Thus, to the extent 
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that this theory is applicable on the activity level, if a person’s focus of attention lies on the 
rate of progress during a recovery or exhausting activity, they might perceive negative 
changes in their mood as an indication that they need to “catch up” rather than disengage, and 
therefore increase their expended effort in order to achieve the desired goal, hence making 
goal disengagement due to a decline in mood less likely. Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 
(2007) could show that goal proximity is an important moderator of this relationship: When 
the goal is still distal, positive mood leads to higher expenditure of effort and negative mood 
to a reduction of effort. Only when the goal looms close are these relationships reversed and 
start behaving according to the theory of Carver and Scheier (2004).  
Finally, the proposed account mainly operates under the assumption that the recovery 
activity is a unifinal means (i.e., mainly serves to accomplish a single goal – recovery), and 
that people disengage from it once they have sufficiently recovered. However, in the hectic 
pace of daily life we are often faced with the necessity of pursuing more than one goal at a 
time (e.g., Riediger, 2007). Hence, means that are multifinal (i.e., simultaneously serve to 
advance multiple goals; Kruglanski et al., 2002) are generally perceived as more valuable 
compared to unifinal means (Kruglanski et al., 2013). Arguably, most daily recovery 
activities such as watching TV or reading a book are multifinal means in the sense that they 
serve other goals in addition to recovery (e.g., maintaining social relationships, personal 
growth, environmental mastery; Ryff, 1995). As such, to the extent that these additional goals 
are salient while a person recovers (but see the “goal shielding” effect; Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002), once the goal of recovery is reached and consequently deactivated 
(Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005), people might still perceive a strong motivational link 
between the ongoing activity and the additional goals, therefore sustaining the value of the 
activity past the point of recovery, and consequently they keep engaged in it.  
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Methodological Considerations and Future Directions 
The present thesis is not without limitations. First and foremost, it relied on single-item 
self-report measures of the variables of interest, because the nature of the study designs 
necessitated a trade-off between methodological precision and empirical feasibility. 
Nevertheless, single-item measures are by definition less reliable than multi-item measures. 
Furthermore, self-report measures can be affected by various cognitive and affective 
processes, such as social desirability, acquiescent responding, and extreme responding (for a 
comprehensive overview of different response styles, see Paulhus & Vazire, 2007), possibly 
resulting in common method bias. However, despite these concerns, the single-item measures 
used in the present studies showed good within-person reliability (RCns between .81 and .87; 
Cranford et al., 2006), indicating that these items were sensitive in detecting between-person 
differences in within-person change over time. Furthermore, the multilevel models were able 
to capture intraindividual variability in these items remarkably well, as is evident from the 
modest amount of within-person random effects (i.e., error variance), as well as the 
consistently large amount of explained variance in subjective recovery and exhaustion by the 
model-fitted fixed and between-person random effects of interest (e.g., between 74% and 
85% in Parts II and III). In addition, as outlined in the Introduction, the present thesis was 
mainly concerned with taking a phenomenological approach toward exhaustion and recovery. 
Given that persons are “the best-qualified witnesses” (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007, p. 227) of 
their own internal states (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), the use of self-report measures for 
these study designs is warranted.  
To complement this self-report approach, future laboratory research should consider an 
additional behavioral measure of goal disengagement, such as having participants directly 
indicate when they feel sufficiently exhausted or recovered and want to do something else. 
For instance, Hofmann et al. (2019, Study 5) developed a promising opt-out paradigm that 
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gives participants the opportunity to abandon a focal task at different exit points in favor of 
another task. Such an approach would enable a more direct test of the effect of an opportunity 
cost manipulation on goal disengagement, as it arguably provides a more precise insight into 
the exact point in time when a person begins to perceive more net costs than benefits of an 
ongoing activity. In addition, this would also allow for a more comprehensive test of the 
reversible relationships between mood, perceived opportunity costs, subjective time 
perception and recovery and exhaustion proposed in Part I.   
Second, the present studies assessed the central constructs of interest – state exhaustion 
and recovery – on a bipolar continuum. One problem with this approach is the difficulty of 
interpreting the scale midpoint and the extremes: Do values around the midpoint indicate that 
persons are neither exhausted nor recovered? Do values close to one extremum (e.g., 
recovery) indicate an absence of the state that is tied to the other extremum (e.g., 
exhaustion)? Consequently, these measures do not allow for the possibility of joint 
occurrences of recovery and exhaustion (in a single functional domain) in situ. However, the 
fact that the separate trait measures of exhaustion and recovery developed in Part V 
consistently showed medium-to-large to large interrelations in our studies (rs between -.44 
and -.73) is an indication that their state measure counterparts are characterized by similarly 
high levels of interdependence. Furthermore, in the exhaustion and recovery literature, there 
is general agreement that it is not the within-domain (e.g. physical exhaustion and recovery), 
but rather the cross-domain (e.g., physical and mental exhaustion and recovery) relationship 
between exhaustion and recovery that might be qualitatively distinct (Inzlicht & Marcora, 
2016) – a notion that we controlled for by measuring physical and mental exhaustion and 
recovery separately in Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 2.  
Third, the intensive micro-longitudinal self-report design employed in the exercise 
studies raises issues related to reactance (Brehm, 1966) and reactivity (French & Sutton, 
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2010). That is, it might have become frustrating for people to answer the same questions 
pertaining to their momentary experiences every two minutes, and the mere process of 
answering these questions might have had a non-negligible impact on their subsequent 
experience and behavior. However, post-hoc control checks revealed that the repeated 
measures were generally perceived as not too distracting for the recovery process (Ms 
between 2.08 and 2.65, SDs between 1.33 and 1.56 on a scale ranging from 0 [not at all 
distracting] to 5 [very distracting] in Part II, Studies 2-4), indicating that the chosen timing 
interval was adequate. Furthermore, these repeated measures might have progressively 
directed people’s attention away from the recovery activity toward their bodily sensations 
(i.e., interoception; Craig, 2002) and made these internal processes more artificially salient 
than they would be naturally perceived in a similar situation in everyday life, thereby limiting 
the studies’ external validity. In fact, goal progress monitoring – while generally beneficial 
for attaining one’s goals (Harkin et al., 2016) – might hinder the attainment of a goal that is 
an internal state3 (Shapira, Gundar-Goshen, Liberman, & Dar, 2013; see also the “affect 
labeling” effect; Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011). On a related note, an 
increased interoceptive focus might be a further explanation as to why subjective time 
perception gradually extended during the recovery period (Pollatos, Laubrock, & Wittmann, 
2014).  
To address these issues, it might seem like a straightforward solution for future 
laboratory work to incorporate non-invasive and continuous physiological measures in 
addition to the repeated self-reports and potential behavioral measures. However, as outlined 
in the Introduction, it is unclear in most cases how to interpret this large swath of 
physiological data and, more specifically, how it relates to the accompanying subjective 
experience (Marcora, 2009). Thus, absent more in-depth theoretical and empirical work, as of 
 
3 I thank Dr. Oliver Kaftan for bringing this particular matter to my attention.  
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yet it is not possible to provide a satisfactory and conclusive solution to this methodological 
problem in the context of exhaustion and recovery (and for emotion research more broadly; 
Barrett et al., 2007). In spite of this, there have been some promising recent advances, one of 
which merits particular mention in this regard: Wrzus et al. (2014) developed a novel 
assessment of physiological recovery as the time until a person’s heart rate reaches her 
individual confidence interval of the baseline heart rate. Importantly, the authors 
convincingly demonstrated that this measure converged substantially with affective self-
reports across different age groups and over time.  
Finally, future research should strongly consider assessing exhaustion and recovery in 
everyday life using experience sampling methodology (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; 
Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013). Doing so allows for the necessary disentanglement of the 
influence of contextual variables (e.g., time of day, life domain, social dynamics, location) 
and activity characteristics (e.g., expectancy, value, demand, valence) on subjective 
experiences in situ (e.g., exhaustion, recovery, mood, opportunity costs). For instance, future 
work could more closely examine differences in the experiential aspects of goal pursuit in the 
context of work and leisure. In a classic experience sampling study, Csikszentmihalyi and 
LeFevre (1989) encountered the seemingly paradoxical situation that although people 
generally reported more positive affect and found themselves in a state of flow more often 
when at work as compared to when at leisure, they also wished to be doing something else 
more often when at work than when at leisure. It might be interesting in this regard to 
examine divergences in the specific content of these opportunity costs in the work and leisure 
domain. For instance, one could differentiate between opportunity costs that refer to want-to 
and ought-to alternative goals (Riediger & Freund, 2008; see also Inzlicht et al., 2014) and 
examine their differential effect on exhaustion and recovery.  
Overall Discussion 
 
199 
 
Furthermore, taking an experience sampling approach enables the investigation of the 
effect of day-level variables (e.g., sleep quality, day of the week) on these subjective 
experiences. For instance, in their daily diary study, Sonnentag et al. (2008) found that people 
felt more exhausted in the morning when they reported a poorer-than-usual sleep quality the 
night before. It would be interesting to examine how sleep quality affects the dynamics of 
exhaustion and recovery over a whole day, and whether these negatively affected persons can 
benefit from specific self-regulation or mood enhancement strategies to “propel” them back 
toward a more manageable level of exhaustion and recovery (Balkin & Wesensten, 2011).  
Practical Implications 
In the words of the late Robert Thayer (1997, p. 22): “If it [energy] could be bottled, 
packaged, or taught, someone could make a lot of money.” The present thesis does not 
provide a convenient tell-all answer on how to “bottle up” or “package” energy. It does, 
however, teach us about the important role of mood and – to a lesser degree – of perceived 
opportunity costs in shaping the phenomenology of exhaustion and recovery. Building on 
these focal empirical insights, here I focus on the (1) subjective experiences people can seek 
out in situations where they wish to engage in recovery, and (2) self-regulatory strategies 
people can employ in situations where they have to persist on aversive tasks despite feeling 
exhausted and the urge to stop.  
First, how to efficiently enhance one’s mood and recover? Is it a viable strategy to 
engage in random leisure activities (e.g., watching TV) and wait for recovery to happen? 
Research strongly suggests that it is less the amount of time spent in pleasurable activities but 
rather the diversity of experiences one encounters along the way that enable recovery 
(Kuykendall et al., 2015) – a fact that is also reflected in the present work in form of the 
substantial between-person variability in the subjective recovery time courses (Part II, Studies 
2-4, Part III, Study 2). Accordingly, what works for one person might not work for another 
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(or might not work for the same person at another time or in a different context). Indeed, 
contrary to the well-researched strategies people can employ to regulate their shorter-term 
emotions (for a meta-analysis, see Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012), less is known about the 
ways people can regulate their longer-lasting moods. Nevertheless, there have been some 
promising attempts at systematizing such mood regulation strategies across persons, time, 
and contexts. For instance, building on previous work in this area (e.g., Larsen, 2000; 
Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer et al., 1994), Sonnentag and Fritz (2007) theoretically 
derived and empirically validated the beneficial effect of psychological detachment, 
relaxation, mastery, and control for recovery. Termed “recovery experiences,” these factors 
have been consistently shown to aid in one’s mood regulation following stressful work 
demands (for a recent overview, see Sonnentag et al., 2017). In light of the inherent difficulty 
involved in classifying specific everyday life activities as either facilitating or inhibiting 
recovery due to the large amount of between-person variability (Knecht & Freund, 2015), the 
work of Sonnentag and Fritz (2007) provides an elegant solution to this problem by 
elucidating the relevant subjective experiences an activity should foster in order for a person 
to recover.  
Note that in our own work, we found mixed results concerning the effectiveness of 
these recovery experiences: Only relaxation and control, but not psychological detachment 
and mastery, were non-negligible predictors of daily recovery (Part IV). Furthermore, we 
found that positive mood substantially contributed to recovery over and above these 
experiences. Thus, these factors are most certainly not the “be-all and end-all” recovery 
enablers. There are likely more experiences that can help shape a person’s mood and 
recovery, such as interest (Part II, Study 4 and Part III, Study 2) or a sense of meaning and 
affiliation (Newman et al., 2014). 
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Second, how to persist on an aversive task that has seemingly become too exhausting to 
continue, as indicated by an increase in negative mood and in motivational conflict (e.g., 
perceiving opportunity costs in the form of pervasive thoughts about attractive alternatives 
that vie for one’s attention)? The straightforward answer is to simply disengage from the task 
and to seek out these more pleasant endeavors instead. In many instances, however, it is 
neither easily possible nor particularly prudent to do so. Consider, for instance, being stuck in 
an arduous meeting that cannot be postponed and necessitates generating concrete solutions 
to a tough problem. The default behavior in such a situation might consist of seeking out 
respite in the form of “mental leisure” at regular intervals (Inzlicht et al., 2014). However, 
mentally distracting oneself from an ongoing aversive activity (e.g., through mind wandering; 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) is an ill-suited strategy to regulate one’s persistence on it 
(Hennecke, Czikmantori, & Brandstätter, 2019). Self-regulatory strategies that seemingly 
work well for promoting one’s persistence on such tasks, according to Hennecke et al. 
(2019), consist of focusing on the positive consequences of the activity (cf. Fishbach & Choi, 
2012; Freund & Hennecke, 2012), goal progress monitoring (for a meta-analysis, see Harkin 
et al., 2016), thinking of the near finish, and emotion regulation (see also Tamir, 2016). One 
explanation for the effectiveness of these strategies might be that they enhance the salience of 
discrepancy reductions between the actual and desired state over time (Carver & Scheier, 
2004). 
Importantly, Hennecke et al. (2019) provide an even more fine-grained analysis as to 
the kinds of self-regulatory strategies that are particularly beneficial for persistence based on 
the prevailing subjective cost of the exhausting activity. For instance, if a person perceives 
the aversive activity as mainly mentally effortful, two particularly viable strategies consist of 
goal setting and monitoring. Importantly, according to goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 
2002, 2006, 2019), goals have to be specific and reasonably difficult to attain (and should 
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not, for instance, be formulated as mere “do-your-best goals”) in order to promote 
persistence. Thus, in situations where people have to persist on aversive tasks that feel 
mentally effortful, they could set goals such as “I am going to continue working on this 
manuscript until I have finished the present chapter and have proof-read it at least once” and 
remind themselves to regularly monitor their progress toward this goal. In contrast, if 
boredom is mainly contributing to exhaustion, the strategy of task enrichment (i.e., adding a 
pleasant component to the activity) seems particularly appropriate. For instance, when one 
inevitably gets bored of reading a poorly written manuscript but has to nonetheless see it 
through, one could add a pleasant layer to this activity by listening to one’s favorite music 
playlist.  
Conclusion: A Tale of Shifting Utilities 
We all know it: Feeling “spent” after demanding exercise, “worn out” after a long day 
at work, or “drained” after an intense emotional argument. The present thesis suggests that 
these shorter-term feelings of exhaustion are not the result of the depletion of some metabolic 
energy resource; rather, these aversive states help us to juggle the demands of daily life by 
alerting us of the waning utility of our current strivings: When an activity tires us out, we are 
hereby given a strong motivational cue that we are better off allocating our precious 
commodities to other, more promising avenues and not to needlessly waste them in futile 
endeavors. A key player in this tale of shifting utilities, the present thesis finds, is our mood – 
the way we feel about the current environment. Do we feel good about it? The implication is 
that the environment is safe and benign, and it therefore helps us to recover. Do we feel bad 
about it? Something about the environment must be off and this could hurt us or hinder us 
from pursuing our personal goals; hence, we feel exhausted and should make an effort to 
change course.   
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table A1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables Before and After the High-
Intensity-Interval Training, along with the 95% CIs of the Mean Difference and Effect Sizes  
(Part II, Study 2). 
 
 Before  After   
Variable M SD  M SD 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Recovery 1.07 2.03  -1.51 2.19 [2.11, 3.04] 0.82 
Mood 2.10 1.74  2.05 1.88 [-0.31, 0.40] 0.02 
Time Perception 0.71 1.89  0.37 2.24 [-0.09, 0.76] 0.11 
Opportunity Costs -2.04 2.12  -1.47 2.50 [-1.01, -0.12] -0.18 
Valence 1.55 1.73  0.82 2.09 [0.32, 1.14] 0.26 
Note. N = 134.  
 
 
Table A2 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables Before and After Stair Running, 
along with the 95% CIs of the Mean Difference and Effect Sizes (Part II, Study 3). 
 
 Before  After   
Variable M SD  M SD 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Recovery 1.25 2.33  -2.33 2.27 [3.07, 4.10] 0.73 
Mood 2.55 1.66  1.88 2.14 [0.26, 1.07] 0.24 
Time Perception 1.00 2.19  0.83 2.36 [-0.35, 0.67] 0.05 
Opportunity Costs -2.38 2.20  -1.60 2.85 [-1.28, -0.27] -0.20 
Note. N = 129.  
 
 
Table A3 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables Before and After Stair Running, 
along with the 95% CIs of the Mean Difference and Effect Sizes (Part II, Study 4). 
 
 Before  After   
Variable M SD  M SD 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Physical Recovery 0.96 1.94  -1.49 2.12 [2.01, 2.89] 0.89 
Mood 2.00 1.73  2.07 1.78 [-0.40, 0.25] -0.03 
Time Perception 0.76 2.15  1.18 2.23 [-0.86, 0.02] -0.14 
Opportunity Costs -2.30 2.19  -1.82 2.58 [-0.89, -0.06] -0.14 
Mental Recovery 1.36 2.20  1.79 1.82 [-0.81, -0.05] -0.14 
Interest 0.61 2.04  1.33 1.93 [-1.04, -0.40] -0.27 
Note. N = 150.  
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Table A4 
 
Bayesian Multivariate Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates of the Random Slopes 
Correlations (Part II, Study 3). 
 
Random Slope 1 2 3 
1. Recovery –   
2. Mood .50 [.31, .67] –  
3. Time Perception .11 [-.14, .34] .49 [.25, .69] – 
4. Opportunity Costs -.14 [-.36, .09] -.38 [-.59, -.15] -.44 [-.64, -.20] 
Note. N = 129. Reported are the means of the posterior distributions (95% credible intervals 
in brackets). Correlations in bold are substantial (their 95% CIs do not include 0).  
 
 
Table A5 
 
Bayesian Multivariate Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates of the Random Slopes 
Correlations (Part II, Study 4). 
 
Random Slope 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Physical Recovery –     
2. Mood 
.32  
[.10, .52] 
–   
 
3. Time Perception 
-.06  
[-.30, .17] 
.33  
[.06, .56] 
–  
 
4. Opportunity Costs 
.06  
[-.17, .28] 
-.09  
[-.34, .16] 
-.50  
[-.69, -.27] 
– 
 
5. Mental Recovery 
.25  
[.03, .46] 
.48  
[.24, .67] 
.11  
[-.16, .37] 
-.29  
[-.51, -.05] 
– 
6. Interest 
.04  
[-.18, .27] 
.27  
[.02, .49] 
.59  
[.36, .78] 
-.69  
[-.83, -.51] 
.30  
[.06, .53] 
Note. N = 150. Reported are the means of the posterior distributions (95% credible intervals 
in brackets). Correlations in bold are substantial (their 95% CIs do not include 0).  
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Table A6 
 
Multilevel Growth Curve Models for all Variables During the Exhaustion Period as a Function of Time, Age, and Their Interaction (Part III, Study 2). 
Note. N = 147, 11 measurement occasions, 1,616 observations. Time is coded 0 to 10. Age is mean-centered. The fixed effects are reported as unstandardized regression 
coefficients (their 95% CIs in brackets). The fixed effects in bold are significant (their 95% CIs do not include 0). The random effects are reported as standard deviations and 
correlations. Marginal R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed and 
random effects combined (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014). 
aDue to model convergence issues, we had to omit this random effect parameter. 
 Dependent Variable 
Fixed Effects Physical Recovery Mental Recovery Opportunity Costs Mood Time Perception Interest 
Intercept 1.79  
[1.52, 2.06] 
1.98  
[1.69, 2.27] 
-2.04  
[-2.42, -1.65] 
2.96 
[2.71, 3.20] 
1.56 
[1.25, 1.86] 
1.51 
[1.19, 1.82] 
Time -0.99  
[-1.15, -0.84] 
0.17  
[0.09, 0.26] 
-0.45  
[-0.65, -0.25] 
-0.13 
[-0.17, -0.09] 
0.58 
[0.39, 0.76] 
0.61 
[0.44, 0.77] 
Time2 0.12  
[0.09, 0.15] 
-0.02  
[-0.03, -0.02] 
0.13  
[0.09, 0.17] 
– -0.17 
[-0.20, -0.13] 
-0.18 
[-0.21, -0.14] 
Time3 -0.01  
[-0.01, -0.00] 
– -0.01  
[-0.01, -0.00] 
– 0.01 
[0.01, 0.01] 
0.01 
[0.01, 0.01] 
Age 0.01  
[-0.00, 0.02] 
0.02  
[0.01, 0.04] 
-0.01  
[-0.03, 0.01] 
0.00 
[-0.01, 0.02] 
0.02 
[0.00, 0.03] 
0.02 
[0.00, 0.03] 
Age x Time -0.02  
[-0.03, -0.01] 
-0.01  
[-0.01, -0.03] 
0.03  
[0.02, 0.04] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.02, -0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.02, -0.00] 
Age x Time2 0.00  
[0.00, 0.00] 
0.00  
[0.00, 0.00] 
-0.01  
[-0.01, -0.00] 
– 0.00 
[0.00, 0.00] 
0.00 
[0.00, 0.00] 
Age x Time3 -0.00  
[-0.00, -0.00] 
– 0.00  
[0.00, 0.00] 
– -0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, -0.00] 
Random effects       
Between-person       
   Intercept 1.40 1.70 1.98 1.27 1.40 1.65 
   Time 0.60 0.41 0.63 0.20 0.58 0.49 
   Time2 0.05 0.03 0.05 – 0.05 0.03 
   Time3 0.00 – –a – –a 0.00 
Within-person       
   Residual 0.92 0.87 1.33 1.00 1.25 1.06 
   AR(1) .26 .21 .52 .49 .59 .47 
Marginal R2 .23 .03 .11 .04 .10 .11 
Conditional R2 .85 .79 .79 .75 .71 .80 
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Table A7 
 
Multilevel Growth Curve Models for all Variables During the Recovery Period as a Function of Time, Age, and Their Interaction (Part III, Study 2). 
Note. N = 147, 10 measurement occasions, 1,470 observations. Time is coded 0 to 9. Age is mean-centered. The fixed effects are reported as unstandardized regression 
coefficients (their 95% CIs in brackets). The fixed effects in bold are significant (their 95% CIs do not include 0). The random effects are reported as standard deviations and 
correlations. Marginal R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed and 
random effects combined (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014). 
aDue to model convergence issues, we had to omit this random effect parameter.   
 Dependent Variable 
Fixed Effects Physical Recovery Mental Recovery Opportunity Costs Mood Time Perception Interest 
Intercept -1.80 
[-2.15, -1.44] 
1.55 
[1.19, 1.91] 
0.00 
[-0.45, 0.46] 
1.65 
[1.29, 2.00] 
0.28 
[-0.08, 0.63] 
0.13 
[-0.24, 0.49] 
Time 2.15  
[1.96, 2.34] 
0.69 
[0.49, 0.89] 
-2.10 
[-2.41, -1.78] 
0.87 
[0.70, 1.04] 
0.45 
[0.22, 0.67] 
1.35 
[1.12, 1.57] 
Time2 -0.36 
[-0.41, -0.32] 
-0.12 
[-0.16, -0.07] 
0.47 
[0.40, 0.54] 
-0.19  
[-0.22, -0.15] 
-0.10 
[-0.16, -0.05] 
-0.31 
[-0.37, -0.26] 
Time3 0.02 
[0.02, 0.02] 
0.00 
[0.00, 0.01] 
-0.03 
[-0.03, -0.02] 
0.01 
[0.00, 0.01] 
0.01 
[0.00, 0.01] 
0.02 
[0.02, 0.02] 
Age -0.00 
[-0.02, 0.01] 
0.00 
[-0.01, 0.03] 
-0.00 
[-0.02, 0.02] 
0.00 
[-0.01, 0.02] 
0.02 
[0.00, 0.04] 
0.01 
[-0.01, 0.03] 
Age x Time 0.00 
[-0.01, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.02, 0.00] 
0.01 
[-0.01, 0.02] 
-0.01 
[-0.02, -0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.02, 0.00] 
-0.02 
[-0.03, -0.01] 
Age x Time2 0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.01, 0.00] 
0.00 
[0.00, 0.00] 
0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
0.00 
[0.00, 0.01] 
Age x Time3 -0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, 0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00, -0.00] 
Random effects       
Between-person       
   Intercept 1.96 1.92 2.08 2.05 1.64 1.84 
   Time 0.71 0.52 1.04 0.77 0.46 0.76 
   Time2 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.07 
   Time3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –a 
Within-person       
   Residual 1.02 1.17 1.88 0.79 1.47 1.33 
   AR(1) .41 .15 .56 .33 .50 .52 
Marginal R2 .29 .05 .08 .04 .02 .04 
Conditional R2 .85 .71 .62 .86 .69 .75 
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Table A8 
 
Bayesian Multivariate Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates of the Random Slopes 
Correlations During the Exhaustion Period (Part III, Study 2). 
 
Random Slope 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Physical Recovery –     
2. Mood 
.35  
[.15, .52] 
–   
 
3. Time Perception 
.28 
[.06, .48] 
.49  
[.32, .65] 
–  
 
4. Opportunity Costs 
-.43  
[-.61, -.23] 
-.47  
[-.63, -.30] 
-.48  
[-.64, -.30] 
– 
 
5. Mental Recovery 
.44  
[.25, .61] 
.62  
[.47, .74] 
.26  
[.05, .44] 
-.40  
[-.56, -.22] 
– 
6. Interest 
.28  
[.07, .47] 
.55  
[.38, .69] 
.57  
[.39, .71] 
-.54  
[-.68, -.37] 
.37  
[.18, .53] 
Note. N = 147. Reported are the means of the posterior distributions (95% credible intervals 
in brackets). Correlations in bold are substantial (their 95% CIs do not include 0).  
 
 
Table A9 
 
Bayesian Multivariate Multilevel Growth Curve Model Estimates of the Random Slopes 
Correlations During the Recovery Period (Part III, Study 2). 
 
Random Slope 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Physical Recovery –     
2. Mood 
.36  
[.17, .54] 
–   
 
3. Time Perception 
.20  
[-.01, .40] 
.38  
[.17, .57] 
–  
 
4. Opportunity Costs 
-.01  
[-.23, .21] 
-.26  
[-.47, -.03] 
-.48  
[-.67, -.27] 
– 
 
5. Mental Recovery 
.48  
[.28, .65] 
.72  
[.55, .86] 
.35  
[.12, .57] 
-.24  
[-.46, .02] 
– 
6. Interest 
.01  
[-.20, .22] 
.41  
[.20, .59] 
.47  
[.28, .64] 
-.75  
[-.88, -.59] 
.36  
[.12, .57] 
Note. N = 147. Reported are the means of the posterior distributions (95% credible intervals 
in brackets). Correlations in bold are substantial (their 95% CIs do not include 0).  
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Table A10 
 
Bayesian Multilevel Model Estimates for Daily Recovery and Optimal Recovery Proximity as a Function of Daily Mood, Opportunity Costs, Time Perception, Psychological 
Detachment, Relaxation, Mastery, and Control (Part IV). 
 
 Daily Recovery  Daily Optimal Recovery Proximity 
 Baseline Model  Covariates Model  Baseline Model  Covariates Model 
   95% CI    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
Fixed effects Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper 
Intercept -0.48 0.15 -0.77 -0.19  -2.59 0.40 -3.37 -1.80  -0.05 0.21 -0.45 0.37  -1.93 0.49 -2.91 -0.98 
Time 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07  0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07  0.09 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.09 0.01 0.07 0.12 
Mood                    
     Within 0.35 0.03 0.28 0.41  0.24 0.04 0.17 0.31  0.19 0.03 0.14 0.24  0.16 0.03 0.11 0.21 
     Between 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.41  0.23 0.08 0.07 0.38  0.10 0.12 -0.12 0.33  0.08 0.11 -0.13 0.29 
Opportunity Costs                    
     Within -0.21 0.03 -0.26 -0.16  -0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.03  -0.12 0.02 -0.15 -0.08  -0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 
     Between -0.15 0.07 -0.28 -0.02  0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.20  -0.21 0.08 -0.37 -0.06  0.03 0.09 -0.14 0.21 
Time Perception                    
     Within 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.13  0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07  0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.06 
     Between 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.35  0.14 0.07 -0.00 0.27  0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.33  0.03 0.08 -0.14 0.20 
Detachment                    
     Within - - - -  0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.09  - - - -  0.07 0.03 0.01 0.13 
     Between - - - -  0.17 0.12 -0.05 0.41  - - - -  0.22 0.14 -0.05 0.49 
Relaxation                    
     Within - - - -  0.61 0.06 0.49 0.74  - - - -  0.16 0.04 0.08 0.23 
     Between - - - -  0.27 0.13 0.00 0.53  - - - -  -0.49 0.18 -0.84 -0.14 
Mastery                    
     Within - - - -  0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.15  - - - -  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14 
     Between - - - -  -0.07 0.09 -0.25 0.11  - - - -  0.05 0.10 -0.16 0.26 
Control                    
     Within - - - -  0.12 0.06 0.01 0.24  - - - -  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.17 
     Between - - - -  0.43 0.12 0.20 0.65  - - - -  0.89 0.15 0.60 1.19 
Recovery                    
     Within - - - -  - - - -  0.35 0.02 0.30 0.39  0.30 0.02 0.25 0.34 
     Between - - - -  - - - -  0.31 0.10 0.11 0.49  0.55 0.10 0.36 0.75 
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Table A10 (continued) 
 
 Daily Recovery  Daily Optimal Recovery Proximity 
 Baseline Model  Covariates Model  Baseline Model  Covariates Model 
   95% CI    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
Random effects Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper  Est. SE Lower Upper 
Between-person                    
     Intercept 0.85 0.08 0.70 1.00  0.77 0.07 0.64 0.92  1.21 0.09 1.04 1.40  1.07 0.08 0.93 1.23 
     Time 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.10 0.01 0.07 0.12  0.16 0.01 0.13 0.18  0.15 0.01 0.12 0.17 
     Mood 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.26  0.19 0.05 0.09 0.28  0.18 0.03 0.13 0.24  0.17 0.03 0.12 0.22 
     Opp. Costs 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.22  0.07 0.04 0.00 0.15  0.11 0.02 0.06 0.16  0.06 0.03 0.00 0.11 
     Time Perception 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.29  0.17 0.03 0.10 0.23  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.13  0.10 0.02 0.05 0.14 
     Detachment - - - -  0.24 0.05 0.13 0.34  - - - -  0.18 0.04 0.11 0.25 
     Relaxation - - - -  0.43 0.06 0.32 0.55  - - - -  0.22 0.04 0.13 0.30 
     Mastery - - - -  0.19 0.07 0.03 0.32  - - - -  0.15 0.05 0.05 0.24 
     Control - - - -  0.28 0.07 0.14 0.43  - - - -  0.18 0.06 0.05 0.30 
     Recovery - - - -  - - - -  0.18 0.02 0.14 0.23  0.17 0.02 0.13 0.22 
Within-person                    
     Residual 1.96 0.03 1.90 2.03  1.75 0.03 1.69 1.82  1.22 0.02 1.18 1.27  1.13 0.02 1.09 1.18 
     AR(1) 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.14  0.09 0.03 0.03 0.15  0.12 0.03 0.06 0.18  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14 
LOO–IC 10168 77.20    9236 80.00    8190 105.10    7561 96.30   
Marginal R2 .28  .40  .42  .51 
Conditional R2 .43  .57  .77  .80 
Note. N = 147 persons, 21 days, 2,332-2,342 observations. Est = Estimate. Depicted are the unstandardized regression coefficients for the fixed effects and the standard 
deviations and correlations for the random effects. LOO–IC = Approximate leave-one-out cross-validation information criterion based on the posterior likelihood (smaller 
values indicate better model fit). Marginal R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R2 depicts the proportion of variance explained by 
the fixed and random effects combined. Time is mean-centered (0 represents day 10 after the final exam). The default priors of the brms R-package (Bürkner, 2017) were 
used.  
Appendix 
 
258 
 
Appendix B: General Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
State Version of the Exhaustion and Recovery Scale 
 
Instruction. Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and indicate 
the extent to which these statements apply to you right now, in this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. We are interested in how you personally feel right now. Please 
answer as honestly as you can.  
 
Recovery Subscale 
 
Right now… 
1. …I feel energized. 
2. …I feel refreshed. 
3. …I feel that I’m doing things better than usual. 
4. …I could tolerate the pressure very well. 
5. …I could stay active for a long time.  
 
Exhaustion Subscale 
 
Right now… 
1. …I feel burned out.  
2. …I feel like I’m at the end of my rope.  
3. …I feel weak.  
4. …I find everything getting on top of me.  
5. …I’m in a bad mood.  
6. …I feel sickened by everything.  
7. …I’m indifferent toward everything.  
8. …I feel like doing nothing.  
 
Scoring. Item responses are measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The item 
presentation order is randomized.  
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